# Militarization

### Notes

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# 1NC core

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#### NATO’s rhetoric of a dangerous Russia creates a security feedback loop of military modernization and unintended consequences leading to conflict

Julie Wilhelmsen, 9-30-2020, "Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/3/ogaa044/5916402//CDMoney

For example, a securitization of NATO as different and dangerous to Russia creates both inner cohesion in the Russian polity and makes possible a policy of “military modernization” and a posture of “defensive deterrence,” but it can have unintended consequences. It can be taken as a rejection of NATO's self-constituted identity as a legitimate, reliable, security-seeking actor and elicit a string of representations of Russia as different and dangerous on the NATO side.8 Failure to be recognized by the other on one's own preferred terms might not necessarily result in feelings of inferiority and shame, triggering efforts to reconstruct one's own identity, as Bially Mattern has suggested (2004, 12–13) or “progressive change” of self to become like the other, as Ringmar (2014) holds. As Lupovici (2012, 818) notes a collective actor that experiences ontological threat can “redefine the situation in order to protect identity.” “Avoidance,” he says, building on Giddens (1991, 188) “allows an actor facing an ontological dissonance to revalidate its identity rather than to change it or to change its behaviour.” Lupovici explores the strategy of avoidance in situations where dissonance is created endogenously, between conflicting self-identifications and the responses undertaken to offset threats to these self-identifications within one political entity. Avoidance may play out differently when the ontological dissonance emerges exogenously in a dyad of political entities. To reduce the dissonance between the understanding of self and the explicit identification of one's own political entity by the other as being something different and dangerous, revalidation of own identity can be achieved through externalization, by simply returning the negative identification. This strategy is manifest as a clear pattern in the texts by Norwegian/Western and Russian leaders studied below. It is hardly surprising that a collective actor would respond to the non-recognition implicit in being securitized with externalization in the form of talking and hitting back instead of undertaking some form of internal revision. Responding by mirroring the securitization of your group by the other party can be rewarding in terms of delineating and maintaining self-identity, particularly in a time of crisis. To restate and return to the case in focus: the non-recognition implicit in Russia's securitization of NATO can elicit highly antagonistic representations of Russia from the NATO side, triggering another round of representations and accusations from the Russian side, and so on. Such a negative spiral of mutual representations and accusations can be driven further when the different non-military issue-areas in which collective political entities engage also become subject to securitization. While relations between such entities usually take place on different international arenas addressing different issue-areas and exhibit a mixed pattern of friendly and hostile interaction (Jervis 2001, 37; Bially Mattern 2004), they may become subject to patterned all-encompassing friendly or hostile interaction. The latter, I propose, can happen when security concerns take center-stage in relations, through a spillover from mutual securitization in the military sphere into other arenas of potentially neutral or friendly interaction, such as trade, culture, or even diplomacy.

#### The 1AC’s language perpetuates and normalizes militarism as a cultural system

Gusterson and Besteman 19 (Hugh, Professor in the Department of Anthropology and Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University, Catherine, Professor in the Department of Anthropology of Colby College, “Cultures of Militarism: An Introduction to Supplement 19”, February 2019, “Current Anthropology Volume 60, Supplement 19”) // Ilake LT🐣

In contrast, anthropologists’ interest in militarism has taken shape in the context of post–cold war transformations in the management of violence. These years have seen the violent reorganization of some cold war client states; the proliferation of militia-led insurgencies; the interpenetration of organized crime and drug trafficking with insurgency and counter in-surgency in parts of the global south; the articulation of coun-ter insurgency abroad with domestic policing at home in many Western countries; the reformulation of the United Nations into an institution of militarized peacekeeping and occupation; the increasing use of military labor to perform civil, humanitarian, policing, and development activities; and a growing awareness of the ways in which militarism as a set of cultural practices and ideologies pervades all domains of social life. The anthropologists in this volume see militarism as a cultural system; it is shaped through ideology and rhetoric, effected through bodies and technologies, made visible and invisible through campaigns of imagery and knowledge production, and it colonizes aspects of social life including reproduction, self-image, and notions of community. We interrogate militarism in its established and emergent forms, probing its genealogies, its facility at colonizing daily life, and its ability to present itself as a response to insecurities it has itself provoked.4This collection of papers draws on the rich discussions at the symposium from which this volume emerged to capture some of the distinctive features of cultures of militarism. The papers emphasize militarization as a contingent process over militarism as a measurable object;5decenter the state as the core locus of such processes; probe the relationship between militarism, experience, and identity, with a special focus on the body; examine connections between militarism and social injustice; and evince a commitment to critique and under-mine militarism while, at the same time, respecting the force of its appeal. The New Anthropology of Militarism: Four Features Threat Constructions These papers understand militarism as a process rather than as a bounded, measurable thing enmeshed in deterministic relationships with other reified variables. Militarism as an in-flective force or bundle of processes acts upon society in pow-erful and expansive but uneven and contingent ways. Although militarism carves its way deep into social structures, it is also shaped and reshaped in the dialectical interaction between in-grained structures on the one hand and human agency and contingency on the other. It is capillary, shape-shifting, always in motion as it constructs threats, enrolls constituencies, colonizes cultural life, and generates new loci of resistance. As Michel Foucault (2007:44) writes, security apparatuses “have the con-stant tendency to expand; they are centrifugal. New elements are constantly being integrated....Security therefore involves or-ganizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits.” And there is no domain of social life it does not touch. Just as contemporary wars seem to have no clearly demarcated end, so militarism has no discernible edge; it increasingly seeps into every corner of the world, every aspect of social life, in someway. Military/intelligence logics and personnel are now being directed to manage arenas of life formerly understood as outside the purview of the military, like development projects in Africa, humanitarian aid, and responses to environmental catastrophes, black markets, and the hacking of political parties’ computers. In the words of Catherine Lutz, one of the foremost anthropological theorists and observers of militarism, the process of militariza-tion“ has reshaped almost every element of global social life over the 20th century.” It involves an intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including the shaping of other institu-tions in synchrony with military goals. Militarization is simul-taneously a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them. Militarization is intimately connected not only to the obvious increase in the size of armies and resurgence of mil-itant nationalisms and militant fundamentalisms but also to the less visible deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legiti-mate military action. (Lutz 2002:723)As Lutz’s comment indicates, the material base of militarism is connected with ideologies and discourses through which proliferating militarized infrastructures and rationalities are normalized, naturalized, and legitimized. Such ideologies and discourses valorize the ethos of the warrior (Gibson 1994; Orr2004; Webb 2018) and construct threats in such a way as to validate military spending, military interventions, and the mil-itarization of formerly nonmilitary arenas of life. To say that threats are “constructed” does not mean that they are imaginary or unreal. But threats can be figured through different narratives and addressed in different ways, and the choice of narrative figuration may have enormous material consequences. The So-viet missiles deployed to Cuba in 1962 were quite real and, if used, would have inflicted crushing damage on the United States. But the United States could have chosen to regard them as a reasonable counterweight to its own Jupiter nuclear-tipped mis-siles in Turkey, on the Soviet Union’s doorstep, rather than pro-voking a global crisis by narrating them as an existential threat (Weldes 1999). Likewise, based on the evidence of the last 2 de-cades of US-Vietnamese relations, the United States could plausibly have decided in the 1960s that its vital interests would have suffered little if a small country on the other side of the planet were allowed to “go Communist. “Instead, it fruitlessly expended the lives of over 50,000 Americans and 2–3 million Vietnamese in what American national security elites wrongly perceived, thanks to the consensually accepted domino theory, as a struggle it could not afford to lose. Or, as discussed in this volume, Turkey in the early twentieth century could have constructed Armenians as constituency to be accommodated, not exterminated, and Guatemalan and Colombian elites could have constructed rural challenges against inequality and injustice as a social problem to address through development and land reform, not a military threat that demanded counterinsurgency. In these cases, the preferred threat constructions militarized the problems at hand, mobilizing more resources for military projects and saturating the social field with militarized violence.

#### The alt is feasible and can be implemented through a three-part plan that involves the defunding of the military, the conversion of the economy and the aiding of veterans in their transition to civilian life.

Burke 22, Matthew, a research associate at the University of Vermont who holds a PhD in Renewable Resources from McGill University; and Nina Smolyar, a Gund Graduate Fellow from the Rubenstein School of Environment and Natural Resources with a BA from the University of Pennsylvania and an MA from Goddard College|Demilitarize for a Just Transition. In: Dunlap, A., Brock, A. (eds) Enforcing Ecocide. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99646-8\_11

This set of deeply intertwined issues underscores the need for converting the U.S. military to civilian purposes and control. This section turns to the specific options and opportunities for a just transition of the U.S. military.

This transition requires nothing less than a complete dismantling and restructuring of this institution of war, firmly rooted under civilian control, toward the goal of creating an equitable and ecological society. There are three broad strategies to pursue as part of this just transition: spending reductions and reallocation; economic conversion to a peace economy; and assistance, retraining, and civilian repurposing for workers and veterans (D’Agostino and Rynn, 2019). Spending Reductions and Reallocation Demilitarization and just transition require decreases in military spending and a green fiscal shift toward meeting urgent social and environmental needs. Often it is a budget reduction that catalyzes deeper, more abiding conversions, yet such a curtailment must be combined with targeted reinvestments (Pemberton and Hartung, 2020). Military spending creates many fewer jobs than if those same funds were spent on healthcare, education, and clean energy and infrastructure, and jobs in these other sectors are on average equally well or better compensated (Peltier, 2019; Pollin and Garrett-Peltier, 2011). Shifting military spending to green manufacturing can support a just transition for regions of the U.S. experiencing declines in manufacturing, while scaling up lower-carbon energy infrastructure and public transportation, better preparing communities for impacts of climate change, and improving and expanding jobs in care work (Steichen and Koshgarian, 2020). A growing consensus is emerging around proposals to cut military spending. For example, a Defense Spending Reduction Caucus has been formed in the U.S. Congress, while an amendment was further introduced in 2020 to cut the Pentagon budget by 10% (Lee, 2020). This reduction is especially urgent in view of the need for and popularity of Covid-19 economic relief payments, and changes in rules to allow significant cuts to the DoD independently of non-defense spending. Even at just 10%, this reinvestment could achieve significant benefits across any number of priorities: housing half a million people, dramatically expanding coronavirus testing, bridging the funding deficit for majority non-white school districts, providing renewable energy to nearly every U.S. household, transitioning nearly every worker in conventional coal, oil, and gas sectors, hiring close to a million public school elementary educators, and so on (Steichen and Koshgarian, 2020). At a global level, the opportunities for shifting funding become even greater, given $2 trillion annually in global expenditures (half from the U.S.) on war and war preparations. Small percentages of this amount could end starvation or provide drinking water worldwide, reducing unrest, and improving well-being (World Beyond War, 2020). Economic Conversion In coordination with these shifts in budgetary priorities, a just transition requires converting from a military to a peace economy, including especially industrial planning and restructuring. Economic conversion refers to “political, economic and technical measures for ensuring the orderly transformation of labor, machinery and other economic resources now being used for military purposes to alternative civilian uses” (Melman and Dumas, 1990). Such efforts have been proposed and tested for decades, emphasizing the use of sector- and community-based planning for workers and communities dependent on defense and defense industries (D’Agostino and Rynn, 2019). Beginning with moves toward nuclear disarmament and the end of the Cold War in the 1980s and 90s, advocates and organizers seriously examined the necessary elements of conversion to a peace economy (Melman and Dumas, 1990; Pemberton and Hartung, 2020). In addition to spending reductions and reinvestment, successful economic conversion depends upon several key conditions. These conditions include availability of technical and financial assistance to firms, workers, and communities; supportive civil society measures including research, education, and legislation; and well-designed industrial policies and planning. Many examples of successful conversion can be traced at the level of firms, communities, bases, laboratories, and sectors since the end of the second world war. However, the size and complexity of the network of militarism in the U.S. now require a largescale industrial policy to achieve full disarmament and demilitarization (Pemberton and Hartung, 2020). Much has already been learned about scaling up economic conversions. Especially since the end of the Cold War, the work of Seymour Melman and colleagues, along with efforts of labor and trade unions, has provided a foundation for this comprehensive approach to economic conversion and industrial planning. These lessons reflect the fact that for decades, military priorities have served as the de facto plan for the U.S. economy, and markets are incapable of making the needed shift to peaceful economies (Eisenscher, 2014; Melman and Dumas, 1990). Supportive legislation nearly passed as early as 1963, while legislation such as the Defense Economic Adjustment Act has been introduced in various forms since the early 1990s (Swanson, 2010). More recently, Miriam Pemberton and others have put forward comprehensive strategies for defense transition that operate at all levels and are federally funded and resourced, and state- and locally coordinated and implemented (Pemberton, 2018). The scale and pace of change needed now demand new models for economic conversion. Demilitarization and conversion to a peace economy will require explicit industrial planning in public and private sectors, a challenge in the U.S. context to say the least. Nevertheless, several tools may provide a starting point if applied to the purpose of a just transition. One obvious measure is to implement new rounds of base closures through the Base Realignment and Closure process, especially including closures of overseas bases, and to shift the savings to just transition and civilian priorities. Closed bases and installations could serve as new sites for restored ecosystems and alternative energy generation (Crawford, 2019). Another measure would be to shift the focus of the Defense Production Act, which provides presidential authority to expedite and expand materials and services from U.S. industries, toward emergency preparedness. A specific focus would be to minimize hazards and impacts of climate change and protect and restore critical infrastructure—both built and natural—as needed for a just transition. In the context of climate emergency, a more direct approach to large-scale industrial planning could effectively reverse the function of the War Production Board, which was active during the wartime period. This mode of planning would instead convert factories from manufacture of weapons and military equipment to peacetime industries under public control, while conserving high-priority materials and limiting waste and luxury items. It is important to emphasize in the context of emergency preparedness and climate resilience, the point is not to extend military control but rather to unequivocally transfer resources and responsibility of the existing military apparatus to civilian control (Barber and Bennis, 2020). For example, civilian organizations such as the U.S. Public Health Service or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention would assume responsibility for medical staff, equipment, and facilities. All these methods and more will need to be integrated over time within a broad strategy of demilitarized industrial planning for conversion to a peace economy. Assistance, Retraining, and Civilian Repurposing The third general strategy for a just transition of the U.S. military centers on the contribution of the workers and their communities toward minimizing ecological catastrophe and providing for basic needs. This strategy therefore involves coordinating targeted assistance, retraining, and transitioning current military service members and contractors toward peace economy sectors, industries, and services. Ensuring social assistance and retraining provides the baseline for a demilitarized just transition. Here again, experience offers many examples, including the various GI Bills, Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment Assistance, the Veterans Retraining Assistance Program and Transition Assistance Program, and so on. Often under the charge of the Department of Veterans Affairs, these programs have demonstrated their ability to make a meaningful difference to people transitioning from military to civilian life by providing assistance and benefits for education, housing, business support, counseling, jobs training, and monthly subsistence payments. Funds could be reallocated from the DoD to the VA including the Office of Transition and Economic Development to dramatically scale up financial and logistical support for these transitions. This process must also involve redirecting economic activity and livelihoods. This would involve retraining public employees displaced by the phase out of military programs and offering them meaningful work in other federal, state, or local agencies, as engineers and mechanics, electricians, public health workers, accountants, and so on (D’Agostino and Rynn, 2019). Many of these programs, historically and presently, emphasize private sector employment in anticipation that the market can supply the needed work. Here again, the present context requires a more targeted system of transition that aims to rectify existing social inequities and minimize ecological catastrophe. This means providing high-quality jobs to build and repair public infrastructure, construct public water and wastewater systems, clean up toxic and nuclear waste sites, restore ecological habitats, provide national and international disaster preparedness and relief, and build new and retrofit existing housing, libraries, and schools. Alongside these priorities, a just transition also calls for creating new opportunities for local manufacturing and production and worker-owned businesses and cooperatives, and providing technical and administrative assistance to communities facing these converging crises (D’Agostino and Rynn, 2019; Melman and Dumas, 1990). An especially relevant opportunity follows from the growing calls for a re-envisioned and permanent Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), or a Civilian Climate Corps as proposed in the first days of the Biden Administration. The original CCC, sometimes known as Roosevelt’s Tree Army, operated from 1933 to 1942 as a New Deal public work relief program. The CCC was highly popular, employing millions, and completing a vast number of projects including planting trees, building parks and trails, fighting fires, and protecting soils. The CCC helped influence environmental programs and attitudes that continue to this day. Yet this program did not provide long-term, high-quality jobs, reinforced racial and gender inequities, and became militarized and subsumed under the war effort (Alexander, 2018; Heller, 2009; Maher, 2008). The just transition needed now would function differently. A reimagined CCC would create high-value work especially in ecological restoration and climate resilience, rectify inequities, and set a clear path for workers and communities to demilitarize in a way that is responsive to present and future needs (Aronoff et al., 2019). Boosted by funds reallocated from the military budget, a new Civilian Climate Corps could provide transitioning workers with well-paid union jobs as “conservation and resilience workers” who restore lands and waters, build green infrastructure, install solar panels and wind towers, sequester carbon in soils, protect biodiversity, clean up toxic waste, and much more (The White House, 2021). To align this initiative more closely with principles for a just transition, the program must center on the needs and priorities among Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC), while providing skills needed for lifelong work in a demilitarized, post-fossil-fuel economy (Collier, 2021). Just as the military now serves as the nation’s largest federal employer, this repurposed program could further serve as a key element of a federal public jobs guarantee program, thus ensuring a viable transition for military workers, families, and communities.

# Links

### Link – General

#### NATO has transcended into a militarist state that’s sole goal is colonizing the Global South.

Acheson 22 – Ray Acheson, researcher from the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, leads the disarmament program Reaching Critical Will, 2022 (“Militarism Cannot Prevent War: An urgent call for de-escalation, demilitarisation, and disarmament in relation to Ukraine and beyond,” *NATO Watch,* February 14th, Available Online at <https://natowatch.org/default/2022/militarism-cannot-prevent-war-urgent-call-de-escalation-demilitarisation-and>, Accessed 07/15/2022)

Behind this current crisis lies a history of militarised and economic violence. Both Russia and the United States are settler colonial states, forging their countries by expanding their “frontiers” and killing and repressing Indigenous populations. Both engage in imperialist actions outside of their now-established borders, interfering, through military and economic action, in countries they deem to be within their “spheres of influence”. Both use militarism, aggression, and forced economic ties to guide their conduct in international relations, and both deal with domestic inequality, poverty, and resistance through policing and punishment.

The governments of both countries critique each other for the same type of behaviour. Russia criticises US imperialism, yet invades and occupies its neighbours, bombs civilians, and engages in cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure that harm ordinary people. The United States criticises Russia as an autocracy yet overthrows democratically elected governments if they threaten US interests, builds military bases and engages in wars and military operations in hundreds of countries around the world, and spends billions of dollars a year on militarism while so many of its citizens live without health care, housing, or food security.

Both countries have built up their militaries, military alliances, and nuclear arsenals to challenge the other. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s expansion eastward is about constraining Russia, just like Russia’s invasion of countries to the west are about constraining NATO. Ukraine, in this context, is a pawn being used by both “sides”.

This gamesmanship runs the serious risk of mass destruction. Between them, Russia and the United States possess more than 11,850 nuclear weapons. NATO members France and the United Kingdom have a few hundred each. The US also stations about 100 nuclear weapons in NATO members Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey. These weapons are not remnants of a past Cold War — they are actively deployed right now, ready to be used. The stockpile numbers, alarming as they are, don’t convey the sheer horror each weapon packs within it. Every single bomb is designed to melt flesh, burn cities, decimate plants and animals, and unleash radioactive poison that lasts for generations. Even the use of one of these weapons would be disastrous. A nuclear exchange would be catastrophic.

Russia and the United States, along with France, United Kingdom, and China, together recently agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, echoing a statement from Gorbachev and Reagan in 1985. Yet each of these countries has been investing billions in the “modernisation” and expansion of their nuclear arsenals, preparing not for nuclear disarmament but for nuclear Armageddon. Each maintains doctrines and policies for the use of nuclear weapons. And some within the US nuclear complex, at least, apparently believe that nuclear war can be fought — and won. This is an incredibly dangerous message to be sending to those responsible for the potential destruction of the world, but one that benefits the military-industrial complex.

#### NATO’s continued existence results in military adventurism—it is a vital enabler of intervention.

Daniel Larison, Contributing Editor at *The American Conservative*, holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago, 10-06-2010 (“The case against NATO,” *The Week*, October 6th, Available Online at http://theweek.com/bullpen/column/207838/the-case-against-nato, Accessed 10-07-2010)

The goal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization used to be, as its first secretary general, Lord Ismay, phrased it, "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." Today, the only reason to keep NATO going seems to be to give Americans a reason to be "in" Europe when there is no longer any need for American military involvement in European affairs. Putting the alarmism of the past few years aside, Europe is under no threat from Russia, which the Europeans seem to understand far better than Americans do. And since its reunification, Germany has become the economic and political heart of a peaceful project of European union. Sixty years since its founding and nearly 20 years since the end of the Cold War, it is well past time to dismantle NATO.

In the end, the main argument for perpetuating the NATO relic is that it provides the support structure for projecting power into remote parts of the globe where American interests are even less clearly defined. In other words, what once was a purely defensive alliance dedicated to European security now has little to do with either defense or Europe. The Alliance is not only outdated for America’s European allies, who increasingly see no reason to participate in "out-of-area" missions, but also functions as a potential enabler of American involvement in parts of Asia and Africa where no vital American interests are at stake. By keeping NATO in existence, Washington leaves itself open to the temptation to meddle in far-flung parts of the globe, even as it provides the superficial "multilateral" cover to make U.S. military intervention overseas more politically palatable.

### War Discourse

#### Aff’s framing of countries as aggressive justifies violence abroad and ignores the internal warfare at home

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

But what is it at stake is not just the definition of police, but of war. Since at least the end of the Cold War, the concept of militarization has been taken on-board across many disciplines. We read of everything from the ‘militarization of urban space’ ([Davis 1990](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)) to the ‘militarization of entertainment’ ([Turse 2008](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). This literature generally portrays the sense that war has become more expansive than conflicts among nation-states, with security and surveillance becoming increasingly central to areas of social life, which appear distinct from formal military engagements. Our argument is not with the merits or the validity of this work but rather with its assumption of there being a traditional form of warfare – most generally defined as a geographically bounded and declared Clausewitzian struggle between states for power and territory. The most far reaching critique of such narrow definitions comes from [Mark Neocleous’ (2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569), [2008](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569), [2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569), [2011](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569), [2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)) work on security and pacification. The liberal definition of war as a confrontation between formally opposed states both ignores ‘the transnational nature of a great deal of warfare’ and ‘obscure the structural and systematic violence through which liberal order has been constituted’ ([Neocleous 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 9). This ideological blurring goes back to European imperialism where, from the 16th century onwards, complex legal and philosophical arguments were used to present wars of colonial expansion as police actions to ensure peace and security – often referred to as ‘small wars’. The military campaigns at the forefront of conquest and violent accumulation were philosophically and ideologically rationalized as necessary to pacify ‘savage’ populations and to liberate their bodies and resources for the benefit of civilization ([Neocleous 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 14). A key point of liberal thought is conceptualizing the military as an institution solely for foreign policy and the ‘over there’ and the police as a domestic institution only deployed ‘here’ for law enforcement and keeping the peace. Through this logic, the liberal state set itself up as different from feudal power and later what would become known as the totalitarian or ‘police state’, in which warfare against citizens is said to be unbound. Therefore, the notion that police powers and war powers come from different logics and mandates is a relatively recent notion that largely emerges out of liberal doctrines on state power (i.e. separation of powers and rule of law), which of course also merged with a nascent capitalist modernity (which was contingent on mass state and private violence against the indigenous, slaves and poor people). What is deliberately obscured is how civil society under capitalism is already at war. As described by Marx in Volume One of Capital the history of liberalism is also of the ‘logic of war, exercised in a permanent fashion against rebellious slaves, antagonistic Indians, wayward workers, and criminals with something unsocial in mind’ ([Neocleous 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 15). Two centuries later, we see ‘semi-permanent wars against the enemy within and without – such as the war on drugs and the war on terror’ ([Neocleous 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 16). The dominant thrust of the liberal tradition is thus to simplify the complexity of political power into dichotomies with policing and war treated as separate endeavours, represented by different institutions and practised within separate territories. However, even left theorists across different disciplines have accepted these distinctions, leading to work which focuses on the ‘overlaps’ and ‘blurring’ between the police and military, rather than on war and police as ‘processes working in conjunction as state power’ ([Neocleous 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 587). From this standpoint, the question is not then about how the police resemble militaries, but rather the role that the police play in the liberal war for peace and pacification. In order to understand this, we first need to understand the liberal arguments, which are at the centre of the police militarization concept.

### LIO

#### Preserving the LIO is only an excuse for both external and internal war

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

The militarization thesis is also haunted by the spectre of the police state in both the past and the future. On one hand, this is accompanied by nostalgic descriptions of ‘real’ policing – as [Balko (2013b)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569) rhetorically asks,

How did we go from a system in which laws were enforced by the citizens … to one in which order is preserved by armed governments agents too often conditioned to see streets and neighbourhoods as battlefields and the citizens they serve as enemy?

Historical examples of state despotism from Nazi Germany to Stalinist Russia are used to depict what a society looks like when ‘constraints demarcating policing and military functions are either ineffective or absent’ ([Hall & Coyne 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 485). These equivalences to past regimes are also used as a guide to the possible future outlaid by militarization with many commentaries, including variations on the theme of ‘America may not be a police state – that is a political system characterised by an arbitrary exercise of power by police – but it’s getting too close for comfort’ ([Greenhunt 2008](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)).

But the extent to which militarization is presented as a novel contemporary phenomenon may reveal nothing so much as the extent to which police institutions have been ideologically successful in naturalizing their role in society. As a result new developments in tactics and equipment come to be presented as a disturbing deviation from the norm. However, this focus on internal signifiers of violence blurs how even ‘community’ and public-orientated policing can work in accord with overt aggression. To the extent that the militarization thesis seems more concerned with excess and spectacle, it misses the routine repression of ‘officer friendly’ as he or she walks the beat, patrols the neighbourhood, and visits schools to build public relations and win popular support. In the United States, one police response to the social crisis of the 1960s was to experiment with ‘softer’ law enforcement to pre-empt social response, which drew upon ‘hearts and minds’ tactics, originating in military counter-insurgency ([Williams 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 91). ‘Militarization’ is therefore just one of the key changes in recent US policing, working in tandem with other forms of softer power.

The idea that police violence and repression is exceptional is encouraged by a political discourse, which maintains that in liberal democratic societies, state power is fundamentally constrained by the rule of law and a concern for human rights. Indeed, many of the critiques of ‘police militarization’ hold that ‘military’ policing can be legitimate as long as it is kept within the bounds of law. For instance, one ACLU advocate said that

The militarization of local police is a threat to Americans’ right to live without fear of military-style intervention in their daily lives, and we need to make sure these resources and tactics are deployed only with rigorous oversight and strong legal protections. ([ACLU 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569))

This faith in legal protection is counterpoised with the threat that seems to lurk in the background of the militarization discourse: the ‘police state’. Underlying this is the idea that a ‘blurring’ between the military and the police is a hallmark of the despotic state, and in particular the various Fascist and Stalinist states of the last century, with their vast coercive apparatuses. What this implies is that liberal democracies have a categorically different kind of police and criminal justice system: one that is intended to protect the interests and property of its (‘law abiding’) citizens rather than internal warfare. Such an ideology holds that while ‘conquest and bloodshed’ may have been central to the genesis of capitalist modernity, contemporary liberal states are marked by fundamentally peaceful social relations ([Trocchi 2011](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 305). In its most media-driven form, the militarization thesis, as it relies on the assumption of separation of police power and war power, therefore, generally regards police as a fundamentally benign institution in society, which provides a central public service and which needs to be steered away from the dangerous pull of militarism.

The militarization concept assumes that the boundary between war and police powers is a common sense fact of life in liberal societies, in which the police should manage disputes and enforce laws without favour and with minimum resort to force. But even a cursory acquaintance with older police sociology indicates that the police are principally involved in domestic operations to uphold the dominant social order. For [Alan Silver (1965)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569), the police emerged as an elite response to the threat posed by the dangerous classes of poor to property – ‘a sophisticated and convenient form of garrison force against an internal enemy’. The role of police goes beyond suppression of internal threats and entails a wide variety of activities, from general administration to pursuing their own interests ([Marenin 1982](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). It was crucial for early police institutions to legitimate themselves, whether through identification with the concept of the rule of law, or direct involvement in communities ([Monkkonen 1981](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). But while we can reject a crude, instrumentalist understanding of the police as exclusively concerned with class repression, the point remains that these spectrum of activities, from daily patrolling to intelligence gathering, should not be assumed to be in the ‘ defence of a universal consensus of the public good’ ([Marenin 1982](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 259). Rather, these functions all work to uphold state order and to administer daily life under capitalism.

Along with the underlying assumption that the police uphold a universal public good, the concept of police militarization makes the a priori assumption that foreign warfare does not, or at least should not, have any bearing on the ‘everyday’ functions of the police. Many liberal thinkers have viewed warfare as both the last resort of state power and as antithetical to capitalism because it interrupts production and consumption ([Kaldor 1982](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 264). In fact, ‘the notion of militarism is itself capitalist. It emerges with the distinction between warriors and entrepreneurs in place of the feudal lord’ ([Kaldor 1982](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). But this distaste for war is ambivalent as liberals accept the war may also be necessary to prevent interruptions to the market and to extend ‘civilization’. Liberals therefore accept war as a historical necessity in establishing the reach of the market and the nation state; but once order has been established, military power is to be withdrawn and replaced with administrative forms of internal pacification ([Giddens 1985](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). To frame it another way, once the green uniforms have subdued the territory, the blue uniforms manage it.

Liberal thought maintains that there is sharp and clear distinction between the green and blue, and it is this distinction between war and police that needs to be refused. That is, the creation of the distinction itself is what does the political work of liberal ideology in obfuscating the fact that the police mandate has always been a mandate of social war. This distinction effectively amounts to a conceptual removal of war from the framing of social order and internal politics, ultimately reifying the ‘war’ and ‘peace’ distinction by misrecognizing ‘peace’ as itself a ‘war’ for capitalist social order The remainder of this article will contest this on two fronts. First, the idea of a classic distinction between the police and military simply does not hold up under historical scrutiny. Second, this distinction is indicative of liberalisms broader inability to depict how war is imbricated within all aspects of capitalist society, and especially in policing. This entails a rethinking of police as a project of pacification.

#### Liberty is only an excuse to continue to extend war and police power

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

Historically, liberals have praised the spontaneity of the market, in contrast with the ‘artificial, violent constructivism’ of other societies, and presented this as a virtuous cycle where economic freedom regulates and reduces the need for state intervention ([Losurdo 2011](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 283). On one level, liberalism is a political philosophy in which peace and freedom are seen to be the end historical goals of the extension of market order. But this discourse of emancipation has been historically tangled with dis-emancipation in which violent policing operations to contain the dangerous classes and foreign barbarians are the mechanisms for extending peace ([Losurdo 2011](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 286, 342). Therefore, the precondition for liberty and the pursuit of rational self-interest is the extension of police and war power. Rather than being primarily focused on liberty, liberalism is thus a politics of security, concerned with reshaping individuals, groups and territories in the image of capital ([Neocleous 2008](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 5). It is in this pursuit of security in the name of liberty that the most authoritarian tendencies of liberalism become apparent, from police killings to the revival of torture and indefinite detention. The danger is not therefore that liberal states can become more like fascist ones through ‘police militarization’, but rather that security politics reveal the fascist or authoritarian tendencies within liberal democracy already ([Neocleous 2008](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 9). In turn, this entails a particular situation where the continual expansion of intrusive police powers has historically been justified in terms of protecting individual freedom, while in practise encouraging despotic power in the protection of economic interests. For example, during the Cold War, the US government provided training and financial support to repressive police forces throughout the world, many which regularly engaged in torture and murder, in the name of fighting totalitarianism ([Kuzmarov 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). A similar process can be observed today when anti-democratic extensions in police and military power are legitimated as measures against anti-democratic extremism.

Recent scholarship has focused on the idea of ‘war: police assemblages’ evident in ‘contemporary liberal interventionism’, such as in the combination of clandestine drone attacks and special force interventions, full scale military invasions and counter-insurgency which have characterised recent wars in the Middle East and beyond ([Bell 2015](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). But as [Ryan (2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 441) points out the history of policing indicates that these current assemblages are not a recent phenomenon – ‘policing arrives once the condition for order have been violently established by the military so that reason of state can be implemented. Policing is the continuation of military actions by other means’. Viewed as continuum or assemblage, even a cursory survey highlights the extent to which the police have been central to the disciplining and oppression of the domestic enemies of liberal states. To give just a few examples, by the end of the 18th century, police forces in Europe were engaged in regular manhunts to round up beggars and vagrants ([Chamayou 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 81), while across the Atlantic, the millions of Africans forced into bondage in the Americas were kept in line with slave patrols, which scholars are now increasingly viewing as one of the key forerunners of modern US policing ([Hadden 2003](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). The police were also at the forefront of state efforts to control ‘free labour’ through the suppression of strikes and revolts in the workplace. To give the example of just one country, the police were key agents in the ‘strikes (which moved) towards miniature civil wars between workers and the state’ during periods of intense labour militancy in the United States ([Brecher 1972](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 236). However, this history is regularly omitted in contemporary discussions of police militarization. An illustrative quote, worth citing in full is from an interview conducted with [Radley Balko (2013b)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569) by the popular Vice website during which he details a version of (US) police history, in which

The Founders were quite wary of standing armies and the threat they pose to liberty. They ultimately concluded – reluctantly – that the country needed an army for national defense. But they most feared the idea of troops patrolling city streets – a fear colored by much of human history, and more immediately by the antagonism between British troops and residents of Boston in the years leading up to the American Revolution. The Founders could never have envisioned police as they exist today. And I think it’s safe to say they’d have been absolutely appalled at the idea of a team of police, dressed and armed like soldiers, breaking into private homes in the middle of the night for the purpose of preventing the use of mind-altering drugs.

What Balko omits is the question of how war and police power were deployed against groups considered as undeserving of liberty by the ‘founders’: slaves, American Indians, African slaves, the property-less and women. The violent economy of chattel slavery and oppression of indigenous peoples gained their political force from the police power. Indeed, in the heroic age of liberty conjured by Balko, the Founders were in fact prepared to use military force to suppress internal revolt, such as in the case of the 1794 rebellion against the Whiskey Tax by farmers in Pennsylvania in which Alexander Hamilton led troops against the revolt ([Zinn 1995](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 100). Tracing the history of the police power and not just ‘the police’, [Markus Dubber (2005)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569) writes of the ways that the ‘Founders’ retained the notion of unlimited and undefinable police powers that operated in England. He writes, ‘Ending the king’s police power, it turns out, did not mean ending police power altogether … Americans didn’t appreciate being policed, but they had no qualms about policing’ (p. 83).

The policing of imperialism occurred in tandem with the foundation of modern police forces in Europe, but crucially this linkage was played down at the time. In the case of Britain, for instance, the creation of the police was influenced by experiments with colonial warfare in Ireland, albeit framed very differently: While the discourse for police advocacy for Ireland explicitly invoked the need for a paramilitary police under the spectre of ‘real or suspected insurrectionary conspiracies’, the militaristic character of policing could not enter the discourses of advocacy in the metropolis ([Williams 2003](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 231). This occurred in a context in which Atlantic political thinkers and the administrators in the late 18th and 19th centuries began to call for a professionalized body of standing police officers, capable of both managing the potential threats posed by growing proletariats in the metropole and the colonies and protecting production ([Williams 2003](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). The military was not a practical institution to govern emerging capitalist societies:

alternating as it does between no intervention and the most drastic and violent procedures. The newly emerging police, in contrast, could penetrate civil society in a way impossible for military formations, less to crush disorder in the form of riots (though it also came to do that of course) and more to fabricate an order in which such disorder did not occur. ([Neocleous 2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 78)

The liberal demand for order was therefore not about so much reducing the threat of arbitrary military power, but rather of ensuring a more thorough policing of civil society, which was regularized and comprehensive ([Silver 1965](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). In practise, however, the differences between the military and police was often more a question of degrees than of fundamental divergences of function, especially evident in colonies. In the case of South Africa, for instance, ‘the military feature of policing’ was dominant – both in terms of the institutional history of serving as an ‘internal army of occupation’ and in the usage of police formations as military units during war-time ([Brogden 1989](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 3). Throughout the British Empire, there are similar examples of military forces gradually developing into police institutions.

The point which derives from these examples is that the dual historical formation of the nation-state and capitalism saw military and police forces enrolled in shared projects of conquest and control. These different forces were joined as part of the machinery of State – ‘armies of wars of colonial pacification, international competition and domestic repression’ ([Robinson 1983](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 20). However, this is not to argue that the police are interchangeable with the military. Instead, they are able to conduct internal operations in a far more sustained but, when considering the historical record, often as violent a manner as military forces:

As states defined a part of their own population as an enemy, the military learned from those who know how to locate individuals and to ‘interrogate’ them: the police. If military dictatorships were so effective in suppressing all political opposition and taking thousands of lives, if they could wage unilateral ‘wars’ on their own populations, it was thanks to the ‘police method’ … ([Seri 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 118)

Police institutions, thus, have a distinct role in ‘facilitating authoritarianism and state violence … that the scholarly emphasis on “militarization” tends to ignore’ ([Seri 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). The general thrust of much of the police militarization literature has been to portray police authoritarianism as intrinsic to non-liberal states but aberrant to capitalist democracies. Liberal societies are understood to be policed societies, in which the institutions work to achieve peace and prosperity in a regulated and consistent fashion, rather than police states, in which officers are at war with society. As argued in the previous section, this distinction omits the pivotal role played by police and military violence and terror in the foundation and extension of capitalism. But this is not limited to primitive accumulation but rather is a central, continuous process of pacification and of fabricating order through police patrolling, surveillance and governance. Police power is not restricted to repression of the state’s enemies but in the daily regulation of society, from administering discriminatory labour practices and environmental practices to penalizing the illicit economic activities of the poor. Police both intervene in the workplace, through their involvement in strikes and industrial disputes, and are the key instruments in enforcing social control over the dispossessed ‘underclass’, who are not integrated into the labour force. In a history of class war in the United States originally published in [1931](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569), the journalist Louis Adamic noted that the ‘police club’ was the pre-eminent symbol of capitalist power (p. 23). Almost a century later, the police club is now accompanied by pepper spray, tear gas, armoured vehicles and drones, but the police still represent the main force employed by the state to attack and control the social tensions generated by economic inequality and exploitation – from industrial conflict in the early 20th century to street battles around austerity and crisis in the early 21st century. Of course, the nature of whom and what is policed changes over time, and in line with changes in capitalist order, from domination over nascent industrial proletariats in the 19th century to regular campaigns of harassment against the unemployed and migrants in the post-industrial badlands of neo-liberalism.

But even without the more high tech accoutrements, the generic officer on the beat is nevertheless a figure of considerable power who enforces state domination on the street, and in particular against the ‘dangerous classes’. Indeed, Mike Brown was not gunned down in the middle of a Ferguson street by an overtly military-inspired SWAT agent. He was gunned down by the routine patrol officer, the state agent that is dressed in ‘traditional’ police attire and driving the ‘traditional’ police cruiser that more closely resembles the ‘community policing solution’ that so many public commentators have posited to supplant police militarization. Yet, soon after the routine execution of Brown, quickly most all of the controversy and criticism of the police power were aimed at the use of military gear, aesthetics, and tactics – attention was placed steadfastly on the spectacle of police–military repression. Of course, we are not suggesting that these developments should not be ruthlessly critiqued. They certainly demonstrate a significant ability of the local state to deploy maximum force. But here the spectacle stayed true to its own governing logic, hiding in plain sight the equally insidious violence of the ‘good old police’.

#### Aff’s discourse of pacification is inseparable with the logic of militarism which entrenches colonialism

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

The inability of the militarization argument to acknowledge how a patrol officer with a nightstick may be as much of a cause of terror and fear as the machine gun waving SWAT team unit, is further indicator of its liberal bent. Moreover, the popular lexicon of police militarization doesn’t offer any ability to critique the police officer reading books to children at a public school, or passing out candy during a parade, or holding ‘public forums’, press conferences and ‘community meetings’. Hence, instead of thinking about the police/war assemblage through the notion of militarization, it might be best to think of this through the idea of pacification. Although pacification most commonly evokes US counter-insurgency efforts in Vietnam, the concept has a much longer history, emerging first in the Edicts of Pacification of the mid to late 1500s, where these laws were said to be aimed at the ending of strife and to make populations submit to state rule primarily through peaceful methods. Drawing on [Todorov (1984)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569), Neocleous reminds us that, in 1573, Philip II ordered that ‘conquests’ be renamed ‘pacification’, so as to help build consent among the colonized. As [Neocleous (2011)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569) states,

The dates are important, since they are deep into the period of global accumulation and the history of capital, or, in other words, the point of departure for the period in which the insecurity of bourgeois order had to be secured. (p. 199)

From here pacification became a means of original accumulation through the colonial conquests of the 17th century, only to be re-theorized, re-named and re-deployed across a plethora of more contemporary colonial geographies, from French counter-insurgency in Algeria and Indo-China, to Britain’s engagements in Malaysia, Cyprus and Kenya, to US counter-insurgencies in Vietnam. Pacification is best thought of as a central strategy of the colonialist, capitalist state as it works to secure the insecurities of accumulation both domestically and internationally, and this lines up with the police mandate. Instead of only describing state power as a pacification project, [Neocleous (2011)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569) argues that critical theory should reappropriate the concept of pacification as a way of understanding the security politics of liberal order building, as capital works to secure accumulation and the state demands order.

As a way of thinking through the police and war assemblage as always about the fabrication of order and productive labour, the notion of pacification better highlights the ways that coercion and consent are always the flip sides to the security coin. That is, it usefully accounts for not only the excesses or spectacular forms of police violence that the militarization thesis is rightly concerned about but also offers a way of thinking through the routine, non-spectacular violence of ‘Officer Friendly’ as well as this agents attempts of winning ‘hearts and minds’. Pacification, then, helps to keep in constant focus the iron fist and velvet glove of police power. Yet, pacification, with its evocation of counter-insurgency, colonization and war, doesn’t base its claims on making a distinction between police and war, or peace and war, or even foreign and domestic. Pacification, then, is not only an international, colonizing strategy as it is most commonly discussed (i.e. colonization of Algeria, Vietnam, Malaysia, for example), but simultaneously a way of fabricating domestic order, as liberalism deploys the police concept in relation to domestic dangers and threats. Police, then, at least in the domestic sense of the term, becomes a pacifying power directed at ordering the disorderly and possessing the dispossessed, or the ‘reserve armies of labor’ so central to capitalist modernity. But whether as war power or police power, pacification is animated by the inseparable logics of security and order, and hinges on a joint strategy of coercion and consent. [Rigakos (2011)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569) suggests that pacification as an ‘anti-security’ concept usefully gets at the heart of class struggle and the violence of capitalist modernity, as it implies that there are subjects and populations that refuse efforts at their pacification, which of course is inseparable from struggles over space. To think in terms of pacification, then, is to also ask who is being pacified and for what reasons and objectives ([Rigakos 2011](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)).

While the militarization literature has highlighted the repressive impacts of the wars on drugs, crime and terror on policing, this has primarily been understood as a matter of error and bad policy, in which the inaccurate metaphor of war mutates the ‘true’ function of policing. Understood as pacification, the wars on drugs, crime and terror are not actually metaphors at all but are real wars which ‘slip and slide from the foreign into the domestic and back again’ ([Neocleous 2011](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 201). At different points, for instance, the war on drugs involved military engagements in Latin America, provided a rationale for expanded police powers and massive growth of the prison population in the United States. This logic of security is also repurposed for police and military projects undertaken by other states. For example, the war on drugs in Mexico and Colombia has been used to displace communities from resource rich areas, for attacks on labour organizing and to create an environment favourable for corporate investment ([Paley 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). In post-apartheid South Africa, police methods adopted from the US war on drugs were incorporated into a new ‘war on crime’, targeting undocumented migrants and the urban poor ([Samara 2011](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). The exchange between war and policing is more insidious and sophisticated than just the transference of combat equipment into the domestic sphere, with models of population control and public relations honed in counter-insurgency returning to the domestic streets ([Williams 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)).

The liberal focus on establishing the correct boundaries between war and policing is also tactically problematic for political activism and organizing, as its shift the critique of police power away from issues of structural oppression and state violence into that of due process. For example, in the wake of the 2015 Baltimore uprisings following the police killing of Freddie Gray, President Obama has promised to restrict the federal transfer of military equipment to local police departments. But while this gives the surface appearance of answering the radical challenges presented by insurgent protest, it clearly does not actually address the racism and everyday brutality which sparks revolt. Unlike more bluntly authoritarian political system, the liberal state can incorporate pressure for reform from below into governance in a manner that appears to be progressive while, maintaining the ruling order. Writing in the wake of the social revolts of the 1960s, [Wolfe (1971)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569) observed that political repression in liberal states required a great deal of social consent, won through the agents of the state appearing to be consistent and law abiding, and the incorporation of the discourses and critiques raised by dissenting groups. Thus, policing in the United States since the 1970s has combined the impulse of militarization with community policing, in which the police are trained to be more ‘sensitive’ about racism and sexism ([Williams 2007](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). Such a combination results in a more sophisticated repression, as communities are enlisted to collaborate with the police, while still maintaining an expanded capacity to deploy violence.

By failing to address the complex and sophisticated mechanisms of police repression in capitalist democracies, liberal critique ends up focusing on procedures and appearance to the ‘point where ends are irrelevant’ ([Wolfe 1971](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 34). The idea of militarization takes a legalistic focus on achieving the ‘proper’ form of policing, a discourse which easily be co-opted by the state. At core, it is based on a liberal frame of trying to establish appropriate boundaries between military and police, rather than looking at how war and police overlap and conjoin in the everyday governance of capitalism. It is focused on the apparent danger of liberal democracies becoming more like despotic political systems while obfuscating the fundamental violence of the liberal state. By contrast, thinking on police violence and state repression through the concept of pacification highlights that this is potentially already existent and apparent within liberalism itself. The problem is not that liberal democracies could become dystopic tyrannies through the negative pull of militarization, but rather that there is already a violent social war within capitalist society. And within this conflict, police institutions are central mechanisms for ensuring class and racial dominance already and have been since their founding.

### S/O

#### US international actions militarized law enforcements domestically

Mack 21 ( Marvin, journalist for Business Insider, Yahoo News, “How America’s State Police Got Military Weapons”, Insider, April 28 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/how-did-local-police-acquire-surplus-military-weapons-2020-8

Narrator: After the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis on May 25, people protested in at least 140 cities across the nation. Here in Indiana, a protestor lost an eye from a tear gas container hitting him in the face.

In North Carolina, protesters were trapped by a cloud of tear gas on both ends of a street. In Kentucky, an officer attacked a newscaster and camera crew with pepper bullets.

And here in Detroit, police backed by armored vehicles marched down the streets. To date, the US has spent over $15 billion on the militarization of police.

All of these weapons, vehicles, and equipment are acquired by the police through a military program called 1033.

It's like eBay for cops with leftover war equipment, except everything is free and you only pay for shipping and handling. Up until 2017, police couldn't be in the program unless they used equipment within a year of receiving it.

So how did local police acquire all of these military weapons? And why do they even need them? To answer this question, we're going to examine four moments in history.

Clip: From Dallas, Texas, the flash apparently official, President Kennedy died at 1 p.m. Central Standard Time.

Narrator: In the wake of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson and Congress signed the Safe Streets Act into law in June of 1968.

Through that act, in an effort to crack down on organized crime and gun violence, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was created.

LEAA guaranteed the distribution of federal money to fight organized crime. This funded what we know as SWAT, and it ensured SWAT received searchlights, emergency radios, bullhorns, nightsticks, body armor, face shields, and special weapons like M79 grenade launchers.

Prior to 1968, SWAT teams were used sparingly, only in volatile, high-risk situations like bank robberies or hostage situations. SWAT's first test as a militarized front came when the LAPD used a tank on loan from the California National Guard on the Southern California Black Panther Party.

Clip: The intermittent warfare between the Black Panthers and police erupted today in Los Angeles. There, a group of them barricaded themselves in their headquarters and fought police with automatic weapons and hand grenades.

Narrator: The US Department of State granted the LAPD authorization to use tear gas and sniper rifles. With national coverage, SWAT grew in popularity across the US and with other local law enforcement, creating a demand for military equipment.

LEAA's budget was a total of $7.5 billion, with a good portion going towards the militarization of US local law-enforcement agencies. After nearly a decade of extremely high budgets and spending, LEAA began to receive criticism because it had not shown success in decreasing crime rates.

On April 15, 1982, LEAA was abolished when Congress failed to fund it. But by that time, SWAT teams and their militaristic approach had already become the norm.

In 1986, Ronald Reagan's Anti-Drug Abuse Act expanded the use of no-knock or quick-knock warrants and assistance of the Air Force, Navy, and Marines in drug-related searches and seizures.

It allowed for members of SWAT to arrive at suspected locations of criminal activities and enter without knocking or announcing themselves, pointing guns at anyone inside.

They often used diversionary tactics like flash grenades, rendering their victims deaf and blind. In some cases, individuals believe they're experiencing a home invasion, to which they grab a gun. Like Jose Guerena, a former US Marine who was suspected of selling marijuana. What you're about to see and hear might upset you. He pulled a gun because he believed his home was being invaded, and the police shot him 60 times in seven seconds. No drugs were found.

In the early 1980s, there was on average about 3,000 recorded SWAT incidents per year. By the mid 1990s, that number grew to about 45,000 SWAT incidents per year. 75.9% were drug raids.

Of those raids, SWAT officers fired 342 times. They injured 61 and killed 139 citizens.

In 1989, George H. W. Bush signed the National Defense Authorization Act.

This act allowed for surplus DOD equipment from the Cold War to be transferred to US law enforcement. Sections 1207 and 1208 allowed for the following: "the procurement of services and leasing of equipment" and the transfer to federal and state agencies personal property, "including small arms and ammunition."

And from those two sections, eight years later, the 1033 program was born. Under Bill Clinton's administration, the use of military surplus trade continued with the introduction of the Law Enforcement Support Office, LESO, which enacted US code title 10, section 2576a, also known as the 1033 program.

Much like National Defense Authorization Act 1208, the 1033 program expanded into other areas, including counterterrorism. This line states that surplus military equipment can be used for counter-drugs and counterterrorism efforts. This line states that surplus military equipment is free of charge minus shipping and handling.

Over $7.4 billion worth of property has been transferred since the program's inception. More than 8,000 law-enforcement agencies have enrolled. Items shipped include boots, radios, shields, M16 assault rifles, tanks, and silencers.

For every one qualified officer, one M1911 pistol, M16 rifle, or M14 rifle is allocated. For every three officers, a department can get a Humvee, and every law-enforcement agency has the ability if they apply to receive one MRAP.

And then, three days after 9/11, George W. Bush signed the Patriot Act.

It created a gray zone where law-enforcement agencies were able to perform more searches and seizures with access to delayed warrants, wiretaps, email, and web search surveillance, all in the name of fighting terrorism. But in reality, the liberties given to police were often used in drug-related cases. Only 1% of sneak and peek searches in 2010 were terrorism related. 76% were drug related.

And the United States' international actions also impacted law enforcement at home. As a result of an increase and then decrease of US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the years, there's been more military surplus equipment available to law enforcement, creating a spike in tactical items distributed by the 1033 program.

The Department of Defense does not provide training for law-enforcement agencies that receive military weapons. Instead, it's left to recipients to certify their own training each year. Because there is no federal mandate that police agencies report on SWAT operations, there's no real way to tell or quantify the effect of SWAT-related incidents.

In an effort to access the program's productivity and safety protocols, the Government Accountability Office created a fake federal agency. After acquiring more than 100 items worth over $1.2 million, the office recommended a process to implement fraud prevention in addition to a website that can track the equipment and the agencies it was sent to.

Prior to the investigation, there was very little record keeping and tracking of weapons after transfer. There were several instances where the agencies did not report lost weapons or disposal of excess equipment.

Clip: And San Mateo and Napa counties were not the only departments in the nation to have lost equipment. About 200, in fact, have military equipment missing at this hour, and that includes, actually, some Humvees.

Narrator: 184 state and local police departments were suspended from the 1033 program. In 2014, sparked by the murder of Michael Brown, civil unrest rolled through the streets of Ferguson, Missouri. Americans watching from home were shocked to see what looked like an army descending on such a small town.

On January 16, 2015, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13688.

Barack Obama: You know, we've seen how militarized gear can sometimes give people a feeling like there's an occupying force as opposed to a force that's part of the community that's protecting them and serving them.

Narrator: The order prohibited a list of equipment from being transferred to law enforcement through the 1033 program: tracked armored vehicles, weaponized aircraft, firearms of .50 caliber or higher, ammunition of .50 caliber or higher, grenade launchers, bayonets, camouflage uniforms. That executive order did not last long before being revoked in 2017 by President Donald Trump.

Jeff Sessions: These restrictions that had been opposed went too far. We will not put superficial concerns above public safety.

Narrator: Today, in 2020, in the wake of George Floyd's killing, protesters are being met with militarized police armed with 1033 program war surplus. No-knock warrants still result in the deaths of innocent citizens, like 26-year-old emergency medical technician Breonna Taylor.

Tear gas is still legal for domestic use on protesters but has been banned for use in war since 1993. And studies on rubber bullets, like the ones used here, show that 3% of those injured by rubber bullets died as a result of their injuries. 15.5% suffered permanent disabilities like eye loss, and nearly 50% of those who were struck on the head or neck were killed.

In the US, law enforcement kills over 900 people a year. Compare that to Norway, where there have been only four police-related killing since 2002.

Norway credits these numbers to its face-to-face community-building approach and believes it has created more trust between citizens and their police department. And we've seen similar changes stateside.

In 2001, a Cincinnati police officer shot and killed 19-year-old Timothy Thomas after he resisted arrest over minor crimes. After riots and protests, in fear of more unrest, the city began to reform its police department in collaboration with the Department of Justice.

They standardized procedures, making civilian-officer interactions more transparent. They also created a training program focused on mental health.

The reforms were met with pushback from city officials and a hostile police union, but the result was a 50% decrease in use of force from 2001 to 2007.

Data shows that building trust within the community may be a better solution to saving lives than using military weapons against them.

### 1033

#### Aff plan leaves surplus weapons that ends in the hand of police officers through the 1033 program

Barrett (Brian, executive editor, news at WIRED, and editor of chief of Gizmodo, “The Pentagon’s Hand-Me-Downs Helped Militarize Police. Here’s How,” June 2nd 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/pentagon-hand-me-downs-militarize-police-1033-program/

THE IMAGES OF this past week are both inescapable and indelible: [protesters flooding the streets](https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-protest-safely-surveillance-digital-privacy/) of cities across the United States, met by police forces equipped with full body armor and tactical vehicles that vaguely resemble tanks. The local law enforcement responding to even nonviolent protests has often looked more like the US Armed Forces—and that was before President Donald Trump deployed an actual [military police battalion](https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/06/01/pentagon-orders-active-duty-military-police-unit-dc-region-amid-protests.html) against peaceably assembled US citizens in the nation's capitol Monday. That’s no accident.

It’s easy enough to buy tactical gear in the US, and the Homeland Security Grant Program has [funneled](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/20/police-billions-homeland-security-military-equipment) billions of dollars to law enforcement agencies to acquire military-grade equipment. But for decades, a primary driver for why it can be so hard to tell a National Guard troop from a local cop has been the Department of Defense itself, through a program that has parceled out everything from bayonets to grenade launchers to precincts across the country.

Created as part of 1997’s National Defense Authorization Act, the 1033 program allows the Department of Defense to get rid of excess equipment by passing it off to local authorities, who only have to pay for the cost of shipping. (A precursor, the slightly more restrictive 1208 program, began in 1990.) According to the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO), which oversees the process, over $7.4 billion of property has been transferred since the program’s inception; more than 8,000 law enforcement agencies have enrolled. Much of that inventory is perfectly ordinary: office equipment, clothing, tools, radios, and so on. But the haul also includes some of the so-called controlled equipment—rifles, armored vehicles, and so on—that have helped create such a spectacle of disproportion.

Those displays are not unique to the current protests against police brutality, either. The militarization of the American police, and the 1033 program specifically, began attracting wider scrutiny in 2014, after [the Black Lives Matter protests in Ferguson, Missouri](https://www.wired.com/2015/10/how-black-lives-matter-uses-social-media-to-fight-the-power/).

Proponents of the 1033 program say that it keeps cities safer. Detractors say the distribution of controlled items actually increases police violence. Widely circulated studies have argued [both](https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/pol.20150478) [sides](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168017712885). But those who have examined the 1033 program in depth more recently argue that the real problem is that no one knows for sure either way, because years of lax record-keeping have made a hash of the underlying data.

“The federal government doesn’t really keep track of a lot of this equipment that goes to local law enforcement agencies,” says Anna Gunderson, a political scientist at Louisiana State University who coauthored a 2019 study that examined the effects of the 1033 program on crime rates. “The agencies themselves are inconsistent in keeping track. That just makes it really difficult for anyone to try to learn about the program or study it to try and analyze it, because we don’t have a very clear understanding what kinds of equipment actually are in the hands of these agencies.”

The LESO does maintain [a spreadsheet](https://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/Reutilization/LawEnforcement/PublicInformation/) detailing to whom it has distributed property over the years. When asked about complaints of inconsistent records, a spokesperson for the Defense Logistics Agency, which oversees LESO, noted that the agency changed accounting systems in 2013 to allow state coordinators and law enforcement agencies to identify and track what they receive. That switch, and spotty record-keeping beforehand, has confounded efforts to understand the impact of a program that has helped transform law enforcement in America.

“The DLA did not archive active inventories prior to 2014. They also did not archive information about transfers of equipment and destruction of controlled equipment during that time. LEAs themselves typically only retain records for a few years, subject to their own local-level record keeping requirements,” says Kenneth Lowande, a political scientist at the University of Michigan whose research includes the 1033 program. “Some of this can never be fixed. You can’t re-create records that are lost.”

The issues with 1033 have also run deeper than just contradictory or incomplete data sets. The Department of Defense does not provide training for law enforcement agencies that receive controlled property. Instead, it’s left to recipients to certify their own training each year. “What programs like 1033 have done is given people the equipment to carry out operations that are traditionally done by tactical teams that otherwise would not have been able to obtain it,” says Jonathan Mummolo, a political scientist at Princeton University who focuses on policing. “That is for sure not always accompanied by extensive training. There’s just a lot of variation in policing standards across the board.”

That seemingly lax oversight has manifested in other troubling ways, as well. In a 2017 sting operation, the General Accountability Office [obtained over 100 controlled items from the 1033 program](https://www.wired.com/story/gao-sting-defense-department-weapons/)—including night-vision goggles and pipe bomb materials—with a total estimated value of $1.2 million. All it took was the creation of a fake law enforcement agency, website, and shipping address. The GAO’s fraudulent application was processed and approved within a week.

The DLA implemented additional controls in the wake of the report, which focused on the acquisition process for federal law enforcement agencies rather that state and local. Those steps include a review of each existing applicant and establishing a point of contact at each federal agency to vet and approve requests. But the GAO’s success in hoodwinking the agency did not inspire confidence. Nor has it inspired the federal government to fundamentally reconsider the premise of distributing controlled equipment to police in the first place.

A year after Ferguson, then president Barack Obama signed an [executive order](https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/publications/LEEWG_Report_Final.pdf) that prohibited state and local law enforcement from receiving certain types of property, like grenade launchers and weaponized aircraft, under the 1033 program, but these restrictions were short-lived: Trump [lifted](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-restoring-state-tribal-local-law-enforcements-access-life-saving-equipment-resources/) them in 2017. Lowande argues the actual impact of that revocation has been negligible. Obama’s original executive order ultimately only applied to around 300 departments, he says, and there’s no sign in recent DLA inventories that previously restricted items have been sent out again. In a working paper currently under review, Lowande finds that the demilitarization efforts that did take place in those two years showed “no detectable impact on violent crime or officer safety.”

“There is no compelling evidence, right now, that arming LEAs with military-grade equipment increases or decreases crime,” he says.

Other research into 1033 program, though, paints an alarming picture about its effect on police activity. "Our research suggests that officers with military hardware and mindsets will resort to violence more quickly and often,” says Ryan Welch, a political scientist at the University of Tampa who coauthored a [2017 study](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168017712885) on the effects of the 1033 program on police violence. “Other research shows that when governmental responses are violent, dissidents and protestors are more likely to act violently at the site and in the future. Of course, that leads to more violence from the government creating a spiral that is hard to escape.” Welch's study relied on the muddy data that researchers have decried, but he says the results have been replicated using more recent, granular numbers.

In 2018, Princeton’s Mummolo published [research](https://www.pnas.org/content/115/37/9181) showing not only that special weapons and tactics teams are deployed more often in communities of color, but that they on average “provide no detectable benefits in terms of officer safety or violent crime reduction.” Which is a point that often gets lost: While the high-profile responses to police brutality demonstrations draw more attention to the 1033 program and others like it, in many parts of the country its impacts are a staple of policing.

“We tend to focus on these events when there’s massive social unrest and they’re dominating the headlines and we see militarized police come in, but militarized police are active in this country all the time,” says Mummolo. “It doesn’t take a situation like we’re seeing right now to activate them.”

### 1033 = racist

#### **1033 is used to target black and brown communities – perpetuates racism and white supremacy**

Singhvi 21 (Sahil, Root-Tilden-Kern scholar at NYU Law, Studies Economics and Sociology at Wesleyan University, Research and Program Associate at Brennan Center for Justice, “Demilitarize the Police,” Brennan Center For Justice, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/demilitarize-police)

Last summer, the Los Angeles Police Depart­ment (LAPD) became the latest police depart­ment to take viol­ent action against peace­ful protest­ers. [Video foot­age](https://theintercept.com/2021/07/18/transphobes-rally-los-angeles-spa-police-attack-counterprotesters/?utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=theintercept&utm_source=twitter) shows LAPD officers acting less like protect­ors of the peace and more like an occupy­ing force in a theater of war as they beat already subdued indi­vidu­als with batons, shot noncom­bat­ive people with so-called “less-than-lethal” muni­tions, and [kettled](https://www.gq.com/story/what-is-kettling) protest­ers before arrest­ing them en masse.

To those famil­iar with the history of poli­cing in the United States, this beha­vior did not come entirely as a surprise. Some of the earli­est [iter­a­tions](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10511250500335627?needAccess=true&) of poli­cing are found in patrols and Night Watches that hunted down runaway slaves, [both](https://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/brief-history-slavery-and-origins-american-policing) in the South and around the coun­try. And law enforce­ment has a long and shame­ful history of [crack­ing down on dissent](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2018/aug/19/the-whole-world-is-watching-chicago-police-riot-vietnam-war-regan), partic­u­larly when expressed by communit­ies of color. Nonethe­less, it would be a mistake to ignore the ways in which the more recent phenomenon of police milit­ar­iz­a­tion has played into the hostil­ity that some police officers exhibit toward the communit­ies they are inten­ded to serve.

The mater­ial milit­ar­iz­a­tion of police has been on an upward traject­ory since the [pres­id­ency of Ronald Reagan](https://gould.usc.edu/why/students/orgs/ilj/assets/docs/25-2-Doherty.pdf), who “[allowed and encour­aged] the milit­ary to grant civil­ian law enforce­ment agen­cies access to milit­ary bases, research, and equip­ment”  as part of the “War on Drugs.” That anti-drug fervor contin­ued into the 1990s, when Congress [allowed](https://gould.usc.edu/why/students/orgs/ilj/assets/docs/25-2-Doherty.pdf) the trans­fer of unused Depart­ment of Defense equip­ment to state and local law enforce­ment for counter-drug activ­it­ies, a meas­ure which was then replaced with what is now referred to as the “[1033 Program](https://project1033.org/),” named for its estab­lish­ing numbered section in the 1997 National Defense Author­iz­a­tion Act.

Though these meas­ures were inten­ded strictly to mitig­ate drug traf­fick­ing, they resul­ted in an explo­sion of the use of milit­ary equip­ment [for other purposes](https://cpj.org/2020/09/when-police-patrol-protests-in-military-gear-journalists-face-a-hostile-reporting-environment/). We saw this milit­ar­iz­a­tion come to a head [last summer](https://graphics.reuters.com/MINNEAPOLIS-POLICE/WEAPONS/xegvbybazpq/), when riot police dressed for combat deployed flash gren­ades, used mine-resist­ant vehicles to drive through throngs of people, and surveilled activ­ists from [advanced spy planes, drones, and heli­copters](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/us/politics/george-floyd-protests-surveillance.html) during the protests follow­ing the murder of George Floyd. It’s no wonder that calls to repeal the 1033 Program and demil­it­ar­ize police have [picked up steam](https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/its-past-time-to-end-the-federal-militarization-of-police/) in civil rights circles and in Congress.

But it’s not enough to see milit­ar­iz­a­tion as simply the use of milit­ary equip­ment. As Columbia Univer­sity Law Professor Bern­ard Harcourt [points out](https://www.amazon.com/Counterrevolution-Government-Went-Against-Citizens/dp/1541697286), along with tanks and night-vision goggles, Amer­ican police in many cities have impor­ted and adop­ted the mental­ity of the milit­ary, down to the idea that the resid­ents of the communit­ies where officers patrol are enemy combatants to be met with force. And it’s worth noting which popu­la­tions are seen as those enemy combatants: left-wing protest­ers are [much more likely](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-polices-tepid-response-to-the-capitol-breach-wasnt-an-aberration/) to be subjects of police viol­ence than right-wing protest­ers, who are often [protec­ted](https://gothamist.com/news/nypd-accused-protecting-violent-blue-lives-matter-marchers-bay-ridge) by police.

This devel­op­ment flies in the face of Amer­ic­ans’ [long­stand­ing belief](https://www.californialawreview.org/posse-comitatus-act/) that police and the milit­ary should be separ­ate. It is an idea that can be traced back to the nation’s [found­ing](https://newrepublic.com/article/157978/police-violence-george-floyd-constitution), when Brit­ish soldiers quartered inside colon­ists’ homes ransacked rooms look­ing for evid­ence of treason against the Empire. The prin­ciple is also embod­ied in the [Posse Comit­atus Act](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42659.pdf), which prohib­its the deploy­ment of the federal armed forces to perform domestic law enforce­ment activ­it­ies unless expressly author­ized by Congress.

The milit­ary has a differ­ent role than the police. As a [Minnesota National Guards­man told a reporter](https://www.thenation.com/article/society/national-guard-defense-department-protests/) during the George Floyd protests, “We’re a combat unit not trained for riot control or safely hand­ling civil­ians in this context. Soldiers up and down the ranks are scared about hurt­ing someone, and lead­ers are worried about soldiers’ suffer­ing liab­il­ity.” Police, on the other hand, regu­larly come into contact with people whose civil rights they are required to respect and uphold. This differ­ence in role should be reflec­ted in a differ­ence of capab­il­it­ies.

Prevent­ing an “us versus them” mental­ity is all the more import­ant when police depart­ments across the coun­try have been [infilt­rated by white suprem­acists](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/new-report-hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right). While the over­all percent­age of white suprem­acists in law enforce­ment is [likely low](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law), incid­ents of white suprem­acy within police forces across the coun­try for decades [have eroded public trust](https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/law-enforcement-and-the-problem-of-white-supremacy) in the police, and with good reason: the pres­ence of white suprem­acist affil­i­ations and views in police depart­ments has been found to [correl­ate with](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law) dispro­por­tion­ate poli­cing of Black and brown communit­ies as well as more use of force against those communit­ies.

Many of the communit­ies that police perceive as “them” are [sorely in need of social services](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/how-i-became-police-abolitionist/613540/), not viol­ent inter­ven­tion. When police bring [snipers to deal with mental health crises](https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/crime/detroit-police-shoot-and-kill-schizophrenic-man-blame-mental-hospital-for-releasing-him/ar-BB1aKB5x), for instance, they further damage an already tenu­ous rela­tion­ship between their depart­ments and their neigh­bor­hoods. As soci­ology professor and coordin­ator of the Poli­cing and Social Justice Project at Brook­lyn College Alex Vitale [writes](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/31/the-answer-to-police-violence-is-not-reform-its-defunding-heres-why), “The altern­at­ive is not more money for police train­ing programs, hard­ware or over­sight. It is to dramat­ic­ally shrink their func­tion. We must demand that local politi­cians develop non-police solu­tions to the prob­lems poor people face.”

So, yes, we should demil­it­ar­ize the police because “when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” We should ask police to make mean­ing­ful changes to how they inter­act with civil­ians instead of allow­ing them to use equip­ment built for war when enga­ging with the public. But we need to demil­it­ar­ize the police because of milit­ar­iz­a­tion’s pois­on­ous effect on poli­cing culture. Today, the commonly under­stood duty of police — to “protect and serve” — is far too often replaced by a combat­ive approach.

### Link – China Cyberattacks

#### Securitization against Chinese cyberattacks based on techno-orientalism treating Chinese cyber as an extension to the “Chinese virus”

Siu and Chun 20 (Lok, Associate Professor Asian American and Asian Diaspora Studies at UC Berkley \*\* PHD in Anthropology from Stanford University, “Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare”, October 2020, Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 23, Number 3, October 2020, pp. 421-440, DOI: 10.1353) // Ilake LT🐣

The exemplary case of Huawei brings our discussion of yellow peril into the explicit terrain of techno-Orientalism where the idea of the Chinese techno-virus—emerging at the nexus of technology, international trade, and cyber-security—is articulated through the racialized fear of Chinese technological domination achieved purportedly by stealing trade secrets, engaging unfair trade practices, and enabling Chinese state surveillance. What the case of Huawei illustrates is the extension of the “Chinese virus” trope that already exists in the domains of public health (as biological pathogen) and research institutions (scientist-spy) into the realm of everyday consumer technologies. Our point in discussing Huawei is not to defend it or to judge its activities. Rather, we want to call attention to the increasing significance of media/communications technologies as sites of interstate techno-economic-security struggles (in addition to already existing corporate surveillance). Toward that end, the Huawei example clearly shows the entwined issues and discourses of technology, international trade, and cybersecurity, all of which are filtered through and constitutive of the racializing techniques of the “Chinese virus.” Between January 2019 and February 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed three indictments against Huawei and its subsidiaries. That Huawei is the first foreign company of recent memory that is singled out by the United States for charges related to sanctions violations, conspiracy to steal trade secrets from American companies (including source code and wireless technology manuals), and federal racketeering (including fraud, obstruction of justice, money laundering) is noteworthy in itself. This last charge of racketeering is used historically to address organized crime (i.e. mafias) and points to the U.S. government’s intended juridical delegitimization of Huawei as an irrational institution mired in secrecy and an unlawful global corporation that cannot be trusted. In response to these allegations, Huawei accused the Department of Justice of exercising a form of political persecution and asserted that “[the charges] are based largely on resolved civil disputes from the last twenty years that have been previously settled, litigated, and in some cases, rejected by federal judges and juries.”31 The case will likely take years to resolve, but its function will become apparent by the ensuing interstate trade and diplomatic negotiations between China and the United States. Meanwhile, the White House and various U.S. state departments have begun to exert pressure on both domestic institutions and allied nation-states to end contracts and research collaborations with Huawei. For instance, the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2019 blacklisted the firm on charges of intellectual property theft and barred U.S. companies from selling products to Huawei without federal authorization.32 Also, as discussed in the above section, the FBI has placed pressure on universities to increase oversight of Chinese American researchers and to divest from research collaborations funded by Huawei and other Chinese firms. Multiple universities, including MIT, Stanford University, and the University of Illinois, have terminated research partnerships with Huawei.33 In addition to these domestic pressures, U.S. officials have asked allied nation-states to cancel any existing contracts with Huawei, especially ones that involve using the firm’s equipment for developing 5G wireless networks. Cybersecurity serves as the stated rationale, conjuring the potential of the Chinese Communist Party through its ties to the firm to engage in cyber surveillance/espionage by intercepting individual, corporate, and government data flowing through the 5G wireless networks. According to this logic, the “Chinese/Asian contagion” manifest as “Chinese/Asian espionage” can now be hardwired into the infrastructural fabric of our telecommunications systems through which data will travel from our phones, computers, online accounts, and other kinds of technologies to Chinese companies and, potentially, the Chinese state. The assertion is that the use of Huawei’s equipment will create massive security vulnerabilities not just to U.S. intelligence but also to American individuals whose personal information can be captured and used for endless possibilities of commoditization. It is also argued that Chinese technology integration into any Western cyber infrastructure project “would give China the upper hand in any potential cyber war.”34

### Link – Diseases

#### Governments and militaries routinely militarize against disease, offering unique consequences and justifying use of violence to contain it

Christopher Watterson and Adam Kamradt-Scott 2015 Fighting Flu: Securitization and the Military Role in Combating Influenza https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0095327X14567364//CDMoney

Militaries also stand to make significant contributions to pandemic response measures, where their capacity to marshal resources and expertise can ameliorate civil efforts to contain outbreaks. The onset of pandemics can rapidly overwhelm medical facilities, upset logistics and supply chains, interrupt essential services, and in severe cases lead to the breakdown of public order.123 The operational self-sufficiency, capacity to rapidly mobilize, and independent medical capabilities that are essential to armed forces will also make them preferred agents for emergency relief in the event of an influenza pandemic,124 particularly where the requirements of the emergency go beyond the standing capabilities of the public health sector, or fall outside the usual remit of such actors, for example in mollifying civil disobedience. In addition to their potential contributions to civil society, militaries also have an interest in building internal capacity to combat influenza. Historically, influenza has depleted military readiness through the incapacitation of soldiers, overwhelming of medical facilities, and disruption of military operations and logistics. Although advancements in preventative and palliative medicine have, to a large extent, reduced the threat that infectious disease poses to modern armies, the contingency of an influenza pandemic still presents a significant challenge to global military 158 Armed Forces & Society 42(1) readiness, given the ongoing threat of novel antigenic shifts and the low rates of influenza vaccination programs in national armed forces.125 Militaries therefore have a strong imperative to bring influenza into their planning and applied medicine regimes such that seasonal and pandemic incidents of influenza are to the greatest extent managed through existing mechanisms of military health without presenting an unacceptable burden to readiness. Beyond the more pragmatic concerns of military readiness, there also exists an ethical obligation on militaries to ensure that the health care needs of their armed forces are met, whether in times of peace or conflict. As Harrison observes, ‘‘service-people have come to demand health care as a right: as part of an implicit bargain between themselves and the military authorities.’’126 Inasmuch as influenza poses a threat to the personal well-being of soldiers, there is likely to be an expectation that militaries remain engaged in activities that will confer a superior measure of protection to those that they have enlisted into service. Recognizing the stake that modern militaries have in the fight against pandemic influenza, how then do we reconcile competing agendas regarding military involvement in public health for the greatest collective benefit of pandemic influenza preparedness and response? Arguably an important first step is to acknowledge the long and distinguished history of military involvement in influenza-related activities, a small proportion of which this article has sought to convey. In the context of the United States, where civil–military cooperation is deep rooted,127 the contribution of the military to both domestic and international influenza surveillance and control efforts appears to be well recognized. Beyond this, however, broader acceptance of the fact that militaries can make substantive contributions to national, regional, or global public health is often lacking—not only with public health communities but also by military forces themselves. There is also a genuine need to increase dialog between the public health and military communities, at both the national level and the international level. More than this though, the dialog must be of a particular type—namely, it must enable a greater understanding and appreciation of the goals and objectives of each respective group, where they compliment each other, and where they stand in contrast. Tension between these camps routinely arises from a perceived lack of neutrality of militaries, particularly in international engagements where broader geopolitical concerns can become entangled in the business of providing public health. Discordant expectations about the remit and chains of command in preparedness and response measures can also diminish the efficacy of civil–military responses to disasters, particularly when such arrangements are constructed on an ad hoc basis.128 Highlevel joint planning and a mutual recognition of respective operational strengths will provide some basis for reducing tensions and identifying which particular public health objectives of the state will benefit from the engagement of one or both parties. Concurrent with these efforts, there must also be a concerted attempt to extract military participation in health efforts from the broader debate surrounding the securitization of health issues. Securitization is, in many respects, merely a Watterson and Kamradt-Scott 159 discursive tool that policy makers may seek to employ in an attempt to elevate specific issues, thereby granting them greater importance and (ideally) obtaining additional resources that may not otherwise materialize. Importantly, however, as acknowledged by the Copenhagen School’s founders, securitization also has several associated dangers including closing down or severely constraining public debate, justifying extreme measures, even legitimizing the use of force.129 By way of contrast, as this article has sought to evidence, military participation in health is a legitimate—even necessary—intervention with a long and distinguished pedigree that has been repeatedly demonstrated to benefit public health and society more generally. Therefore, to facilitate a more balanced assessment of the contributions that militaries can bring to public health, the distinction between the practice and implications of the ‘‘militarization’’ and ‘‘securitization’’ of health needs to be recognized.

### Cyber

#### Foreign Adversaries are only motivated to develop offensive cyber capabilities because the US did so first.

Carroll 12/20 Ben Carroll is a writer for Workers World and serves on the advisory board of the Durham Solidarity Center. “After massive cyberattack, imperialist U.S. blames Russia — and China” https://www.workers.org/2020/12/53520/

**The U.S. government is quick to cry foul when targeted by cyberattacks. But the reality is that the Pentagon and the U.S. government have pioneered and carried out some of the most vicious and extensive cyberattacks across the globe**. In 2010, the U.S. government conducted a cyber attack against an Iranian nuclear facility, using malware called Stuxnet, which damaged or destroyed upwards of 1,000 nuclear centrifuges, by some estimates. Iran has long maintained that its nuclear program is strictly for peaceful purposes of economic development, not for weapons. In 2013, Chinese research institutions, technology companies and mobile phone carriers were targeted by a U.S. hack that mined extensive information from millions of Chinese people and from higher-level targets. This attack came to light in a trove of documents from the U.S. National Security Agency released by whistleblower Edward Snowden. And **in 2019, the Russian electrical grid came under a cyberattack led by the U.S. Cyber Command**, as reported by the New York Times. (June 15, 2019) **These are but a few of the numerous instances of cyberattacks carried out by the U.S. government in** recent years, not to mention many other ways that the Pentagon has employed technology — namely by the extensive use of drone warfare — to rain terror and destruction down on people around the world in the quest by the U.S. ruling class to hold onto power and profit. Continuing to prop up U.S. militarism, on Dec. 8, 2020, Congress passed a $740 billion budget for the Pentagon. Despite it being vetoed by Trump, Congress is expected to easily override that veto and authorize this staggering budget. Congress passed the military budget with near unanimous consensus from both the Democratic and Republican parties. But for months they refused to pass meager economic assistance for the tens of millions of workers and oppressed people struggling to survive in the current staggering economic crisis. Many millions have lost their jobs and healthcare, and are now experiencing hunger, the threat of eviction and loss of their homes, and other severe hardships during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The goal of the U.S. government is to maximize the profits of the ruling class, whatever the human cost. It refuses to respond comprehensively to the desperate needs of people living and dying within its borders. Whether the recent hacking came from its imperialist rivals or others, it is **clear that U.S. attacks for profit on people around the world – through direct military war** and indirect economic war by sanction – **have created more than enough reasons for the recent historic cyberattack** on U.S. government and corporate entities.

#### Militaristic Offensive Cyber Operations are both epistemologically and practically flawed, they are prone to be misused due to systemic bias towards offense and crushing the enemy and they result in escalation and fear regardless.

Valeriano and Jensen 19 Brandon Valeriano is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is also the Bren Chair of Military Innovation at the Marine Corps University and serves as senior adviser for the Cyber Solarium Commission. Benjamin Jensen holds a dual appointment as a Donald L. Bren Chair of Creative Problem Solving at Marine Corps University and as a Scholar-in-Residence at the American University, School of International Service.

<https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#defense-and-deception> “The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint”

**The rationale behind persistent action—that the best defense is a good offense—is deeply flawed. In fact, most military and strategic theory holds that the defense is the superior posture.**[49](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-049) For example, Sun Tzu describes controlling an adversary to make their actions more predictable, and hence easy to undermine, by baiting them to attack strong points.[50](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-050) **The stronger form of war is a deception-driven defense: confusing an attacker so that they waste resources attacking strong points that appear weak.** This parallels cybersecurity scholars Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay’s claim that cyberspace is not offense dominant, but deception dominant.[51](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-051) Rather than persistent action and preemptive strikes on adversary networks, the United States needs persistent deception and defensive counterstrikes optimized to undermine adversary planning and capabilities. Fear and the Security Dilemma **New policy options proposed by Cyber Command** and the Trump administration **risk exacerbating fear in other countries and creating a self-reinforcing spiral of tit-for-tat escalations that risk war even though each actor feels he is acting defensively**—or, as it is called in the scholarly literature**, a security dilemma.**[**52**](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-052) **A**s shown above, most cyber operations to date have not resulted in escalation**.** The cyber domain has been a world of spies collecting valuable information and engaging in limited disruptions that substitute for, as well as complement, more conventional options. Shifting to a policy of preemptive offensive cyber warfare risks provoking fear and overreaction in other states and possibly producing conflict spirals. Even limited-objective cyber offensive action defined as “defending forward” can be misinterpreted and lead to inadvertent escalation.[53](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-053) As the historian Cathal Nolan puts it, **“intrusions into a state’s strategically important networks pose serious risks and are therefore inherently threatening.”**[**54**](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-054)More worryingly, with a more offensive posture, it will be increasingly difficult for states to differentiate between cyber espionage and more damaging degradation operations.[55](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-055) What the United States calls defending forward, China and Russia will call preemptive strikes. Worse still, this posture will likely lead great powers to assume all network intrusions, including espionage, are preparing the environment for follow-on offensive strikes. According to cybersecurity scholar Ben Buchanan, “in the [aggressor] state’s own view, such moves are clearly defensive, merely ensuring that its military will have the strength and flexibility to meet whatever comes its way. Yet potential adversaries are unlikely to share this perspective.”[56](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-056) The new strategy risks producing a “forever cyber war” prone to inadvertent escalation because it implies all cyber operations should be interpreted as escalatory by adversaries.[57](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-057) The Myth of Decisive Cyber Victory **There is a tendency in the military profession, at least in the United States and Europe, to uphold the concept of decisive battle as central to the Western way of war**.[58](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-058) **Often, disruptive technologies**—from strategic bombers in the mid-20th century to cyber operations in the 21st century—**are seen as providing decisive offensive advantages in crises**. In the interwar period between the world wars, airpower enthusiasts argued that bombers would reliably reach their targets, forcing political leaders to end hostilities or face the prospect of destroyed cities and economic collapse.[59](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-059) Yet the search for decisive battle is often an elusive, if not dangerous, temptation for military planners and policymakers. In a comparative historical treatment of major 19th- and 20th-century battles, Nolan argues that “often, war results in something clouded, neither triumph nor defeat. It is an arena of grey outcomes, partial and ambiguous resolution of disputes and causes that led to the choice of force as an instrument of policy in the first place.”[60](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-060) Decisive victories in any one battle are rare. Adversaries can refuse to fight.[61](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-061) They can even signal resolve through demonstrating their ability to endure pain. Planning and Assessment Pathologies **The new policy framework for offensive cyber operations risks compounding common pathologies associated with strategic assessments and planning**. [62](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-062) Removing interagency checks increases the risks that an operation will backfire on the attacker or compromise ongoing operations. Misperception is pervasive in insulated decisionmaking processes for several reasons.[63](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-063) First, small groups unchecked by bureaucracy tend to produce narrow plans prone to escalation during crises.[64](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-064) Second, **leaders often give guidance to planners during crises that reflects their political bia**s or personality traits rather than a rational assessment of threats and options.[65](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-065) Third**, offensive bias in planning may have little to do with the actual threat and more to do with a cult of the offensive and the desire of officers to ensure their autonomy and resources.**[**66**](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint#endnote-066) Removing interagency checks therefore risks compounding fundamental attribution errors and other implicit biases. Cyber operations are too important to be left to the generals at Cyber Command alone.

### Link – NATO

#### **NATO’s militarization reduced trust and security in nations around the world**

Naidu 00’ M.V. Naidu is an Indian politician serving as the 13th and current vice president of India since 2017. Previously, he served as the minister of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Urban development and Information and Broadcasting in the Modi Cabinet. THE UN, NATO AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS; A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS on JSTOR, Canadian Mennonite University, Feb. 2000, (https://www.jstor.org/stable/23607681?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A1bc59f1a6cf97e6336f75f45d0907055&seq=4)//BNB

By setting up antagonistic blocs, NATO undermined the UN principle of international co operation. By emphasizing military preparation and militarism, NATO did not pave the path for peaceful settlement of differences. of deterrence, the military alliances generated distrust and insecurity among the nations of the world. In legal terms NATO is claimed to be a system of collective self-defense permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The NATO Treaty does not invoke Chapter VII; nor is collective self-defense specified under that chapter. In political terms, NATO was created as an anti-Communist alliance inspired by the Truman Doctrine of communist containment through military deterrence and means. However, certain provisions in the NATO Treaty satisfy some of the criteria of a regional arrangement under Chapter VII. The NATO Treaty promises to uphold the purposes and the principles of the UN. Under Article 1, NATO pledges to settle all disputes peacefully as required under Article 52 of the UN Charter. NATO acknowledges the primacy of the Security Council in matters of international peace and security. If the NATO members were sincere in their commitment to peaceful solutions, they would not have needed an alliance that is heavily loaded with militarization and militarism. IF the NATO states were honest about their dedication to international peace and security, they could have also created the UN collective security system envisaged in Chapter VII, instead of the sectarian NATO. NATO was patterned on the model of the Rio de Janero Treaty of 1947, which is called a regional arrangement. Articles 5, 6, 10, and 12 and paragraph 3 in the Preamble of the NATO treaty define the region as the “North Atlantic area.” But then the NATO members Greece and Turkey are not in the North Atlantic region; besides, Italy and Portugal were not even members of the UN in 1949, as was pointed out by the U.S.S.R. on 31 March 1949. A main argument against NATO being a regional arrangement in the fact that NATO has been claimed to be a scheme of collective self-defense, but according to Chapter VII of the Charter, self-defense is not a subject of regional arrangement. Legally, a collective self-defense scheme has certain fundamental differences from a collective security scheme of regional arrangements. self-defense by definition is protection of, by and for a particular state or states, and not an enforcement action to protect international peace and security. As an inherent right , self-defense is subjectively determined by the concerned state, whereas enforcement action under regional arrangement is based on objective determination by the Security Council. Self-defense, triggered off as soon as an armed attack on the victim state occurs, is unilateral. Collective enforcement by regional arrangement is to the based on the consent of authorization of the Security Council. Under Article 51 self-defense is strictly after-the-fact, i.e., after an armed attack has occurred. This prohibits aggression rationalized as self defense. But enforcement action by regional arrangement can be both anticipatory and after-the-fact. Under a regional arrangement enforcement can be intra-regional, but collective self-defense is organized against external forces, not against a member state of the regional alliance. Thus the collective self-defense scheme of NATO cannot make NATO a regional arrangement. Nor can NATO be legitimized under Article 51 as an approach to collective self-defense, because NATO’s scheme is anticipatory while Article 51 provides for defense only after an armed attack has occurred. Even is defense preparation is considered allowable under Article 51, predetermination of a potential enemy is not envisaged or permitted by Article 51. Further, Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the NATO Treaty imply self-defense against an aggression from outside the NATO membership. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty refers to threats to “the territorial integrity, political independence or sovereignty” of the member states; Articles 5 and 6 mention “armed attack.” And Article 3 talks of resistance to armed attack from outside the NATO alliance.

#### NATO’s rhetoric of a dangerous Russia creates a security feedback loop of military modernization and unintended consequences leading to conflict

Julie Wilhelmsen, 9-30-2020, "Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/3/ogaa044/5916402//CDMoney

For example, a securitization of NATO as different and dangerous to Russia creates both inner cohesion in the Russian polity and makes possible a policy of “military modernization” and a posture of “defensive deterrence,” but it can have unintended consequences. It can be taken as a rejection of NATO's self-constituted identity as a legitimate, reliable, security-seeking actor and elicit a string of representations of Russia as different and dangerous on the NATO side.8 Failure to be recognized by the other on one's own preferred terms might not necessarily result in feelings of inferiority and shame, triggering efforts to reconstruct one's own identity, as Bially Mattern has suggested (2004, 12–13) or “progressive change” of self to become like the other, as Ringmar (2014) holds. As Lupovici (2012, 818) notes a collective actor that experiences ontological threat can “redefine the situation in order to protect identity.” “Avoidance,” he says, building on Giddens (1991, 188) “allows an actor facing an ontological dissonance to revalidate its identity rather than to change it or to change its behaviour.” Lupovici explores the strategy of avoidance in situations where dissonance is created endogenously, between conflicting self-identifications and the responses undertaken to offset threats to these self-identifications within one political entity. Avoidance may play out differently when the ontological dissonance emerges exogenously in a dyad of political entities. To reduce the dissonance between the understanding of self and the explicit identification of one's own political entity by the other as being something different and dangerous, revalidation of own identity can be achieved through externalization, by simply returning the negative identification. This strategy is manifest as a clear pattern in the texts by Norwegian/Western and Russian leaders studied below. It is hardly surprising that a collective actor would respond to the non-recognition implicit in being securitized with externalization in the form of talking and hitting back instead of undertaking some form of internal revision. Responding by mirroring the securitization of your group by the other party can be rewarding in terms of delineating and maintaining self-identity, particularly in a time of crisis. To restate and return to the case in focus: the non-recognition implicit in Russia's securitization of NATO can elicit highly antagonistic representations of Russia from the NATO side, triggering another round of representations and accusations from the Russian side, and so on. Such a negative spiral of mutual representations and accusations can be driven further when the different non-military issue-areas in which collective political entities engage also become subject to securitization. While relations between such entities usually take place on different international arenas addressing different issue-areas and exhibit a mixed pattern of friendly and hostile interaction (Jervis 2001, 37; Bially Mattern 2004), they may become subject to patterned all-encompassing friendly or hostile interaction. The latter, I propose, can happen when security concerns take center-stage in relations, through a spillover from mutual securitization in the military sphere into other arenas of potentially neutral or friendly interaction, such as trade, culture, or even diplomacy.

#### NATO is THE largest force for militarization in the world today and is an obstacle to peace.

Ruiz 22 Pablo Ruiz is a Lat**i**n America Networks Coordinator for SOA watch, an advocacy organization founded by former Maryknoll Father Roy Bourgeois and a small group of supporters in 1990 to protest the training of mainly Latin American military officers, by the United States Department of Defense, at the School of the Americas (SOA). Prior to SOA Watch, Pablo worked in Chile with Amnesty International and the Ethical Committee Against Torture. <https://www.pressenza.com/2022/02/us-nato-more-militarisation-less-peace-for-the-world/> “**US-NATO: More Militarisation, Less Peace for the World**”

In the context of a preparatory meeting last January, activists from various organisations gave their views and data on how bad the Atlantic Alliance, NATO, has been for the world. Jörg Kronauer, a German journalist, noted that “**NATO has never been a good force at all.** They talk about democracy and human rights, **how can you say they stand for democracy and human rights and send aid to Saudi Arabia**? The journalist recalls that “NATO was established when the Cold War began. The capitalist countries were against the Eastern countries and NATO wanted, through brutality and threats, to suppress these countries”. NATO was founded in 1949 with an alliance of 12 countries and today there are 30 member countries. Many believed that with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact (founded in 1955 and dissolved in 1991) NATO would disappear but this has not been the case as it continues to expand, fueled by narratives and justifications of supposed threats and the creation of enemies. It is true that in the early 1990s, the former USSR had a commitment that the US and NATO would not advance towards its borders: “Not one centimeter to the East” was the promise made by US Secretary of State James Baker, but the promise was not kept. Jörg Kronauer recalls that “in the decades of the Cold War, NATO was simply, and everyone knew it, an anti-communist organisation”. However, he points out, “if NATO were simply anti-communist, it would have been disbanded after the collapse of communist forces in the 1990s; but NATO is still used by Western countries to do their dirty work, to kill, to drop bombs”. Fiona Edwards of the “No Cold War” platform points out that “the US and NATO have left a trail of destruction. The current situation in Afghanistan, after twenty years of US-led war, **is a great test. There are hundreds of thousands of people who have died in this war,** killed by US forces, and what they have left there, in these 20 years of war: extreme poverty, it’s a humanitarian disaster”. The Aukus Alliance On the other hand, the activist denounces that “the military pact between the US, Britain and Australia against China is threatening stability. We are talking about a new Cold War and it is important to understand that the main priority of the US and US policy is to take down the Chinese government”. “If we look at the maps and the maps of military bases around China, we can compare them with the bases that China has in the rest of the world, and China has zero military bases in the rest of the world and China is surrounded by military bases around it. China has zero military assets around the US and Europe. We’re talking about zero versus hundreds of military bases,” says Fiona Edwards. The strategic alliance called AUKUS (an acronym for Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States) has been reported in the press as aiming to “defend the shared interests in the Indo-Pacific” of these governments. The AUKUS Alliance will enable the Royal Australian Navy to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. “What we have is a US war against China and China has made it clear that they don’t want a cold war. They don’t want a war, hot or cold, and they don’t want a nuclear war, which is a great threat to all of humanity,” says Fiona Edwards, adding that “China is asking for peace; and what we need now is for all the resources of humanity to be deployed against real threats, not imaginary threats. The big threat is pandemics, climate change is a big threat. Poverty is another real threat. And this cold war is against the interests of all humanity. NATO responsible for military spending Ludo De Brabander, a Belgian peace activist from Vrede, adds that “NATO is responsible for military spending”. He recalls that when the US and NATO launched their **campaign in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya**, the arms budget went through the roof. “The combined arms sales of the world’s 100 largest military services companies and arms producers (SIPRI Top 100) were 531 billion in 2020 compared to 300 billion in 2001.” **“NATO today accounts for more than half of global military spending, and that proportion will surely rise in the coming years, Russia’s military spending is 6%, of what NATO spends**, only slightly higher than that of Germany or the UK, so the confrontational politics around Ukraine are driving NATO’s military budget even higher,” he points out. The activist recalls that “the coup in Kiev and Russia’s annexation of Crimea were used by NATO to agree at the Wales Summit (2014) that NATO member states should spend 2% of GDP on their military apparatus. Twenty per cent of their military expenditure should henceforth be spent on the purchase of military equipment. Since then, **NATO’s military budget has risen** from $896 billion to $1,049 billion **by the middle of last year, an increase of 15%**”, and that “NATO’s war industry also dominates the global market. According to CIPRI, the three NATO member states, Germany, France and the US increased their share of the arms market to more than 50 per cent”. “**In recent years, NATO has increased tension with Russia and China whom it has called “systemic rivals**” and this is how the war industry can make huge profits at the expense of real security and peace, and of human security and safety,” says the Belgian activist. Adding that **there is not only increased spending and militarisation of NATO member countries but real acts of provocation against countries that are declared enemies. In recent years, NATO aircraft and warships, including nuclear-capable submarines, have conducted military manoeuvres near the borders of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, and even attempted to penetrate the borders of these countries**. Nuclear weapons Ludo De Brabander notes that “Rising international tensions are also driving new investment in nuclear weapons arsenals. According to ICAN, the nuclear powers invested $72.9 billion in maintaining and upgrading their nuclear weapons. The US accounts for half of that and, with France and the UK included, **67 per cent of nuclear weapons investment is on behalf of NATO countries**”. For Britain’s Kate Hudson of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, “NATO is an alliance with nuclear weapons states. The US, France and the UK have an estimated 6,000 nuclear weapons in their nuclear arsenals. “NATO has continuously reiterated its commitment to being a nuclear alliance. Most recently, at the heads of state summit in Brussels last year. In addition to these nuclear arsenals, there are some 150 thermonuclear gravity bombs in Europe. Basically, these are nuclear weapons that are released from aeroplanes. They are located in 5 countries: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. And, recently, the US announced that these weapons, under its nuclear umbrella, are going to be upgraded to be more usable,” Hudson points out. However, **there is strong opposition to the existence of nuclear weapons from European social movements and also from the governments of the states that host them**. “It is an issue that has been raised again recently under the new German government with some members of that government who have committed themselves to a nuclear-free Germany. Those weapons could be moved to Poland, which led to an immediate response from Lukashenko offering Russia to bring nuclear weapons into Belarus, which could potentially be an escalation,” says Kate Hudson, adding that “Russia has made a proposal that all nuclear weapons should be in the nuclear weapons state, which would mean removing US B 61 bombs from EU member states, and that is a long-standing demand of the Peace Movement. The activist recalls from the Non-Proliferation Treaty that “articles 1 and 2 prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to states that are not nuclear powers. But US nuclear weapons are located in countries without a nuclear force, making their presence there illegal”.

### Link – Drones

#### Technological innovation allows cheaper and more effective warfare for Western countries, increasing security and justification for more “efficient” militaristic operations (conclusion is a maybe)

Alex Harris, 3-7-2016, "Killing by Remote Control: Western Countries Relying on Technology in the Military," E-International Relations, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/03/07/killing-by-remote-control-western-countries-relying-on-technology-in-the-military//CDMoney

In helping to explain the increasing reliance upon drones in Western warfare, I first wish to reference the economic and technological advantage that drones bring to the battlefield. Following Hallgarth’s argument, the West possesses a large quantity of resources with a clear technological superiority. However, what the West lacks is ‘available recruits’, where the redundancy of conscription and, perhaps, public opinion, leaves troop numbers lacking. However, this is a minor disadvantage, far surpassed by its very superiority in technology. This might be indicative of the West’s continued drive to improve and develop its technological capabilities within war. In relation to the economics of drones, for the resourceful West, the numbers are advantageous. Recent figures place the cost of a Reaper Drone at around $10.5 million dollars. In comparison, one F-22 Fighter Jet is priced at around $150 million dollars and that involves a human element on top of the cost. Looking at this statistic alone, it is not surprising that the drone has become an increasingly relied on weapon of war. Despite this relatively low cost, one where America is leading the ‘Drones Arms Race’, it has come under criticism. For Singer, wars are only morally permissible if public and legal channels have offered their approval, believing that “by making war costless, it takes the public out of the loop by giving it no reason to care about the decision to start a war”[7]. While I would suggest this statement is a little dramatic, it raises an interesting question; what are the implications if the West begins only relying on cheaper alternatives to conduct its warfare, if indeed, this is a key factor for the increased reliance on drones? If drones intervene on humanitarian grounds and save lives, Singer would still disregard such positive reports as ‘crude calculations’, where the West was ‘powerful ‘ enough to save those innocent civilians but “only at a time and place of its choosing and, more importantly, if the costs were low enough”[8]. It is clear that the cost-efficiency of these drones helps to explain the increasing Western reliance. While I disagree that this is the only element contributing to its use, citing their precision next as a factor, Singer’s argument is interesting. While war will clearly never be ‘costless’, it is an important warning from Singer, highlighting his concerns if this reliance upon drone strikes continued. Another clear advantage of the utilisation of drones lies in their precision, a mode of warfare that appeals to ‘humane’ western values, where human error is reduced and the risk of collateral is to be avoided. David Whetham described a scenario where a drone strike could be effectively utilised. An insurgent leader, moving from safe-house to safe-house in hostile territory, would be extremely difficult to apprehend. If the state could surgically ‘remove’ that person, with no allied human lives at risk and legal authorisation granted, this would be a case of a targeted killing. Troops on the ground would avoid that risk and the legality of the authorised strike would be undisputed. In our modern ‘information age’, political accountability is of importance. For every badly directed missile hitting a school or a hospital, there will be mobile recording devices on the ground sending such images around the world over social media platforms. The western world fights ‘humane’ wars, governed by rules and regulations. Western states believe that drones offer the best (current) technological advancement to fight these wars. They allow for precise targeting and they have to be approved through various legal-politico channels before being granted approval. A common criticism argues that civilian casualties are still present, dismissed by Christine Fair who characterised these strikes as “the product of meticulous planning among lawyers and intelligence officers”[9], usually “accomplished with minimal civilian deaths”[10]. An article released in 2010 reported that drones had now upgraded their weaponry from 100 pound Hellfire Missiles to 35 pound Scorpion Missiles, possessing smaller blast radiuses and thus more effective at reducing collateral damage[11]. There will always be civilian casualties within war – it’s a fact of war – but it seems convincing that a real advantage of this technology is in its reduction of collateral damage. In addition, the restrictions required for authorisation instil a degree of accountability and its precise form of attack suits the fourth-generation mode of warfare that the West fights. Consequently, the increased reliance upon drones by the West seems to represent the form of warfare that the West now wishes to fight – precise, accountable and a reduction in the loss of both innocent and allied lives.

\*\*\*To conclude, I wish to assert that, despite a growing reliance upon the presence of drones in the asymmetrical wars that are being fought by the Western powers, it would be dangerous to continue to solely rely on technological advances. To gain a lasting political settlement, territory needs to be held and controlled, with a ‘friendly’ government instilled and maintained. This cannot be achieved by technological advancements alone, an advantage that the West holds over those it seeks to restrict, but must be achieved by ‘boots on the ground’. States have always relied on technology to gain superiority on the battlefield and this move towards UAVs is no different. The West’s increasing reliance highlights the new precise, efficient and accountable form of warfare that it now seeks to wage, to distinguish itself from the lawless ‘other’ it holds in its sights. However, to truly gain total victory, a heavy human influence is still required on the ground.

#### Drone technology able to give military superiority to Western States – justifies more violence by rhetoric of ‘efficiency’

Alex Harris, 3-7-2016, "Killing by Remote Control: Western Countries Relying on Technology in the Military," E-International Relations, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/03/07/killing-by-remote-control-western-countries-relying-on-technology-in-the-military//CDMoney

Upon President Obama’s inauguration into office in 2008, he pledged to end the ‘war on terror’, the public ‘call to arms’ that President Bush first issued following the events of 9/11. Instead of concluding the war, Obama placed it further within the private sphere, where combat was now fought ‘in the shadows’, through special operations and a substantial increase in the use of robotic and surveillance technology. This substantial increase can be demonstrated through empirical data collected by the New America Foundation. Within Pakistan, the height of Bush’s drone strike action reached 36 in 2008. By 2009, Obama had authorised 52 strikes in 2009, reaching an apex of 122 strikes in 2010, with 72 in 2011. From 2004-2015, of 401 total strikes, Obama has been responsible for authorising 353 strikes (88%) over Bush’s 48 strikes (12%). While I am doubtful that this represents the ‘real’ total of strikes that have been conducted (with the NAF stating that the data came from ‘credible news reports’), the empirical data is useful in demonstrating an increasing reliance on technological solutions[2]. It is my contention that the growing reliance on these technological advances highlight the Western requirement for precision, accountability and a reduction in collateral damage. While I will reference some of the criticisms concerning the ethics and morality of this ‘technological solution’, I will primarily be focusing on the tactical and strategic advantages that these weapon systems offer the West, in waging ‘humane’ and ‘hybrid warfare’. Firstly, I wish to discuss the role of technology within war. Is it fair to suggest that warfare now solely employs technological solutions to military problems? Has the use of drones changed the nature of warfare that is now fought by the Western countries? A warring state relying on technological solutions to gain strategic advantages in combat is an idea almost as old as war itself. Indeed, it is on the battlefields that these technologies are first “invented, exploited and then properly scrutinized by thinkers seeking to rightfully limit their use to morally justifiable purposes”[3]. From the creation of the long-bow to the repeating machine-gun, technological solutions have always played a vital role in warfare. As aptly described by Van Creveld, “every single element is either governed by or at least linked to it”[4]. When Van Creveld refers to a ‘single element’, he is not just referring to the act of battle itself but its elements in its entirety, such as communication, strategy and command. It’s convincing and I wish to speak of technology in the same way, recognizing its presence within all aspects of warfare. However, despite recognizing the omnipresence of technology within the elements of war, it cannot be its sole reliant. The use of technology in war, as concluded by Van Creveld, “often means there is a price to be paid in terms of deliberating diminishing efficiency”[5] – a line of argument I will later conclude as a warning against this ‘increasing reliance’, as a warning that true victory cannot yet be individually gained by ‘eyes in the sky’. Now, to turn to drones or UAV’s (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), they are also by no means a recent invention. Their first reported battle-test was said to have occurred in 1849 when Austria sent unmanned balloon, loaded with explosives, to attack Venice. A pilotless aerial torpedo was tested during World War 1 and UAVs were actively used by the US during the Vietnam War. The War of Attrition, from 1967-1970, was the first recorded battlefield appearance of UAVs equipped with camera equipment, for the function of surveillance, a role of the drone that is certainly established within the popular consciousness today. Now that I have discussed the use of technology and, more specifically, the history of UAVs on the battlefield, I wish to briefly summarize the ethical arguments that are raised, in part due to the efficient lethality of these weapon systems, namely the ‘threshold’ argument. This argues that the effectiveness of their drones – both in cost and in deployment – lowers the threshold that normally limits violence within morally acceptable boundaries. If it is perceived as a safer and more politically safe option than deploying troops, critics are concerned that drones will serve to exacerbate violence, where the ‘fog of war’ is dispersed and the ease at which an insurgent can be surveilled and then neutralized, concerns critics of its legal and moral implications. However, this ease is praised as precise and efficient, indeed referenced in President Obama’s State of the Union Address, expressing his view in regards to Osama Bin Laden, where “if you have twenty minutes, you do it swiftly and surely”[6]. It is also suggested that these ‘strikes from the sky’ are serving to radicalize generation after generation in the Middle East, where ‘dishonourable’ killings from a faceless enemy, albeit one with superior technology associated with the ‘West’, is acting as a recruitment tool. However, under Just War theory, drones are deemed morally permissible. While it is accepted that they are capable of great damage, it is deemed permissible due to the improvements that they offer at the other end of the spectrum, in prevention and deterrence. Indeed, in 21st century hybrid warfare, where the enemies are no longer identified through uniforms or emblems, can technology such as drones be justified under this identification framework, under the support they can offer ground-troops and the targeting of the disguised guilty hiding among and behind the general population? Such questions of the morality and ethics of drone warfare are perhaps more suitable of a different paper but it is important to make reference to the prevailing narrative nonetheless.

### Link – Democracy

### Link – DPT

#### Democratic Peace Theory reinforces western ideals of Democracy being an avenue to peace – provides idealistic justification for violent actions

Robert Skidelsky, 4-19-2022, "The False Promise of Democratic Peace," Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/democratic-peace-theory-is-wrong-by-robert-skidelsky-2022-04//CDMoney

According to democratic peace theory, democracies do not start wars; only dictatorships do. A wholly democratic world thus would be a world without war. This was the hope that emerged in the 1990s. With the end of communism, the expectation, famously expressed by Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 article, “The End of History?,” was that the most important parts of the world would become democratic.2 US supremacy was supposed to ensure that democracy became the universal political norm. But Russia and China, the leading communist states of the Cold War era, have not embraced it; nor have many other centers of world affairs, especially in the Middle East. Hence, Fukuyama has recently acknowledged that if Russia and China were driven together, “then you would really be living in a world that was being dominated by these non-democratic powers…[which] really is the end of the end of history.” The argument that democracy is inherently “peaceful,” and dictatorship or autocracy “warlike,” is intuitively attractive. It does not deny that states pursue their own interests; but it assumes that the interests of democratic states will reflect common values like human rights, and that those interests will be pursued in a less bellicose manner (since democratic processes require negotiation of differences). Democratic governments are accountable to their people, and the people have an interest in peace, not war. By contrast, according to this view, rulers and elites in dictatorships are illegitimate and therefore insecure, which leads them to seek popular support by whipping up animosity toward foreigners. If democracy replaced dictatorship everywhere, world peace would follow automatically. This belief rests on two propositions that have been extremely influential in international relations theory, even though they are poorly grounded theoretically and empirically. The first is the notion that a state’s external behavior is determined by its domestic constitution – a view that ignores the influence the international system can have on a country’s domestic politics. As the American political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz argued in his 1979 book, The Theory of International Politics, “international anarchy” conditions the behavior of states more than the behavior of states creates international anarchy. Waltz’s “world-systems theory” perspective is particularly useful in an age of globalization. One must look to the structure of the international system to “predict” how individual states will behave, regardless of their domestic constitutions. “If each state, being stable, strove only for security, and had no designs on its neighbors, all states would nevertheless remain insecure,” he observed, “for the means of security for one state are, in their very existence, the means by which other states are threatened.” Waltz offered a bracing antidote to the facile assumption that democratic habits are easily transferable from one location to another. Rather than trying to spread democracy, he suggested that it would be better to try to reduce global insecurity. Though there is undeniably some correlation between democratic institutions and peaceful habits, the direction of causation is disputable. Was it democracy that made Europe peaceful after 1945? Or did the US nuclear umbrella, the fixing of borders by the victors, and Marshall Plan-fueled economic growth finally make it possible for non-communist Europe to accept democracy as its political norm? The political scientist Mark E. Pietrzyk contends that, “Only states which are relatively secure – politically, militarily, economically – can afford to have free, pluralistic societies; in the absence of this security, states are much more likely to adopt, maintain, or revert to centralized, coercive authority structures.” The second proposition is that democracy is the natural form of the state, which people everywhere will spontaneously adopt if allowed to. This dubious assumption makes regime change seem easy, because the sanctioning powers can rely on the welcoming support of those whose freedom has been repressed and whose rights have been trampled underfoot. By drawing superficial comparisons with postwar Germany and Japan, the apostles of democratization grossly underestimate the difficulties of installing democracies in societies that lack Western constitutional traditions. The results of their handiwork can be seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and many African countries. Democratic peace theory is, above all, lazy. It provides an easy explanation for “warlike” behavior without considering the location and history of the states involved. This shallowness lends itself to overconfidence that a quick dose of economic sanctions or bombing is all that is needed to cure a dictatorship of its unfortunate affliction. In short, the idea that democracy is “portable” leads to a gross underestimation of the military, economic, and humanitarian costs of trying to spread democracy to troubled parts of the world. The West has paid a terrible price for such thinking – and it may be about to pay again.

#### **Democratic Peace Theory is empirically false and attempts by “Liberal Democracies” in justifying warfare against non-democratic/Europeans prove that Western dominance and discrimination are inherent in the thesis**

Rosato, Sebastian. no. 4, 2003 “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 97, pp. 585–602, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593025//CDMoney>

The historical record indicates that democracies have failed to adopt their internal norms of conflict resolution in an international context. This claim rests, first, on determining what democratic norms say about the international use of force and, second, on establishing whether democracies have generally adhered to these prescriptions. Liberal democratic norms narrowly circumscribe the range of situations in which democracies can justify the use of force. As Doyle (1997,25) notes, “Liberal wars are only fought for popular liberal purposes.” This does not mean that they will go to war less often than other kinds of states; it only means that there are fewer reasons availible to them for waging war. Democracies are certainly justified in fighting wars of self-defense. Locke (1690 1988), for example, argues that states, like men in the state of nature, have a right to destroy those who violate their rights to life, liberty, and property (269 – 72). There is considerable disagreement among liberal theorists regarding precisely what kinds of actions constitute self-defense, but repulsing an invasion, preempting an impending military attack, and fighting in the face of unreasonable demands all plausibly fall under this heading. Waging war when the other party is not engaged in threatening behavior does not. In short, democracies should only go to war when “their safety and security are seriously endangered by the expansionist policies of outlaw states” (Rawls 1999, 90–91). Another justification for the use force is intervention in the affairs of other states or peoples, either to prevent blatant human rights violations or to bring about conditions in which liberal values can take root. For Rawls (1999, 81), as for many liberals, human rights violators are “to be condemned and in grave cases may be subjected to forceful sanctions and even to intervention” (see also Doyle 1997, 31–32, and Owen 1997, 34–35). Mill (1859) (1984) extends the scope of intervention, arguing that “barbarous’ nations can be conquered to civilize them for their own benefit (see also Mehta 1990). However, if external rule does not ensure freedom and equality, it will be as illiberal as the system it seeks to replace. Consequently, intervention can only of conditions in which appropriate principles of justice can be satisfied” (Beitz 1979, 90). The imperialism of Europe’s Great Powers between 1815 and 1975 provides good evidence that liberal democracies have often waged war for reasons other than self-defense and the inculcation of liberal values. Although there were only a handful of liberal democracies in the international system during this period, they were involved in 66 of the 108 wars listed in the Corelates of War (COW) dataset of extra systemic wars (Singer and Small 1994). OF these 66 wars, 33 were “imperials,” fought against previously independent peoples, and 33 were colonial,” waged against existing colonies. It is hard to justify the “imperial” wars in terms of self-defense. Several cases are clear-cut: The democracy faced no immediate threat and conquered simply for profit or to expand its sphere of influence. A second set of cases includes wars waged as a result of imperial competition: Liberal democracies conquered non-European peoples in order to create buffer states against other empires or to establish control over them before another imperial power could move in. Thus, Britain tried to conquer Afghanistan (1838) in order to create a buffer state against Russia, and France invaded Tunisia (1881) for fear of an eventual Italian occupation. Some commendations describe these wars as defensive because they aimed to secure sources of the expense of other European powers. There are three reasons to dispute this assessment. First, there wars were often preventive rather than defensive. Second, there was frequently a liberal alternative to war. Rather than impose authoritarian rule, liberal great powers could have offered non-European peoples military assistance in case of attack or simply deterred other imperial powers. Finally, a substantial number of the preventive occupations were a product of competition between Britain and France, two liberal democracies that should have trusted one another and negotiated in good faith without compromising the rights of non-Europeans if democratic peace theory is correct.

### Link – Nuclear War

#### Affs support of binaries is what causes nuclear impacts – viewpoint promotes separation

Falk ND – (Richard Falk is an international law and relations scholar who taught at Princeton University for 40 years. “The Nuclear Challenge: Seventy Years After Hiroshima & Nagasaki: Against Binaries”, *Richardfalk.org*, September 10, https://richardfalk.org/2015/09/10/the-nuclear-challenge-10-seventy-years-after-hiroshima-nagasaki-against-binaries/) // TMBL

Perhaps, the most blatant of all binaries bearing on nuclear weapons is between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ nuclear weapons states, which immediately reminds us of Mahmood Mamdani’s devastating critique of the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims. [See Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (2005)] The United States and its allies regard themselves as ‘good’ nuclear weapons states that the world has no reason to worry about while Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan are ‘evil,’ or at best ‘irresponsible’ or ‘insecure’ states that should if at all possible be disallowed to acquire nuclear weapons. It is this primary binary that provides the moral/political disguised infrastructure of NPT treaty regime, which when established was confined to the P5 of the UN Security Council, which while not conceived of as ‘good’ by the West were at least not part of ‘the axis of evil’ depicted by George W. Bush during his presidency. In this series on the nuclear challenge as of 2015, I have myself succumbed to the ‘binary temptation’ in at least two respects—distinguishing arms control from disarmament, and separating nuclear disarmament from conventional disarmament. Relying on binaries can contribute to a certain clarity of analysis, leading I believe to useful political discourse, but it is also misleading unless qualified and transcended. Dichotomizing choice and consequences in these ways can be especially useful in pointing out weaknesses and pitfalls in ‘politically correct’ methods of solving societal problems. In this spirit, I continue to believe it is illuminating to insist on the critical difference between complete nuclear disarmament as transformative of the security scene as now embedded in world order and arms control as a series of more or less helpful reformist moves that stabilize and manage the role of nuclear weaponry in contemporary security structures. These arms control moves are made without posing any challenge to the fundamental distribution of power and authority in the world, and tend to make such a challenge appear less urgent, and even of questionable benefit. From this perspective, then, a critique of the NPT regime as the preeminent stabilizing structure in relation to nuclearism seems justified. It provides the basis for setting forth an argument that the NPT approach is antagonistic, rather than complementary to denuclearization and disarmament. This is contrary to the way the NPT regime is generally explained and affirmed, which is as step toward achieving nuclear disarmament, and an indispensable place holding measure to reduce the risks of nuclear war. It is true that inhibiting the spread of nuclear weaponry seems to be in the spirit of what might be described as horizontal denuclearization, although even this limited assertion is not without controversy. The recently deceased Kenneth Waltz with impeccable logical consistency seemed to believe so deeply in rational decision making as embedded in the doctrine of deterrence that he favored the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries because it would tend to make governments more cautious, and hence nuclear war less likely. Others, including myself, are more ambivalent about such an out of the box position, worrying about any further spread of the bomb, but thinking that only when there is a sense of a loss of control in the capitals of the nuclear nine will there arise a sufficient interest in denuclearization as a genuine political project (as distinct from more or less sincere rhetorical posturing). Obama’s Prague speech in 2009 still seems sincere as of the time of its delivery, but we need to notice that it lived and died as rhetoric because it lacked legs, that is, the rhetoric was never converted into a political project. In contrast, the NPT is definitely a political project and enjoys strong geopolitical support.

### AT Weapons Go To EDA or Ukraine, That’s Good

#### Even if some goes to the EDA, Iraq war proves that most of the weaponry still lands in the hand of domestic police.

Lazare 13 (Sarah, Reported for *In These Times* and writer for Common Dreams, “’It’s Intimidating. And it’s Free’: Iraq War Surplus Militarizing US Police”, November 25 2013, https://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/11/25/its-intimidating-and-its-free-iraq-war-surplus-militarizing-us-police)<https://www.commondreams.org/news/2013/11/25/its-intimidating-and-its-free-iraq-war-surplus-militarizing-us-police>

Weapons of occupation are coming to cities and towns across the United States after the Department of Defense handed 165 military fighting vehicles formerly used in Iraq to local law enforcement as part of a military surplus program.

This transfer of military weaponry, reported in an Associated Press [exclusive](https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/spoils-war-police-leftover-iraq-trucks-20994749) on Monday, will send mine resistant ambush protected vehicles, or MRAPs—which weigh 18 tons each and include gun turrets and bulletproof glass—to urban and rural areas, some of which don't even have the physical infrastructure to support such heavy and large vehicles.

These are not the first armored military vehicles given to U.S. police departments. A little-known 1033 program, originating from the National Defense Authorization Act of 1997, allows the Department of Defense to donate what it considers surplus military equipment to police and sheriff departments,

Michael Shank and Elizabeth Beavers [wrote](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/07/militarization-local-police-america) in The Guardian. A total of $4.2 billion in such equipment, including tanks and grenade launchers, has been donated so far.

Albany County, New York Sheriff Craig Apple said of the MRAP vehicle his department will be receiving, "It's armored. It's heavy. It's intimidating. And it's free," the Associated Press reports.

These giveaways, which have expanded in recent years, are on top of [$34 billion in Homeland Security-backed federal grants](https://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/20/local-cops-ready-for-war-with-homeland-security-funded-military-weapons.html) given to local police departments since September 11th, 2001 to fight "terrorism."

This is in addition to growing business between law enforcement, private defense contractors, and arms manufacturers that has facilitated the influx of military-grade weapons and vehicles—including drones—onto U.S. streets. Private sector and law enforcement collaboration is exemplified in annual weapons expos and SWAT team training [Urban Shield](https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/10/24-5), previously reported in Common Dreams.

Critics blast the MRAP giveaway as evidence of the heightening militarization of the police.

"The militarization of U.S. law enforcement is but an extension of the expanding police state," said Lara Kiswani of the [Arab Resource and Organizing Center](https://araborganizing.org/) in an interview with Common Dreams. "The U.S. not only exports and imports military equipment and weapons, but it also exchanges strategies and tactics of repression that have seeped deep into our communities."

"From the gross devastation that the people in Iraq have suffered as a result of US wars and occupation, to oppressive torture tactics and violent military attacks of the apartheid state of Israel, to the growing militarization of communities in the U.S., the policies and interests are one in the same," she added. "They are all a means of social, political and economic control at the expense of the poor, working class, immigrants, youth, and black and brown communities."

#### Even if some weapons goes to Ukraine, it will go to hands of terrorists, that’s an external impact for the neg

Fan and Lin 22 (Lingzhi and Xiaoy, Journalist for Global Times; Journalist for Global Times, People’s Daily, and Yerepouni Daily News) “Weapons sent by US and NATO may fall into dark net and even to terrorists, leading widespread and unbearable cost,” Global Times, June 9 2022

Heartless terrorists turned dreadful mercenaries, weapons scattered in a chaotic battlefield… These disturbing signs showed that a big, horrible disaster is sprawling in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.   
  
Executive Director of Europol Catherine De Bolle told German media in late May that they were very concerned that the military equipment the West is sending to Ukraine will end up on the black market and in the hands of terrorists and criminals.   
  
Previous reports show that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) found the US was stepping up its efforts to recruit members of international terrorist groups, including extremist organizations, as mercenaries to fight in Ukraine and take part in sabotage operations against Russian forces.  
  
After US President Joe Biden formally signed the $40 billion aid package to Ukraine, this worry became more pressing. Can the flow of weapons from NATO and the US to Ukraine be monitored? Is it only a matter of time before terrorist groups take hold of those weapons? Who is laughing behind Europe's worried back?  
  
Several experts told the Global Times that it is difficult to control the flow of weapons on the battlefield. They noted that not only Europe, which has been deprived of its security autonomy by the US and NATO, but also the third world countries, will suffer the costs.   
  
Those who prefer to live by the sword will fall by the sword. While the military-industrial complex profiteers, it is only a matter of time before this backfires, experts noted.

Flow of illegal weapons  
  
Jürgen Stock, the head of Interpol, warned that once the Russia-Ukraine conflict ends, guns and heavy arms will flood the international market, according to a Guardian report.   
  
"Once the guns fall silent [in Ukraine], illegal weapons will come. We know this from many other instances of conflict. Criminals are even now, as we speak, focusing on them," said Stock, stressing that the illegal weapons flowing into the criminal market will create a challenge.   
  
Several days ago, De Bolle expressed the same concern in an interview with the German newspaper Die Welt am Sonntag. She said the arms delivered from the EU to Ukraine could easily fall into the hands of criminals which would imperil the internal security landscape of the EU.   
  
Along with weapons are bloodthirsty criminals. According to the SVR, in April about 60 ISIS militants, aged 20 to 25, were released from prisons controlled by Syrian Kurds with the intervention of American intelligence services.   
  
They were "transferred to the US military base of Al-Tanf, located in Syria near the border with Jordan and Iraq, for combat training with the aim of a subsequent deployment to Ukraine," according to a statement from the SVR.  
  
Analysts pointed out that the frantic fascist "dream" of killing is the same on both sides of the Atlantic.   
  
The far-right "white supremacists" in the US now also threaten ordinary people's lives. The recent spate of mass shootings in the US has made the possible influx of illegal weapons from Ukraine more even frightening.   
  
What would it look like, on both sides of the Atlantic, if a large amount of unregulated weapons flows from Ukraine to extremists around the world? Regardless of this question, it seems that the US does not care.   
  
On May 21, during his visit to South Korea, Biden signed into law a $40 billion aid package for Ukraine.   
  
Previously, the US Senate and House of Representatives had quickly passed the bill with unusual "efficiency."

A heavy price to bear  
  
What weapons have the US and other NATO countries provided since the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted? A June 5 report by Al Jazeera titled "Weapons to Ukraine: Which countries have sent what?" said that US aid accounts for a significant portion, including 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems, 5,000 Javelin anti-tank missiles, several thousand rifles with ammunition, and a range of other equipment.  
  
However, some of the Western weapons sent as aid to Ukraine are being sold on the dark net. ASB Military News reported on June 2 that some of the arms the US and NATO donated are being sold to buyers in the Middle East and North Africa. According to the Pentagon's 2021 budget, each Javelin missile costs $178,000. However, these missiles are now listed for sale on the dark net for just $30,000, ASB Military News revealed.  
  
"Many people are taking these weapons and selling them to terrorist organizations on the black market. As a result, these weapons will be used in the future to kill people in Europe and other places," US journalist John Mark Dougan confirmed the news in an interview with the Global Times, saying it is almost impossible to monitor the circulation of these weapons. Dougan is a former US Marine who traveled to Ukraine as a reporter after the conflict broke out.   
  
"The management of weapons on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield is in a very chaotic state and the whereabouts of these weapons cannot be traced at all," Li Wei, an expert on national security at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, told the Global Times.  
  
Li pointed out that the Russian army, as the regular army, has a set of weapons management processes. On the side of the Ukrainian army, the situation is more complicated. In addition to the regular army, there is the Azov Battalion and other militia organizations. "At the beginning of the conflict, some weapons were even distributed to civilians," he said.  
  
Li noted that in the process of delivering aid, Western countries just handed them over to the Ukrainian government, but as these weapons are funneled into the conflict and their final destination, there lacks the ability and interest to monitor the situation.  
  
Where might these weapons go in the future?  
  
Akila al-Taya, an Iraqi security expert, recently told Russian news agency Sputnik that US weapons currently supplied to Ukraine are likely to be smuggled to extremists inside or outside Ukraine, as well as to terrorist groups, including the Islamic State, to arm them or create new organizations under other names.  
  
 "If these weapons are in the hands of terrorist organizations and criminal gangs, this could strengthen European separatism and spark internal conflict. Europe would be held accountable for US military actions and its own mistakes," He Zhigao, a research fellow with the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), told the Global Times.  
  
He noted that the influx of refugees after the Ukraine crisis has raised the possibility of terrorist attacks, adding that "the overlap of the refugee crisis, the influx of weapons, and the threat of terrorism is a scenario that Europe is extremely unhappy to foresee."   
  
"These episodes of chaos prove that the autonomy of Europe's security has obviously been lost during the Russia-Ukraine conflict," Li told the Global Times. Looking back, whenever Europe has tried to achieve security autonomy, the US has caused trouble to block the process, with NATO as a key culprit.  
  
"Russia tried to improve relations with Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but in the US' view, such an improvement could be a threat to its global hegemony," Li said, noting that "the US wanted to re-awaken 'Russophobia' in Europe, and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has made the US' plan perfectly realized."  
  
"For Europe, it is necessary to define and maintain its core interests more clearly. If they blindly follow the pace of the US, their security autonomy will be a fantasy, let alone being an independent actor with global influence," Li said.  
  
He believes that Europe should strengthen strategic autonomy and transfer its security concepts. Europe should also support the role of the UN in the field of conventional arms control with major powers including China, He said.  
  
Doomed to be backlashed  
  
In addition to the deepening anxiety in Europe, frequent gun violence has hit the US recently.   
  
At least 13 mass shootings occurred in the US over the last weekend, resulting in 16 deaths and more than 70 injured. So far, there have been 246 mass shootings in the US this year, according to a report by CNN on June 6.  
  
Scattering guns in foreign countries while being unable to ban guns domestically, the US' practice at home and abroad seems to be linked by a "dark line."  
  
"The dark line shows that some people want to see the consequences of the proliferation of guns," Zhang Yifei, an assistant research fellow with the Institute of American Studies of the CASS, told the Global Times, highlighting that by "selling guns globally and not banning guns at home, the biggest winner would be the military-industrial complex of the US."  
  
The American political magazine "Jacobin" recently published an article indicating that it is difficult to say how much of the $40 billion in US aid will ultimately go directly to Ukraine. But one thing is clear. For arms manufacturers, what is happening in Ukraine is a "bonanza."  
  
Meanwhile, sending a mixed bag of mercenaries into the battlefield seems like the last piece of the puzzle to fully implement the whole plan.  
  
Just as De Bolle assessed, "people who are going to fight in Ukraine do not represent a homogeneous group but rather adhere to different ideologies."  
  
Zhang said that the biggest hidden danger of US' approach is that those who hold dollars and American weapons must be pro-US. "Those who gather with a common interest will naturally disperse when their interests are exhausted. Therefore, backlash will be a sure outcome for the US," he said.  
  
"The US is ready to use any means to achieve its geopolitical goals, not excluding sponsoring international terrorist groups," the SVR said.  
  
The Global Times found that the definition of terrorist support in the UN's International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, almost "fits perfectly" with the behavior displayed by the US, and ironically, the US is also party to the convention.  
  
"As a hegemonic country, the US often defines 'terrorism' unilaterally," Li said, noting that "in the eyes of the US, whether it is 'supporting terrorism' is not defined by the UN, but only by the US' standards."  
  
But Al Qaeda, which was responsible for the 9/11 attacks, was created with US funding. Therefore, the US is a country that supports terrorists, Li concluded.

### AT Perm Do Both

#### Perm fails – aff diverts the discussion from the demilitarization of the police and coops the movement

Phillips 18 (Scott, Professor at the State University of New York College at Buffalo in the department of criminal justice, Police Militarization: Understanding the Perspectives of Police Chiefs, Administrators, and Tactical Officers (1st ed), Routledge, published in New York, May 30 2018)

The extensive media coverage over several days of the police tactical operation in Ferguson, and the Senate hearings examining the federal governments funding programs for police agencies, might portend substantive changes in policing and how they are organized. At the very least changes in tactical units, and how or when they are deployed, would be expected. Past research indicated, however, that unless this policing issue consistently remained in the spotlight for a period of time, the images of militarized police officers would simply fade from the public’s memory. The police might still enact minor symbolic adjustments in their policies or procedures, but whatever institutional status quo exists in policing would be maintained. The disruption in society between the public and the police would eventually return to its usual condition of quasi-stable equilibrium. The results of the survey data collected at the National Academy in 2015 demonstrated that, for the most part, this occurred in many American police agencies. Respondents reported that their agency continue to utilize tactical units as they have in the past. While there were some minor modifications in how these units are used, or the policies associated with them, the police chief and tactical officer interviews showed that these changes may occur for reasons contrary to the “organizational survival” that is characteristic of some organizational change (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The chiefs and tactical officers argued that the components of militarization are merely tools that are occasionally required as part of policing’s role in society. Policing sees the existence of tactical units in law enforcement as perfectly reasonable. It was illuminating, however, to hear many of these chiefs and tactical officers articulate that sometimes “we are our own worst enemy.” They are aware that appearances matter, and that tactical units should be used in a judicious manner. These are the areas of change that were found in the surveys and interviews: a reduction in the use of tactical units for some types of warrants, keeping armored vehicles out of sight when they are not needed, doing a better job with transparency, and questioning the need for tactical units in some police agencies. The chiefs and tactical officers are unwilling, however, to expose themselves, their officers, or citizens to danger when handling the tasks expected of the public

### AT 1033 Makes Communities Safer

#### 1033 doesn’t make community safer – multiple studies prove

Lawrence and O’Brien 21 (Charlotte and Cyrus, special assistance for Digital, Tech, and Analytics at ACLU; ACLU Research Fellow and ACLS Public Fellow; ACLU, “Federal Militarization of Law Enforcement Must End”, May 12 2021, https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-law-reform/federal-militarization-of-law-enforcement-must-end)

In addition to our examination of the potential impact of the Obama reforms on the actual equipment provided to law enforcement agencies, we also reviewed the existing empirical research on the stated value of providing such equipment through the 1033 program. Defenses of 1033 typically put forth the arguments that the program makes [officers](http://www.napo.org/files/8915/4723/8241/NAPO_LE_Priorities_Position_Paper_Trump_2016.pdf) [safer](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-114hres559ih/pdf/BILLS-114hres559ih.pdf) and [saves taxpayer dollars](https://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/Reutilization/LawEnforcement/ProgramFAQs.aspx).

Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, for instance, [defended the program by saying](https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-63rd-biennial-conference-national-fraternal), “Studies have shown this equipment reduces crime rates, reduces the number of assaults against police officers, and reduces the number of complaints against police officers.”

The actual data, however, tell quite a different story, and the studies Sessions touted have since been debunked. In 2020, political science Professor Anna Gunderson and a team of scholars [revisited](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-00995-5) the methodology and evidence behind those studies and detailed a number of fundamental methodological flaws, including that most such studies were inadequately granular to connect 1033 equipment to affected communities.

Gunderson’s team found that both studies cited by Sessions conducted their analyses entirely at the county level, comparing crime rates and assaults against officers to the aggregate amount of 1033 equipment transferred to that county. Because counties are often very large, including a number of distinct law enforcement agencies with distinct jurisdictions, an increase in 1033 equipment in one part of the county might happen to correspond with a decrease in crime in another, even though no causal effect is likely. Conducting an analysis themselves using agency-level data correctly, the team found no effect between 1033 transfers and decreased crime.

Another [peer-reviewed study](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-00986-6) corroborated this finding, determining that receiving militarized vehicles had no impact on either crime rates or officer casualties. This study was particularly powerful because it took advantage of the natural experiment created in 2015 when certain types of equipment were recalled by the E.O. but others were left in circulation. Kenneth Lowande, the study’s author, found no “downside risks” of federal reforms to demilitarize police.

### AT Perm / Alt = Abolish Police / Military

NOTE: I DON’T RECOMMEND READING THIS ALT WITH THE 1033 LINK BECAUSE THE CARD SAYS MILITARISM ISN’T JUST ABT THE WEAPONS THEY GET, ETC, ETC, BUT IS INHERENT IN THE INSTITUTION – THE AFF COULD EASILY TURN THIS BY SAYING NO LINK BC AFF DOESN’T MAKE SQ WORSE.

#### **Militarism is entrenched in the Liberal Order, we must abolish the military industrial complex and the police institution**

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

Despite the different political orientations which converge on the idea of militarization, it is notable how they all rely on a particular narrative about the nostalgic image of the ‘bobby on the beat’ or ‘ Officer Friendly’ being replaced by camouflage wearing brutes. Such imagery suggests that militarization is a problem because of its excessiveness (doors kicked in, armoured vehicles on the streets, officers faces hidden behind threatening helmets) – the implication being that more ‘ordinary forms’ of policing are warranted as long as it does not become excessive ([Napper & Kaba 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). But what is often absent is that the ‘ordinary’ history of modern police institutions is itself a history of state repression, economic exploitation and structural racism. But even more importantly, police power’s intimate links with military power is in no way new or aberrational. As this article will stress, war and policing continually overlap and intertwine. This crucial relationship is often downplayed or completely omitted within much of the militarization literature. For example, much of the coverage of Ferguson focused on the newness of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams and no-knock warrants, frequently neglecting how these have historically been used against people of colour – ‘for blacks, the war on terror hasn’t come home. It’s always been here’ ([Napper & Kaba 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). Correspondingly, tactics and expertise from imperial warfare have long fed into domestic policing in the United States – for instance, August Vollmer drew extensively on first-hand experience in brutal counter-insurgency in the Philippines, while ‘modernising’ police work in the early 20th century ([Schrader 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)).

But the problem with the militarization concept is not just conceptual, but political. The constant reiteration of a narrative in which the norms of policing are being superseded by aggressive new tactics and technologies rests on the assumption that there is a politically neutral and sociologically unbiased ideal of police which must be returned too. This is obvious in the case of some commentary: While focusing on the evils of the state, right libertarian commentaries avoid the central role of police power and violence in the fabrication of capitalist social relations – a gymnastics to be expected of a political ideology, which is based on critiquing state power while promoting unrestricted power for capital and private property (social relations that have historically been forged and protected by police power). But even more centrist liberal positions criticize excessiveness while nonetheless accepting the police as a fundamentally beneficent institution – such as the [ACLU (2014)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569) report which suggests that the problem with militarization is that it distracts the police from their proper job. Even many radicals have problematically accepted the police mandate as one of ‘protecting and serving’; hence, the institution itself must be extricated from the bad elements of violence and abuse. When left of centre and even radical scholarly critique and alternative media accounts start to mirror critiques coming from mainstream media, state officials, and right-wing think tanks, then perhaps it is time to revisit the utility and force of normalized scholarly concepts. The fact that the mainstream media echoes the ‘militarization of the police’ mantra so easily and frequently should be a cause of concern for critical theory. In particular, the prominence of right libertarians highlights how the police militarization concept doesn’t entail an accompanying critique of the relation between capital and the police institution.

### AT War and Police Are Separate

#### **War and police power are intricately connected to preserve the State’s order**

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

In an interview, South African police commander, Jeremy Vearey ([Amandla Magazine 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)), responded to a question on the apparent ‘remilitarization’ of the police by arguing that

Firstly let me just demythologise for you. The police never demilitarised and remilitarised through the sloganeering of someone. Never. Never. The structure in terms of the military tradition of instruction was always there. A militaristic way of doing tactical planning was always there. Do you understand the military way of planning? You firstly see those on the other side as an adversary.

In this article, we have worked towards the beginning of a wider demythologizing of the concept of ‘police militarization’. In our analysis, the historical conjunction between the military and the police, the ‘tradition’ as described in the above quote, is too strong to describe recent developments across the world as a disturbing new trend. And this is not just a past facet of policing but carries on into the present in capitalist democracies. Our concern then is not that the ‘militarization thesis’ does not describe real phenomena, but that it relies on an overstated and unquestioned distinction between war and police. This conceptual separation focuses too much on differences between the different coercive wings of the state, which disguises how social war and conflict is central to the logic of ‘internal’ or ‘domestic’ policing. War power and police power are best thought as not opposites, but as being always together. Indeed, the ubiquity of the militarization thesis may prevent more radical and comprehensive thinking about the connections of the police institution to power, violence and authority. Instead of focusing on the question of the divides between the police and military, we should ask if state violence and repression is any less problematic and traumatic and wrong if the officer was dressed in ‘non-military’ uniforms (is there such a thing as a non-militarized uniform?). Put another way, would the latter example be any more illegitimate and unjust? We are not convinced. Both the iron fist and the velvet glove, we suggest, have to be seen in conjunction, on a continuum of police power, where coercion and consent are always already together: the point being, the problem that we must grapple with is the way the state claims the right in the first place to actually arrest, kill or maim any subject, abroad and domestically, in the name of ‘security’, by which we mean its own narrow, bloody interests – repressive killing and smiling faces in uniform that are at once enacted as projects of pacification so that capitalist order survives and thrives.

# Framework

## 2NC – FW General (Long)

#### Role of the ballot is to endorse the team the best represents the world – Couple of net-benefits

#### A) Reps first – failure to analyze their discursive constructions of the opposition between self and Other guarantee error replications and policy failure

Turner ’16 – Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh

Oliver Turner, “China, India and the US Rebalance to the Asia Pacific: The Geopolitics of Rising Identities,” Geopolitics 21, no. 4 (2016): 922-944. Taylor and Francis.

A Genealogy of the Rebalance: Geopolitics, Postcolonialism, and the Politics of Identity

Logan, Swaine, Ross and others examine the US rebalance to the Asia Pacific in an unproblematic world in which the United States is responding to a selfevidently rising China. Yet these actors are not self-evident or unproblematic. Their realities (as threatening, benevolent, cooperative and so on) are subjectively defined, and socially and imaginatively constructed. Like the world they inhabit they are discursively spacialised or geo-graphed.12 The Asia Pacific for example was imagined into existence as recently as the 1970s, through the agglomeration of East and South East Asia.13 Peoples and places, moreover, are Othered from understandings of the self and for the self, with China historically existing in uncivilised, idealised, and anachronistic forms, among others, from the vantage point of the necessarily more ‘civilised’, ‘Enlightened’, ‘technological’ United States.14 This makes the relationship between self and Other inherently co-constitutive; “identity is constituted in relation to difference and [d]ifference is constituted in relation to identity”. 15

The United States’ contemporary geographical claims to the Asia Pacific, then, like all claims, are geopolitical because they inscribe Others with meanings which determine how they should be dealt.16 Discourse is thus not simply descriptive but performative in that it produces the effects that it names,17 fabricating global territories as sites of interest and material power. “Although often assumed to be innocent. . . geography [is]. . . a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy and administer space”. 18

In asking ‘how’ the rebalance is being enabled in its current form, the claim here is not that direct causal lines can be convincingly drawn between selected discourses and the implementation of policy. As Doty observes, the explanations of why questions are incomplete because they tend to take for granted the possibility that particular courses of action can happen, by presupposing the backgrounds of discursive meaning so central to that process. Asking ‘how’ is thus to examine how certain meanings are produced and attached to social subjects, creating discursive environments within which practices are made possible and others are precluded.19 The aim here then is to expose the discursive conditions which make ostensibly problematic or contradictory policies around the rebalance possible and which, as noted above, more traditional paradigms have difficulty explaining, through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth and knowledge about the ‘realities’ of China, the United States, India, and so on. It is to undermine the problematic self-evidences of the existing literature by revealing how rituals of power arise, take shape, gain importance, and affect contemporary politics.20 In tracing the genealogy of the rebalance, then, the expectation is not to locate its physical ‘origin’ in the rise of China, the Cold War or elsewhere. It is to explore the constitution of its knowledges through a ‘history of the present in terms of its past’, to show how ‘the present has become logically possible’. 21

#### B) Ground – 1AC is the focus of the debate and they choose everything in it. Plan focus justifies severing DA links and case turns --- making offense impossible.

#### C) Policy efficacy – Their attempt to limit out our argument is part and parcel with a security strategy that ignores the flawed framing resulting in hopeless policies now, which means “you link, you lose,” because the aff results in serial policy failure.

#### You can’t win offense – we aren’t policy-makers but policy analysts

Andress ‘02 – MPH, JD, Texas Program for Society and Health, Rice University and Doctoral Candidate, University of Texas School of Public Health. FrameWorks Instistute and the Center for Communications and Community (Lauri, Strategic Frame Analysis & Policy Making: Where Does SFA Fit into our Strategic Plan?, FrameWorks Institute, Issue 18)

From time-to-time after a presentation on strategic frame analysis, a group will ask how to apply this information to achieve their primary task of passing legislation, advancing a policy at the legislative level, convincing a targeted group of the public that a policy position should be supported, or creating a communications campaign to promote a specific policy position. This section is presented in an effort to ground the art and science of framing a message in the larger strategy and tactics that your organization must undertake to advance its public policy resolutions. The key point we hope to advance is that Strategic Frame Analysis (SFA) is a key building block in the policy making process and every activity that you undertake in pursuit of policy-making. Used effectively, SFA can become the foundation upon which your organization builds its policy advocacy strategy. In order to not distract us from our primary goal we will use a simplified model of the public policy process. This will allow us to more clearly demonstrate the benefits of SFA. In this case it is not the steps of the policy process or the model that we want to emphasize but the role of SFA in the process. Accordingly, the use of a standard model of policy making allows us to deconstruct the process indicating where SFA fits in each step of the policy model. Let's look at the phases of the policy making process as traditionally identified in the policy literature. Problem identification/gaining agenda status Policy Formulation and adoption Policy Implementation Policy Evaluation/adjustment/termination In order to illuminate the contribution of SFA to policymaking, we will first discuss policy making in general, presenting a normative view of the process. We will then shift to a definition that more closely matches the objectives of SFA. Next we will quickly review each policy making phase, culminating with an emphasis on the first phase, where SFA plays such a vital role. We will use examples from public health throughout this analysis. We do this for the following reason. Health outcomes are determined by a wide variety of factors that range in nature from individual behavior to medical care to socioeconomic factors. Accordingly, the decision making process involved in naming the health problem, and selecting a policy solution and intervention provides us with excellent examples to use in exploring how SFA interacts with the public policy process. Thus, it is by focusing on public health issues, we believe, that this analysis can best realize its' goal of helping you discern why SFA needs to be interlaced into your policy efforts. Policy Making Typically, policy making is described as an assembly line of the elements required to make policy: first the issue is placed on the agenda and the problem is defined; next the executive branches of government objectively examine alternative solutions based upon factual data, then select and refine them; then the executive agencies implement the solutions while interest groups often challenge the actions through the judicial branch; and sometimes the policy is evaluated and revised or scrapped. However, scholars of the policy process such as Deborah Stone say that this model fails to portray the essence of policy making which she describes as "the struggle over ideas" [2002]. Ideas are a medium of exchange and a mode of influence even more powerful than money, votes and guns. Shared meanings motivate people to action and meld individual striving into collective action. Ideas are at the center of all political conflict. Policymaking, in turn, is a constant struggle over the criteria for classification; the boundaries of categories, and the definition of ideals that guide the way people behave [Stone, 2002, 11]. Using Stone's image of policymaking matched against the purpose and objectives of SFA, we can begin to see the importance of framing and how it applies broadly at every level of the policy making process. We have said that framing is a communications tool that transmits conceptual constructs able to tap into people's deeply held values and beliefs. We have also tried to indicate that behind policymaking there is a contest over conflicting conceptions of the policy based on equally plausible values or ideas. The question at each step of the process then becomes: what frame transmits the policy with concepts that represent the values and worldviews of the public, policymakers and other key groups that you need to persuade? Accordingly, framing is the key mechanism that animates the policy process. For example, the second step in policymaking is policy formulation and adoption. In this step, elected officials, house or senate committees, or the President's cabinet identify, evaluate and select from among alternative policy solutions. A rational, generally accepted view of decision-making based on reason requires the identification of objectives, the prediction of the consequences of alternative courses of action, and finally the evaluation of the possible consequences of each alternative. However, adhering to the definition of policymaking as a struggle over values and ideas, we can see that a rational step-by-step method for policy formulation based on objectivity, facts and reason is not accurate. Humans use models, metaphors and other techniques to impose structure on the world and to reduce considerations. We use stories and exclude stories as we seek order. Policy formulation as a part of policy making is, once again, nothing more than reasoning by analogy, category and metaphor where those involved, based on their values and views, strategically select the data, facts and information that will be most persuasive in getting others to see a situation as one thing rather than another. A good example of framing in relation to the description of health problems and the formulation of public health policy is Nurit Guttman's [2000] explanation of the role of values that underlie various health interventions. Guttman explains that public health interventions are not always chosen because they are effective but because they have a stronger link to certain social values over others [2000]. Health education strategies targeting individuals with persuasive techniques raise the issue of individual autonomy and privacy because they reduce the ability of individuals to freely choose among options [Guttman, 2000]. On the other hand, regulatory strategies restricting the marketplace or protecting the environment draw on the values of justice and equity and the requirement to provide people an opportunity to live in environments that promote health and minimize risk [Guttman, 2000]. Thus the regulatory restrictive health intervention is inherently associated with the values of self-actualization and the promotion of the public good [Guttman, 2000]. Various methods or strategies can be employed for the purpose of achieving the goals of a public health communication intervention. Strategies may include the use of fear arousal appeals, asking individuals to put social pressure on others, or teaching people skills such as the use of self-monitoring devices…Values clearly play a central role in the choice and application of such strategies…Questions about the morality of coercion, manipulation, deception, persuasion… typically involve a conflict between the values of individual freedom and self-determination, on the one hand and such values as social welfare, economic progress, or equal opportunity on the other hand [p. 80]. Milio, [1981] explains another frame and related underlying values to describe the selection and use of particular public health strategies and policies. The obligation of health policy, if it is to serve the health interests of the public, does not extend to assuring every individual the attainment of personally defined "health". In a democratic society that seeks at least internal equanimity, if not humanness and social justice, the responsibility of government is to establish environments that make possible an attainable level of health for the total population. This responsibility includes the assurance of environmental circumstances that do not impose more risks to health for some segments of the population than for others, for such inequality of risk would doom some groups of people- regardless of their choice- to a reduction in opportunities to develop their capacities [Milio, 1981, p.5]. The key point is that, while policymaking is a process, it is also a human endeavor and as such it is not based on objective and neutral standards. Behind every step in the policy process there is a contest over equally plausible conceptions of the same abstract goal or value [Stone, 2002]. Remember, those participating in policymaking are also driven by their belief systems, and ideology. These values and ideologies precede and shape the decisions along every step of the policy process. Steps in Policymaking Now let's take a look at how framing plays a role in each step of the process. We will begin with step two in the policy making process, leaving the first step for closer examination later. Policy Formulation and adoption occurs if an issue achieves agenda status. Policy formulation involves analyzing policy goals and solutions, the creation or identification of alternative recommendations to resolve or address the identified public problem, and the final selection of a policy. The U.S. Surgeon General, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and most public health experts support exchanging clean needles for used ones as a way to reduce the spread of H.I.V. infections. New Jersey- a state with more than 9,000 orphans who lost their mothers to AIDS, 26,000 people with AIDS, the nation's third highest rate of intravenous HIV infection and the nation's highest rate of infection among women and children- not only refuses to pay for needles, it used under cover police to arrest those distributing clean needles to prevent AIDS activists from violating the state ban on distributing syringes [Clemons and McBeth, 2002.]. Former Governor Christine Todd Whitman (R) was adamantly opposed to needle giveaways, claiming it sent the wrong message to children about drug use. Former President Bill Clinton (D) who admitted the benefits of a needle exchange program -also failed to support the effort due to pressure from the then Republican majority in Congress. [Clemons and McBeth, 2002.]. AIDS activist lost this war of ideas that occurred at the policy formulation stage of the process. Possible policy solutions considered were increased sex education in schools; education about and free distribution of condoms; and the distribution of needles to IV drug users [Clemons and McBeth, 2002.]. Facts, reason and objectivity should have induced the elected officials to select a policy of needle exchange. However, these policies invoked a series of images and ideas antithetical to the values of powerful groups in the country such as the religious right [Clemons and McBeth, 2002.]. These same groups then framed the policy solutions in such a manner as to make them "about" the behaviors they recognize - illegal drug use, illicit sex, and addiction -as opposed to the prevention of HIV and the death of women and children. The framing of the problem limited the policy options. Policy Implementation occurs within organizations, typically administrative bureaucracies, directed to carry out adopted polices. Occurring at the national, state and local levels, implementation begins once a policy has been legalized through a legislative act or a mandate from an official with authority to set policy. Administrators make decisions about how to deploy resources, human and financial, to actualize a policy. The war of ideas and values continues to play out even at this level because administrators must define and put into operation key terms and ideas in the legislative policy. There is often great disparity between the intentions of a policy and how it is carried out. The outcome will be affected by how the policy is interpreted, the values, ideologies, and views of the administrators, and the resources available and selected to implement the policy. Consider the national policy that over hauled the welfare program during the Clinton administration. The phrase "welfare-to-work" was termed. The President's administration made a great effort to frame the legislation as a means to transition from welfare into jobs that allowed the recipient to establish a means of livelihood. Values expressed in this case might have been "doing-no-harm", or self-actualization. But later, in the execution of the legislation, some states emphasized the transition off of welfare to jobs, while others chose to see the policy simply as a call to decrease welfare rolls. The values invoked in these kinds of programs might be described as market autonomy, utility, or efficiency. Let us also reflect on the public health mandate to decrease smoking as enunciated by the Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in Healthy People 2010. The goal is to reduce the number of adults over age 18 who smoke by 12% by the year 2010. The Healthy People 2010 website provides information for individuals on how to stop using tobacco. The federal agency also invested in public service announcements featuring Bill Cosby on a variety of topics including the tobacco issue admonishing individuals about the dangers of smoking. No mention is made in the strategies on the website regarding market place regulations or structural remedies such as the tobacco lawsuits, banning smoking in public places, or the marketing of cigarettes. Guttman [2000] says that, consciously or unconsciously, the implementation of public health communication interventions involves the application of values. For instance, the execution of stop smoking programs at the individual level assumes that individuals should be responsible for the solution to health problems and simply need to have their refusal skills improved. On the other hand, the decision to implement a program at a societal-structural level identifies the locus of solution as external to the individual. Social problems are time, place and context bound. The way the health issue is framed as a problem (or not) is likely to reflect certain priorities or ideologies of the more dominant stakeholders. The mere identification of the problem itself presents a value judgment: the particular view of the ideal state is what determines what is considered problematic, thus requiring action. Is the problem conceived as poor motivation on the part of individuals who do not adopt recommended practices? Perhaps the problem is a result of structural socioeconomic conditions such as limited access of smokers to smoking cessation programs. …The locus problem can be identified at different levels, as a lifestyle issue versus an issue mainly associated with societal structures and distribution of resources [p.74]. Policy Evaluation The final stage of the policy process determines what occurred as a result of the selection of a policy and makes corrections in the current policy or program as needed. Essentially, the final stage of the policy process assesses what has occurred as a result of the implementation of the legislative policy. Just as there is no escape from values into an objective, fact-based mode for selecting one policy in lieu of another, there is also no neutral, rational, objective way to measure and calculate the benefits or harms resulting from a policy. All the same considerations of values-based framing come into play in this seemingly "objective" phase as well. To begin to evaluate a policy, several pieces of information must be established: the goals or original objectives of the policy; a means by which to measure the extent to which goals have been met; and the target of the program or who the program was intended to affect. Assembling this information involves value laden decision-making including the views, and values of the organizations involved, the analysts, clients or the target population, and the general public who may be paying for the program with their tax dollars. When assembling the indicators of success for a policy evaluation, priorities and values become important. A particular indicator that may gauge success by one value-laden goal [efficiency] may not capture the success of the policy for another goal [community solidarity] [Guttman, 2000]. An example provided by Deborah Stone shows us how a value laden evaluative criterion figures in something as seemingly straight-forward as measuring the efficiency of a library [Stone, 2002]. Scholars agree that an efficiently run library is one that builds up a good collection of books and that a particular library in California might be more efficient if it replaced some highly paid professionals and spent the money on building the collection of books [Stone, 2002]. It is possible to imagine several challenges to the evaluative criterion of efficiency. Some citizens may value the resources available in the library in the form of storytelling for children, or jobs for teenagers [Stone, 2002]. Some might debate what a "good book collection might include [Stone, 2002]. Finally, others might say an efficient library is one that would save the users time by providing the maximum amount of assistance while the patron is using the services [Stone, 2002]. On the use of efficiency as an evaluative criterion, Stone says it "is always a contestable concept…to go beyond the vague slogans and apply the concept to a concrete policy choice requires making assumptions about who and what counts as important…The answers built into supposedly technical analyses of efficiency are nothing more that political claims" [p. 65]. "By offering different assumptions, sides in a conflict can portray their preferred outcomes as being most efficient" [Stone, 2002 p.66]. Ultimately, evaluation of a policy becomes nothing more than a selection among criterion based on values and ideologies. In the example below, one can see clearly how the selection of the evaluation criterion extricates different values. [In] ... an intervention to prevent adolescent pregnancy that chose the strategy of persuading adolescent girls to use a contraceptive implant, a likely evaluation criterion would be the relative frequency of pregnancies before and after the intervention in the target population. For stakeholders who define the problem as based on sexual promiscuity or for those who believe the girls engage in abusive sexual relationships because of low self-esteem however, this criterion would be irrelevant because these adolescent girls may continue to engage in premarital sex and may have simply adopted enhanced contraceptive practices. Stakeholders who are interested in preventing youth from being infected with sexually transmitted diseases are not likely to find this criterion satisfactory. The contraceptive implant may protect the adolescents from pregnancy, but they may continue to be exposed to infection [Guttman, 2000]. Problem identification/gaining agenda status We saved the first step in the policy process for last because it is here, more than at any other stage, that framing becomes critical. The first step involves getting a problem onto the radar screen of the legislative body that must deal with that issue [Clemons & McBeth, 2001]. Problems gain legislative attention in many ways, but typically gaining agenda status happens once there has been a value -driven, subjective determination that an issue is now a "public problem". The question then becomes: why do some issues become public problems reaching agenda status and others do not? The answer to this question has to do with frame construction in the sense that an issue must be constructed so that it is perceived as qualifying as a social problem (Best, 1995). This is a key objective in getting the attention of the legislative body in charge. This assertion is derived from the notion that issues get attention when they are labeled as social or public problems (Best, 1995). How an issue becomes a social problem is not based entirely on objective measures of the severity of the condition but rather on a host of factors related to how society perceives or constructs the information presented regarding the issue (Best, 1995). Accordingly, SFA is used to help determine the organizing constructs or values that may be used to frame an issue in order to convert it into a social problem that then captures the minds and concerns of the public and its elected officials. First, a few ideas on why a social condition is not automatically a social problem and why it must become one before it can become a priority with the legislature. Joel Best (1995) asserts that until something is labeled a "social problem" it does not rise to a level of importance sufficient to attract the attention of the public and policymakers. His view is called the subjective, constructionist perspective in that it says a social condition is a product of something defined or constructed by society through social activities (Best, 1995). For example, when a news conference is held on crack houses or a demonstration on litter, or investigative reporters publish stories, or when advocacy groups publish a report, they are constructing or framing the issue using claims that help build the issue into a social problem. Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse [1977] use the term "claims making" to define the activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions that result in social problems. According to all of these definitions, it does not matter if the objective condition exists or even that it may be severe. It only matters that people make claims about it in such a way that it invokes the subjective mental construct that will frame the issue in such a manner that it is believed to be a public problem of magnitude and worthy of attention. In other words, social problems are the result of claims making activities that frame the issue so that it triggers organizing principles attached to an individual's deeply held worldviews and values (Best, 1995). Claims making activities draw attention to social conditions and shape our sense of the nature of the problem (Best, 1995). Through rhetoric, every social condition can be constructed as many different social problems. A claims makers' success [or framing] depends in part upon whether their claims persuade others that X is a social problem or that Y offers the solution (Best, 1995). In the area of public health, the construction of a problem explicates embedded values and ideals of those who made the health problem in the first place [Guttman, 2000]. The results of that construction further determine whether the problem gets on the agenda as well as the range of policy solutions that appear natural or appropriate. For instance, using claims that frame the problem at the organizational level assumes a major cause of the problem is based in organizational arrangements or practices [Guttman, 2000]. The problem of an overweight America is defined as people's lack of time or facilities at work to exercise or food at work that is high in nutritional value [Guttman, 2002]. Identifying the problem of overweight adults at this marketplace level may involve a frame that links the problem to the industry's quest for profits through the marketing of inexpensive food products high in calories instead of nutritious products that are more expensive and thus made less accessible [Guttman, 2002]. In this instance, the description of the problem involves a frame and claims that value the public good over market autonomy. In order to evaluate the relative merits of different frames applied to the social problems we wish to take into the policy process, we need to ask the following kinds of questions: Would such a frame make this problem a public issue that gets the attention of the legislature? In the instance above involving the problem of obesity, we would ask: Framed in this way, would the legislature then consider marketplace restrictions on advertising or regulations on food content? This presentation was meant to leave you with two "take home" lessons. Strategic frame analysis [SFA] is a critical tool in the larger public policy strategy that your organization must implement in order to eventually win approval for your policies. The use of SFA animates the public policy process because policy making, like SFA, is driven by subjective value systems, worldviews, and ideas.

#### Plan focus makes violence inevitable --- mental deputy politics absolve individual complicity

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Associate Professor – Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, p. 10-11)

‘We are the war’ does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society—which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of collective irresponsibility1, where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyze the specific and differential responsibilities of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective ‘assumption’ of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility—leading to the –well-known illusion of our apparent ‘powerlessness’ and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens- even more so those of other nations – have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia – since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls ‘organized irresponsibility’, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot ‘do’ anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ‘What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?’ Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution.’7 ‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so—called peace talks, namely as Drakuli~ says, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’ — our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others’. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

## FW/! – Structural

#### Prioritize structural violence — it’s been normalized even though it’s generational and just as dangerous as direct violence.

Winter and Leighton 99 — Deborah DuNann Winter, a psychology professor at Whitman College, Dana C. Leighton, professor at Texas A&M University, researches in social psychology and peace psychology, 1999 (“Structural violence,” *Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century*, June 1st, Available Online at <http://sites.saumag.edu/danaleighton/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/09/SVintro-2.pdf>, Accessed 07-13-2022) //rjain

Direct violence is horrific, but its brutality usually gets our attention: we notice it, and often respond to it. Structural violence, however, is almost always invisible, embedded in ubiquitous social structures, normalized by stable institutions and regular experience. Structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal, economic or cultural traditions. Because they are longstanding, structural inequities usually seem ordinary, the way things are and always have been. The chapters in this section teach us about some important but invisible forms of structural violence, and alert us to the powerful cultural mechanisms that create and maintain them over generations.

Structured inequities produce suffering and death as often as direct violence does, though the damage is slower, more subtle, more common, and more difficult to repair. Globally, poverty is correlated with infant mortality, infectious disease, and shortened lifespans. Whenever people are denied access to societys resources, physical and psychological violence exists.

#### Militarism contributes structural violence internationally.

Winter and Leighton 99 — Deborah DuNann Winter, a psychology professor at Whitman College, Dana C. Leighton, professor at Texas A&M University, researches in social psychology and peace psychology, 1999 (“Structural violence,” *Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century*, June 1st, Available Online at <http://sites.saumag.edu/danaleighton/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/09/SVintro-2.pdf>, Accessed 07-13-2022) //rjain

Patriarchal values also drive excessive militarism, as Deborah Winter, Marc Pilisuk, Sara Houck and Matthew Lee argue in their chapter, Understanding Militarism: Money, Masculinity, and the Search for the Mystical. The authors illuminate how socieites make soldiering a male rite of passage and proof of manhood, thereby showing the close link between militarism and masculinity. Militarization is also deeply rooted in spiritual motives, as men attempt to experience mystical sacrifice through war. Both masculinism and mysticism drive military expenditures beyond rational ends, and produce great structural violence to those (usually women and children) whose human needs for adequate food, health care, and education go unmet because arms are bought instead. In addition, market forces fuel arms production and distribution throughout the world; half the worlds countries spend more on arms than health and education combined.

The global economy that drives weapons production and excessive militarization produces structural violence on a planetary scale, especially in developing countries, as Marc Pilisuk argues in his chapter Globalism and Structural Violence. As global markets grow, income disparity increases around the world. Relaxed trade regulations and increased communication networks are creating powerful multinational conglomerates that derive huge profits off under-paid laborers in developing countries. The result is horrific structural violence to workers who toil under brutal conditions. Globalism also produces a mono-culture, in which people throughout the world learn that the good life consists of convenience products, western dress, and western values of individuality and consumerism. The seduction of western norms is disintegrating traditional societies which in the past provided meaning and care for its members. Pilisuk argues that nongovernmental organizations at the local level must work to reclaim workers dignity and neighborhoods.

## FW – Language

**The affirmative’s framework imposes language of war that standardizes militarization within debate and enforces a ceaseless cycle of violence**

**Marcinkevičienė 2011** (Rūta Marcinkevičienė, 8-25-2011, accessed on 7-13-2022, *The Marketing of War in the Age of Neo-Militarism,* "A Dangerous Language", )

Present-day authors continue talking about **dehumanizing people and euphemising war along the** same lines (i.e., focusing on indirectness and warning about the **destructive power of such language**). The author of The Language of War , Steve Thorn (2006), among other things, discusses how **military discourse has entered mainstream language use**. He also focuses on how **language is used to construct opposing sides during armed conﬂict** (Thorn 2006). A number of other authors such as linguists, discourse analysts and columnists mostly deal with two issues while talking about LW (i.e., its indirectness [cl. A twisted language of war ] and its inﬂuence on human minds and behavior). A natural question arises as to whether a direct LW exists. The most probable type of disourse would be military jargon reﬂecting the everyday reality of war. However, the experience provided by observers reveals the opposite. Military jargon is even more indirect than political discourse. The abundance of acronyms and abbreviations that hide full and direct names of weapons of mass destruction (e.g., nuclear weapons are called ABMs, SLCMs and MIRYs) (Bosmajian 1984) and euphemistic expressions with meaning hardly comprehensible for a lay outsider (e.g . , comic books : military maps, cracker box: ﬁeld ambulance, chicken plate: chest protector [body armor] worn by helicopter gunners) (Bob Hersey’s K Troop 2009) as well as abstract nouns are prevailing features of military people’s language. “One hardly senses that war and killing are being discussed. The destruction of human life has been euphemized through using abstractions” (Bosmajian 1984). Thus, the speciﬁc disourse that could be sufﬁciently direct is reported to be indirect. Its negative effects are made explicit by Haig Bosmajian (1984): “Dehumanizing the enemy and euphemizing the weapons of war and war itself is a deadly combination that, unfortunately, has historically been successful in defending the indefensible.” He continues to explain that these two language behaviors together have the effect of a) making the reality of genuine violence invisible and b) making violence acceptable and even desirable when military terminology is metaphorically applied to everyday matters. The paradox of LW is that: “We have wars on everything now: poverty, child hunger, famine, debt, drugs, and even war. The only times we don’t seem to have war anymore is when we are actually involved in armed conﬂict. We have police actions, military interventions, occupying forces, peacekeepers, and peacemakers. They all involve the movement of troops, the ﬁring of weapons, the destruction of property, and the loss of life the same as war does, but technically speaking, none of them are a state of war.” (Marcus 2006) In their famous book on metaphors, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) reveal how **a concept of argument is verbalized in terms of war ( indefensible claims , to attack weak points , to shoot down somebody’s arguments ) and how the structure of an argument reﬂects this. They claim that the ‘argument is war’ metaphor “structures the actions we perform in arguing”** (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 4). Moreover**, they suggest “to imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way. In such a culture, people would view arguments differently, experience them differently, carry them out differently, and talk about them differently.”** They elaborate on the essense of conceptual metaphor that is “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakofff and Johnson 1980, 5). Some other authors, like Hardman (2002), go further and recognize the power of language for users of the war metaphor. **The power manifests itself not only in understanding and experiencing reality**, as stated by cognitive linguists**, but also in accepting appropriateness of war**: We clearly recognize the power of language. Nevertheless, **we use a great deal of violent language in ordinary everyday speech quite oblivious of the way in which we are constructing our language to glorify war and violence and in that way make such violence appear appropriate even acceptable when it appears in reality.** (Hardman 2002) **He claims that the war metaphor plants seeds of violence and teaches the appropriateness of war**. Authors who pursuade to drop the war metaphor (and not to ﬁght against it) talk speciﬁcally about the ‘War on Terror’ metaphor. The metaphor appeared in the post-9/11 American-led narrative. As George Lakoff and Evan Frisch (2006) observe, the War on Terror metaphor was chosen by the Bush administration even though for a few hours after the towers fell on 9/11, administration spokesmen referred to the event as a crime . The authors argue that the frame of crime “would have involved international crime-ﬁghting techniques” (Lakoff and Frisch, 2006). Once the war metaphor took hold, the real war started. According to Lakoff and Frish, “the war metaphor created a new reality that reinforced the metaphor.” That is ﬁ nely tuned with Julie Redstone’s (2001) article about the new rhethorics and the labeling of national policy toward terrorism as ‘America’s New War.’ She further elaborates on the power of the war metaphor: “And it involves the choice of a particular language which shapes public opinion. **The language of war is created long before the ﬁrst plane takes off, long before the ﬁrst missile is ﬁred, long before the ﬁrst soldier sets foot on foreign soil. It is created by a consciousness, whether individual or collective, that chooses war as the most effective response to threat. This choice, in turn, shapes the consciousness of a nation**” (Redstone 2001). Cognitive linguists or any authors sensitive to language and its possible effects on human minds discourage against LW: “**Locked in the language of war, it’s impossible to ﬁnd another way out”**

#### Security Cooperation enforces a culture of dependence of militarism, but society can choose to reject this paradigm – only the alt solves

Jackson 11 (Susan Jackson, 8-25-2011, accessed on 7-13-2022, The Market of War in the Age of Militarism, "The National Security Exception, the Global Political Economy", )

In addition to militarism, several concepts are central to this study: militarization, the neo-liberal economic agenda and the NSE. **Militarism is** characterized as “**the excessive inﬂuence of armed forces over civilian life**” (Kaldor 2001). **This inﬂuence can be an explicit factor in political life, with the military either directly running the government or having a strong impact on policymaking from ‘behind the scenes**.’ At the other end of the spectrum, militarism can be less obvious, **with societal factors generating overall acceptance (if not overt support) of high levels of military spending and general military readiness**. In either case**, the military is considered integral to society because of the role it is assumed to play in protecting society**. In general, “[v]irtually **all nations make huge economic, political, and ideological investments in militaries and militarism— a broad system of institutions, practices, values, and cultures that take their meaning and value from war**” (Kirk 2008, 34). These investments become apparent in the NSE. In the context of the intersection of the GPE and national security, militarism is the idea that national security and military security are one in the same— **the heightened role the military plays in state-level security issues is based on the assumption that national security is achieved via military capabilities.** This militarism becomes apparent when we examine the assumptions that motivate the pursuit of national security through military means and the rules we put in place to ensure this type of national security. Of particular interest here is how the global business rules privilege. business when it is in connection with national security by employing the NSE in the GPE. **Militarization is the underlying process that maintains the manifestation of militarism in societal outputs** (e.g., arms production and military spending). **It is the process that entails what societies do to prepare for war even when war is not imminent** (see e.g., Bowman 2002; Enloe 1989; Regan 1994), such that it is the “contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence” (Gillis 1989, 1). This **categorization of militarization** moves beyond the standard deﬁnition of militarization **as the “expansion or relative size of some integral part, scope, or mission of the armed forces**” (Bowman 2002, 19)—which is usually observed through budgets, number of soldiers and so on— to a deﬁ nition in which the role of the military is a part of societal institutions. In basic terms, **militarization is a process in which a person or thing gradually becomes dependent for its well-being on militaristic ideas, and military needs are considered valuable and normal** (Enloe 1989). It is this process through which states maintain or increase their general preparations for war even in peacetime (Regan 1994). The **common perception remains, however, that security is necessarily military, and arms-producing and military services business happens because it is supposed to happen rather than because people have chosen to fund their militaries and thereby purchase weapons and services for these militaries. In reality, people could have chosen, and still can choose, otherwise. Militarization is not simply a given; it does not just happen but occurs because of the actions and inactions of real people and their interactions with real institutions or structures**. Rather, **this process rests on deliberate decisions** (Enloe 2000). In this way, **militarization is not just about those directly involved in the military and in arms-producing and military services companies, but also about wider society and those who either outright bolster or more passively fail to argue against the view the military is unquestioningly good, natural and necessary**. 2 Relevant for this project, militarization is the process through which societies decide to allow arms-producing and military services business to operate under different rules when the regular rules become cumbersome.

## FW – flawed policy

#### Negation – the AFF’s terms of debate present an all or nothing approach that equates disinvestment to fatalism – entrenching the status quo

Aziz Rana 22, Professor at Cornell Law School and is a fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “Left Internationalism in the Heart of Empire,” Dissent Magazine, 05/23/2022, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online\_articles/left-internationalism-in-the-heart-of-empire

These two tendencies pose real dilemmas for left internationalists. Precisely because of the potential traps, it is incumbent on American leftists to develop the type of internationalist vision and politics that universally and effectively joins anti-imperial and anti-authoritarian ethics.

For starters, this requires having a coherent response to ongoing crises, especially given the role of these crises in retrenching the seeming inevitability of the national security establishment. The terms of foreign policy debate in the United States present each new emergency as a series of either/or choices, with the left at a decided disadvantage. This dynamic is further reinforced by the fact that U.S. officials huddle with allied state actors like Emmanuel Macron and Boris Johnson to devise their agenda. Without political power and with limited transnational institutions, global left voices are instead largely isolated even from one another. There is no mechanism for developing anything like a common alternative proposal, and so, unsurprisingly, left discourse in the United States can read as fractured and discordant. All of this promotes an environment in which “doing something” means supporting the security state’s approach, while questioning that approach amounts to “doing nothing.”

For this reason, the American left must inevitably pursue a difficult balancing act: offer a genuine account of how the security state could engage differently with the issue at hand while highlighting how American geostrategic priorities tend to subvert democracy promotion or civilian protection. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Middle East, where strategic objectives—whether propping up or toppling governments, tilting the regional balance of power toward allies such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, pursuing counterterrorism goals against actors like ISIS, or securing Israeli interests—have borne, at best, a contingent relationship to stated humanitarian values.

Recent events in Ukraine provide an example of the challenges involved in this balancing act. Russia’s invasion is a brutal act of imperialism that violates basic principles of self-determination. Ukrainians on the ground are engaged in a legitimate war of armed resistance that has so far stalled Russian advances, in part due to defensive military aid from abroad. The United States has rightly championed such resistance, but it has done so through a flawed policy framework that harks back to a mid-twentieth-century Manichaean idea of friends and enemies.

The approach is built on boosting military primacy in Europe (more troops are now on the continent than in over two decades), as well as ratcheting up arms across the region. Along with a “lend-lease” bill aimed at easing weapons supplies—with a name that invokes memories of the Second World War—Congress just passed a new military assistance package that involves massive sums ($40 billion on top of an earlier $14 billion, even more than what Biden requested). Together this is, according to the Associated Press, equal to nearly the entire State Department budget and about one-third of Ukraine’s GDP. As historian Adam Tooze noted, all this means we are “financing nothing less than a total war,” a worry reinforced by leaked (and then denied) reports that the United States is providing intelligence specifically directed at killing Russian generals.

Such policies have also gone hand in hand with an aggressive sanctions approach, effectively meant to cut off Russia from much of the global economy—despite scholarly evidence noting that most sanctions, while forcing civilian populations to pay a heavy price, rarely bring wars to a close. At the same time, the United States is supporting Sweden and Finland’s applications to join NATO and by all accounts has been cool on various third-party efforts to negotiate a diplomatic solution.

The United States is embracing an anti-imperial fight, but that genuine desire to confront authoritarian aggression is filtered through an existing set of national security paradigms and institutional practices. U.S. actions are effectively shaped by background geostrategic assumptions—in this case, to weaken a global antagonist on a relatively peripheral battlefield (for Americans, at least). The problem is that these framing drives—especially connected to sustaining a dominant global position—tend to reproduce a conveyor belt of common policies that lock into place whenever crises emerge. Taken as a whole, these policies often push in escalatory directions that can diverge from goals of humanitarian protection and peaceful resolution. They may deemphasize concern with the costs connected to keeping a conflict going if it can undermine Russia’s relative power vis-à-vis the United States and its allies.

The potential for dangerous ratcheting effects under established U.S. policy doesn’t mean that left voices should argue for nonintervention in the context of Russian imperialism. But it does require a tailored analysis that carefully disaggregates the bundle of conventional security policies that jointly have pushed toward destructive outcomes. Such analysis resists the security state’s “take it or leave it” stance, which habitually defines as left obstructionism any refusal to sign up to whatever package officials contend promotes freedom abroad.

Russia’s invasion calls for a left embrace of Ukrainian self-determination and support for genuinely defensive military assistance, aimed at preventing an illegitimate overthrow. The hegemonic position of the United States and its history of failed interventions tend strongly to countenance against American military involvement, especially if one begins from a basic principle of assessing policy choices through the prism of “do no harm.” But that does not mean that in all cases leftists should oppose any kind of U.S. military support. I would argue, for instance, that the failure of the United States in the early to mid-1990s to provide similar assistance to Bosnians, also under circumstances of invasion, was a moral and political error. It set the stage for genocide and ethnic cleansing. And later, that very failure to provide defensive support became a justification for an illegal American and NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo—one that augured decades of sustained U.S. international rule defection.

Critically, though, any defensive assistance must be employed to deescalate rather than intensify hostilities and violence. In this case, that means carefully distinguishing between actual self-defense needs and a proxy geostrategic conflict—and refusing to fund a shift toward the latter. It also entails rejecting broad sanctions in favor of targeted measures that focus on those complicit in Russian aggression. And to the extent that other wider economic policies are also pursued, these should proceed through multilateral efforts to close tax havens that all oligarchs, not just Russians, take advantage of. Above all, defensive military assistance must be joined to a driving commitment to diplomatic negotiations that generate peace. Assistance cannot be used as a way—through seemingly unlimited funds—to trap Russia in a Ukrainian quagmire. That goal may aid American objectives in a “new Cold War” but would also intensify the humanitarian catastrophe on the ground.

Moreover, a leftist analysis should be deeply concerned about the further militarization of the European continent. Such militarization moves in the opposite direction of any truly peaceful order, which would be marked instead by mutual disarmament and shared decision-making. The idea of a European future governed by yet more American primacy and structured through the overwhelming presence of arms carries with it real dystopian possibilities, even if the prospect of a demilitarized Europe appears farther away than ever.

Russia is an incredibly dangerous actor, but it is clearly outmatched militarily and economically by U.S. allies in Europe, a fact further underscored by its reversals in Ukraine. At the same time, authoritarian populism is on the rise throughout the continent. Future scenarios exist in which the United States, and perhaps France as well, are run by far-right autocrats, in addition to various other European states. Sharply expanding military spending everywhere in this context is a recipe for hostile confrontations between belligerent and xenophobic foes on all sides. It also seems predicated on an implicit exceptionalism that views the United States and core European allies as impervious to democratic backsliding, despite the record of the last decade.

#### Policymaking – systematic thinking beyond individual case studies key to a recalibrated vision of good governance – AND that’s only achievable thru debating the best approach to the shifting international order

--yes this card cites people like Brands but the reason it’s good is because it says that we need to figure out what our strategic thinking principles ought to be, which includes the possibility that the US strategy of liberal hegemony is BAD

Andrew Ehrhardt & Maeve Ryan 20, Postdoctoral fellow with the Centre for Grand Strategy at King’s College London; History and Grand Strategy and Co-Director of the Centre for Grand Strategy at King’s College London, “GRAND STRATEGY IS NO SILVER BULLET, BUT IT IS INDISPENSABLE,” War on the Rocks, 05/19/2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/grand-strategy-is-no-silver-bullet-but-it-is-indispensable/

Towards a Humbler Conception

Much of the problem with grand strategy is that, as a concept, it suffers from people over-claiming what it can achieve — it is often thought of as a “silver bullet,” “master plan,” or a “road map to match means with ends.” Seeing it as such a panacea for policymaking only sets it up for failure, since no fixed, tidy, and decided plan on the scale required could ever withstand the unpredictable onslaught of international politics.

Instead, grand strategy is best understood not as a process (leading to the production of plans) but as a habit of mind: a conscious attempt to look beyond the confines of short-term requirements of national defense or day-to-day, immediate foreign policy, and to the pursuit of national interests in a more systematic and synchronized way. It remains conscious of first-order assumptions and first-order principles within a nation’s policymaking culture, and importantly, the ways in which these should be altered in the context of a changing international order. As David Morgen Owen writes in the Strategy Bridge, “grand strategy is a concept rooted in the demands of making strategy in the real world.” Indeed, an appreciation for the nature and pace of change in the international environment, and a country’s place within that system, is central to grand strategic thinking. In formulating such a position, it creates what Hal Brands refers to as “the intellectual architecture” from which more detailed policies flow.

At no other time is grand strategic thinking more useful than in moments when the international order seems to be shifting in unpredictable directions. To suggest that grand strategy is only possible in predictable and harmonious environments is short-sighted. It is difficult to think of many periods in the past two hundred years when statesmen and women anywhere in the world have enjoyed such conditions. Their worlds, like ours, were of ever-increasing interaction and complexity. The planet today is not the first “disordered, cluttered, and fluid realm” that has challenged policymakers, and it would come as quite a surprise to certain statesmen and civil servants of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for example, to be told otherwise.

Understanding Rooted in History

It is well known that the term “grand strategy” was first used in the mid-19th-century Britain to describe the scale of the military activity during the Napoleonic Wars, and has evolved since then through thinkers such Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett, who used the term in the context of maritime strategy, eventually coming to mean something bigger and more all-encompassing than the military sphere. As Basil Liddel Hart described it, grand strategy was a way of thinking that “looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace.” Others, including the historian Michael Howard later spoke of grand strategy as not simply being about “war fighting” but “war avoidance.”

Yet this approach to statecraft — what is essentially a way of thinking about the international system and a country’s place within it — had been in practice for much longer. One could look to Castlereagh, Canning, or Palmerston and find that for them, good statecraft meant conceiving of national interests in a more systematic and synchronized way than the day-to-day business of foreign affairs. Despite their individual differences, all shared an understanding of British national interests as being both shaped by the international environment, and — with good leadership — constitutive of it. They did not set down strict rules of conduct or “roadmaps” to achieve this, but reflected, in broader terms, about the international context in which the state operated and the type of environment that was best suited to its pursuit of prosperity and security. Good statecraft for them, in other words, meant taking the time to think grand strategically. At the core of this was what might be called a “historical sensibility” — an understanding of the nature and pace of change in the international environment — and an effort to craft a foreign policy around the big picture and the long term.

Similarly, when the Fifth Marquess of Lansdowne became Foreign Secretary in 1900, he found the British Empire in danger of being subsumed by a rapidly changing international environment, and rather than retreat into incrementalism, he advocated a strategy suited to present realities. The fallout from the Boxer Rebellion in China, the Fashoda Incident with France in the Nile River Valley, and the Spanish-American War were indicative of an international order that was edging towards an uncomfortable reset. The increases in naval power among the French, Russians, Germans, Americans, and Japanese led the Director of Naval Intelligence to remark that British superiority in the West Indies, Pacific, and Atlantic had “passed away.” As one journalist wrote, “The Empire stripped of its armour, has its hands tied behind its back and its bare throat exposed to the keen knife of its bitterest enemies.” Within this context, the Boer War, which began in 1899, was becoming both a highly public humanitarian catastrophe and an embarrassing quagmire for the country, which exposed an under-trained and ill-equipped military. Thus, Lansdowne did not inherit a “shared worldview among key political constituencies,” which Drezner, Krebs, and Schweller consider a requirement for grand strategy, nor even a shared understanding of the nature and purpose of the empire. Both within and without parliament, the government was challenged by strong opposition to the Boer War and by fierce debates about the future of the imperial project. Was Britain a “benign hegemon” or an illiberal imperial behemoth which needed to be restrained or even dismantled? And what did this mean for the policy of non-alignment which had served the country well for decades? The Cabinet was deeply divided, riven by debates that questioned the first-order principles governing national strategy. In this context, Lansdowne reflected on the precariousness of world order, and the startlingly high stakes modern policymaking had created: “In these days, war breaks out with a suddenness which was unknown in former days, when nations were not, as they are now, armed to the teeth and ready to enter on hostilities at any moment.”

Yet these conditions did not paralyze grand strategic thinking — instead they catalyzed it. The “prejudice against alliances,” which for so long had existed in the highest ranks of British foreign policy, would have to be replaced by a more innovative approach, one based on repairing and developing strategic partnerships. For Lansdowne, the pace of armament and the frequency of international conflicts meant that Britain’s traditional approach — which some referred to as “splendid isolation” — was no longer viable. The remedy, in his view, was a dramatic break with the policy of non-alignment in order to develop a strategic alliance with Japan, and by the end of 1905, Britain’s position on the high seas, as Paul Kennedy has noted, was “more favorable than it had been for the previous two decades.” Closely related was Lansdowne’s desire to repair relationships considered to be of strategic value to the United Kingdom. The Anglo-French agreement of 1904, known as the Entente Cordiale, helped lay the foundation for a cross-channel alliance which would develop in later years, one which had profound effects on the course of World War I. Added to this was an understanding that an agreement with France, as Lansdowne put it, “would not improbably be the precursor of a better understanding with Russia,” a country which was France’s alliance partner and viewed by some in the British government as the preeminent long-term threat. Further afield, Lansdowne initiated a rapprochement with the United States — our “brothers across the ocean,” as he worded it — which resolved longstanding differences between Washington and London concerning the construction of an Isthmian canal and the boundary of the Alaskan territory. The agreements provided a “clean slate,” as Lansdowne put it, which would give way to a “new chapter” in Anglo-American relations.

# Alt

## Alt – Demilitarization

#### Through the act of repurposing the military as a means of demilitarization, a just transition can be better advanced.

**Burke and Smolyar, 22** (Matthew Burke and Nina Smolyar, B.S. in Natural Resources from Ohio State, M.A. in Parks, Recreation and Environmental Education, M.P.A. from University of Vermont, and Ph.D. in Renewable Resources from McGill University, B.A. in Economics and Political Science from UPenn, MA in Sustainable Business and Communities from Goddard College, 7-1-2022, accessed on 7-13-2022, Cham Palgrave Macmillan, "Demilitarize for a Just Transition", https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99646-8\_11)

Implementing these steps of fiscal shift, economic conversion, and retraining and transition would have a profound benefit for workers and communities, while greatly reducing the additional risks and already occurring impacts of social and ecological catastrophe. A just transition approach brings this necessary focus to the process of demilitarization. The demographic profile of the U.S. military has dramatically diversified over the last half century, demonstrating the opportunities here for the many BIPOC people now doing this work. It is also recognized that veterans, BIPOC people, and people of Latin American descent often hold high levels of concern for climate change (Leiserowitz and Akerlof, 2010; Motta et al., 2021). Yet for many communities, military service provides a rare path out of inequitable conditions at home, while military recruitment is known to target low-to-middle income and poor communities (Steichen and Koshgarian, 2020). This repurposing would dramatically broaden the opportunities for high-quality, safe, and meaningful work among these communities and beyond. Meanwhile, military personnel, bases, and their communities often suffer disproportionate levels of pollution, domestic violence, mental and physical health problems, alcohol and drug use, suicide, and other social and economic disparities. Contamination and pollution from military testing sites and weapons manufacturing hit local communities hardest, too often involving inadequate compensation. A repurposing would reduce these vulnerabilities by directly remedying and improving conditions for these communities. This work would start by cleaning up the many contaminated sites worldwide, and extend to a permanent peace economy that avoids the multi-generational and multi-dimensional harms and trauma of militarism. As the U.S. military extends globally, so too would the effects of demilitarization through a just transition. Shifting from a role of securing fossil-fuel and energy dominance, a repurposed military under civilian control could activate a wave of global cooperation and solidarity, moving funding and personnel to support international aid and climate change adaptation and mitigation. Global agreements for nuclear weapon and fossil-fuel non-proliferation, poverty reduction, and ecological restoration may then receive the attention and support needed to make a real difference for people and planet. This approach is based on a radically different view of “national security” in recognizing the impossibility, immorality, and recklessness of the “fortress” response to climate change. Global climate change by definition is a global issue, not a national security one. Implementing a just transition urges a world view of collective solidarity and mutual interdependence. Demilitarization can enable support for displaced refugees and climate migrants, reduce tensions and military build-up in other nations, and ripple out to improving the lives of poor people worldwide (Siddique, 2021). The obstacles and challenges of demilitarization are many. For one, we must stay critically engaged, lest this process be coopted as yet another opportunity to exert further military control over civilian life. The nonnegotiable goal is rather to reclaim the assets of the military and reposition them under strict civilian control for non-military purposes. There are also the cultural biases and identities, and myths of the glory of war and militarism that require a committed, multi-faceted response to shift these narratives and develop real alternatives for achieving lasting security (Shifferd and Hiller, 2020). The vested interests, from fossil-fuel corporations, military contractors, Pentagon elites, and DoD officials, to federal, state, and local politicians will do all in their substantial power to resist cuts and downsizing. Yet no real transition to a peaceful and ecological future is possible without demilitarization. A significant leverage point is whether and how workers and their communities can be effectively and consistently engaged and help lead this just transition (Eisenscher, 2014).

#### Demilitarization has worked empirically – key to promoting disarmament and preventing further unchecked violence

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In 2017 Finland is celebrating its centennial. This year, it marked an even older anniversary: on 30 March 2016, it was 160 years since the demilitarization of the Åland Islands, an archipelago of more than six and a half thousand islands scattered in the middle of the Baltic Sea between what is today mainland Finland and Sweden. They are inhabited by almost 29,000 people, the vast majority of whom are Swedish speakers. The demilitarization of the Åland Islands was established by a tripartite convention between Great Britain, France and Russia and confirmed in the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which ended the Crimean War. To be sure, it was hardly a naïve love of peace that motivated the agreement, nor was there at the time any particular concern for the wellbeing of the people who populated the islands. The logic of the demilitarization was, and still is, that of ensuring that this small piece of territory would not be fortified and therefore would be less attractive militarily and less dangerous than it would otherwise be. This was of particular concern for neighbouring Sweden, one of the driving forces behind the agreement, even though Sweden chose to remain outside the settlement of 1856 for various reasons. An early confidence-building measure With the Convention on the Demilitarization of the Åland Islands, the superpowers of the time wanted to provide a pragmatic solution to the challenge of strengthening, as it was put in the French original text, “les bienfaits de la paix générale” – “the benefits of general peace”. Rather than competing for military presence in and territorial control of this controversial territory, the states parties accepted to keep away from it and create a platform for communication about matters that concerned it. One could call it an early confidence-building measure. The demilitarization agreement can be seen as a forerunner to the collective security system that was established through the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1920, with the aim of limiting the use of force in interstate relations and creating new avenues for addressing conflicts and threats to peace. The idea of collective dispute settlement was at the core of the League of Nations system, but, as we all know, it collapsed, or rather took time out (in part as a result of the unwillingness of the superpowers of that time to follow the rules they had themselves enacted) before being succeeded by the United Nations and the United Nations Charter in 1945. Meanwhile, the Convention on the Demilitarization of the Åland Islands was strengthened through the adoption in 1921 of the Convention on the Non-Fortification and Neutralization of the Åland Islands. Among the ten original signatories was Finland, which had been recognized by then as an independent state and become a member of the League of Nations. Finland had already been granted territorial sovereignty over the islands through a dispute settlement by the League of Nations earlier that same year. The internationally entrenched binding rules on neutralization for the islands are distinct from the policy of neutrality and non-alliance of Finland. The neutralization rules added to the previous international legal commitments the prohibition of using “directly or indirectly” the Åland Islands “for any purpose connected with military operations” in times of war. A long tradition In fact, demilitarization was nothing new in the late 19th century. The first documented examples date back to the early Middle Ages and rules requiring the demolition of fortifications and prohibiting their reconstruction were found regularly in peace treaties concluded in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. An early example was the 1559 Treaty of Château Cambrésis (between France and Spain), which included a prohibition of fortifications in the area of Thérouanne. In 1768, Denmark ceded several islands in the mouth of the river Elbe to Hamburg and at the same time it was provided that no military installations were to be built on these islands. A large number of demilitarization arrangements were included in the treaties ending the First World War, e.g. on the Saar Region, the Free City of Danzig, Spitsbergen/Svalbard and islands in the Mediterranean. This pattern continued well into the period following the Second World War, for instance with regard to the Dodecanese Islands, Pelagosa and the Free Territory of Trieste. A special case, in terms of the level of institutionalization of its internationalized management is that of Antarctica. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty stipulates that “in the interest of all mankind…Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord”. A more recent, though inconclusive, effort towards demilitarization was the 1999 plan by the former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan for Cyprus. One element of the plan was the demilitarization of the island. Sovereignty maintained Demilitarization and neutralization can be understood as limitations to territorial sovereignty, but they function, simultaneously, as confirmations of the idea of territorial sovereignty and control of territory. In fact, the Åland Islands regime is premised upon clear territorial sovereignty and thus the ability and legal right as well as obligation – of Finland in this case – to repel attacks and imminent threats against the zone, in order to safeguard its demilitarized and neutral status. However, this same solution is also an exception and a provocation to our thinking about the ways in which such territorial sovereignty can be exercised. The rules of demilitarization and neutralization entail a legally binding promise of giving priority to diplomatic means of communication and negotiation, before means of military power, even though power relations are acknowledged. The demilitarization is managed primarily by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The system requires transparency and communication on alleged controversies, something which became even clearer in the 1940 bilateral treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union. Both Sweden and the Russian Federation have consulates on Åland. The Governor of the Åland Islands heads the state administration on the islands, attends to state security matters and functions as a link between the Republic of Finland and the regional government and parliament of the self-government of Åland. The Governor, who is appointed by the President of the Republic of Finland with the agreement of the Speaker of the Åland parliament, also maintains regular contact with the consulates. Demilitarization is a small step towards disarmament. It is a recognition of the fact that the arms races that took place in many countries prior to both 1914 and 1939 were strong contributing factors to the outbreak of the devastating World Wars. The financial frustrations of these pre-war periods are absent today. According to the United Nations Development Programme’s 2015 Human Development Report, most countries in the OSCE region belong to the top strata of countries with a very high or high human development level. Still, we are witnessing, in Europe and beyond, a slow but steady escalation of aggressive rhetoric and military expenditures and activities, alongside an expanding use of force internationally. It is seldom easy or fruitful to try to establish who was first to start a conflict and who should take the largest blame in the midst of a difficult situation. Under such conditions we need to strengthen tools and strategies of communication and co-operation wherever we can and find new ways of promoting disarmament. Demilitarization is one of them. It is a pragmatic and contextual solution which requires cautious management by all parties concerned and a commitment to the restriction of the use of force. Could it be useful in new situations? What about the Arctic, for instance? Could a different but similar solution be envisaged here, relying on the old idea that the Arctic areas should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes?

## AT: alt fails

### SPF

#### Systemic Militarization results in serial policy failure.

Giroux 06 Henry Armand Giroux (born 1943) is an American-Canadian scholar and [cultural critic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_critic). Giroux earned a [Doctor of Arts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctor_of_Arts) degree in history at [Carnegie Mellon University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnegie_Mellon_University) in 1977. One of the founding theorists of [critical pedagogy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_pedagogy) in the United States, he is best known for his pioneering work in public [pedagogy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedagogy), [cultural studies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_studies), [youth studies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Youth_studies), [higher education](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higher_education), [media studies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_studies), and [critical theory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_theory). In 2002 [Routledge](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Routledge) named Giroux as one of the top fifty educational thinkers of the modern period. “The Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: Political Culture under the Bush/Cheney Administration” <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40550717.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ac6a3b26f52206ea8b79ff616be0edb22&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1>

**As militarization spreads through the culture, it produces policies that rely more on force than on dialogue and compassion**; it offers up modes of identification that undermine democratic values and tarnish civil liberties; and it **makes the production of** both symbolic and material violence a central feature of everyday life. As Kevin Baker points out**, we are quickly becoming a nation that "substitute[s] military solutions for almost everything, including international alliances, diplomacy, effective intelligence agencies, democratic institutions - even national security"** (38). Within this ideology, masculinity is associated with violence, and action is often substituted for the democratic processes of deliberation and debate. Militarization is about the rule of force and the expansion of repressive state power. In fact, democracy appears as an excess in this logic and is often condemned by militarists as being a weak system of government. Echoes of this anti-democratic sentiment can be found in the Patriot Act with its violation of civil liberties, in a rancorous patriotism that equates dissent with treason, and in the discourse of public commentators, who, in the fervor of a militarized culture, fan the flames of hatred and intolerance. One example that has become all too typical emerged after the September 11 attacks. Columnist Ann Coulter, in calling for a holy war on Muslims, wrote "We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity. We weren't punctilious about locating and punishing only Hitler and his top officers. We carpet-bombed German cities; we killed civilians. That's war. And this is war/715. While this statement does not reflect mainstream of American opinion, the uncritical and chauvinistic patriotism and intolerance that inform it not only have become standard fare among many conservative radio hosts in the United States but are increasingly being legitimated in a wide variety of cultural venues. **By blurring the lines between military and civilian functions, militarization deforms our language, debases democratic values, celebrates fascist modes of control**, defines citizens as soldiers, and diminishes our ability as a nation to uphold international law and support a democratic global public sphere. **Unless militarization is systematically exposed and resisted at every place where it appears in the culture, it will undermine the meaning of critical citizenship** and do great harm to those institutions that are central to a democratic society

### Education possible

#### Demilitarization key to education – Change this goofy ass tag

Gwyn Kirk, 2018 has taught courses in women’s and gender studies at various US colleges and universities for nearly thirty years. She has written widely on ecofeminism and women’s peace organizing; coauthored work includes Greenham Women Everywhere, Women’s Lives: Multicultural Perspectives, and the documentary, Living along the Fenceline. Gwyn Kirk is a founding member of the International Women’s Network against Militarism, and Women for Genuine Security, the USbased partner in this Network. She is on the Steering Committee of Women Cross DMZ and a member of the Bay Area Comfort Women Justice Coalition. She holds a PhD in sociology from the London School of Economics.Demilitarization for Social Justice Gwyn Kirk Feminist Formations, Volume 30, Issue 3, Winter 2018, pp. 34-44 (Article)https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/705523/pdf//CDMoney

From 2014 to 2017, I taught an intensive January term course, Cultures of War and Peace, at St. Mary’s College of California, a Catholic liberal arts school. I wanted students to see that the United States is a highly militarized society, bolstered by massive corporate investments in military contracts and political support for high military spending, and to think about what could be gained, in terms of social justice and everyday security, by changing this. Students came into these classes with a wide range of knowledge and opinions. They had grown up on video games, war movies, mass shootings, and drone strikes. They had heard repeated assertions that war is “a necessary evil” or that “diplomacy doesn’t work.” Many believed that America (their term) is the “good guy” and strongly identified with the nation (“We went into Iraq . . .”). Two-thirds were young men, mostly first year students and mostly white. A few were veterans or enrolled in ROTC. Most had family members who had served in the military. Their affection and respect for these relatives made it difficult for many of them to question militarism as an institution. I provided a lot of information, which I hoped would help students contextualize and evaluate what they already knew. I emphasized the scale of US military spending, for example. This was $611 billion in 2016, more than the next eight countries combined.1 Over $700 billion is projected for 2019, over half the Federal discretionary budget.2 Yet we are told money is not available for public schools, Head Start, elder care, Veterans benefits, and many other socially useful programs that have been cut without remorse or apology. In researching Federal budget trade-offs many students were shocked to discover what their cities and counties could have bought with the money they contribute to the military.3 Some students felt the course was too negative about this country and war in general. They thought of themselves as realists—mature, pragmatic, and willing to accept “necessary evils.” They scorned moves toward demilitarization as idealistic. I asked what ideas and projects “realism” excludes, makes unsayable, or unimaginable? The course materials referenced the vast damage war and militarism cause.4 What is realistic about this? What might be useful about idealism? I wanted students to be able to question government policy and the role of the United States internationally. What does it mean to be American? Is there only one place to stand? How to widen the limited public discourse on Gwyn Kirk · 37 these issues? Could this country play a more constructive role internationally? If so, how should it do this? I wanted students to see that it is absolutely legitimate to desire something better than the current militarized, unsustainable state of the world. The college’s stated principles of social justice, religious faith, and respect for all persons created the space for a course like this. Even so, it was a hard sell. I discarded many readings I thought these students might dismiss as rhetorical. I tiptoed around feminist concepts like “militarized masculinity” (Enloe 2000, 235). I had to learn how to carry on this intensive discussion as a white woman older than their grandmas, with students I would probably not otherwise teach. I focus on militarism here, but those who teach about the impacts of globalization or the role of the nation-state face similar challenges. Liberal perspectives do not question the fundamental assumptions and institutions of our society, which is essential for addressing the root causes of injustice. By contrast, seeking equal access to combat roles or Senate seats, difficult as that may be, is a very limited goal. Further, many students know little about the effects of US policies on people in other nations, or how the United States exercises power worldwide—culturally, economically, politically, and militarily. Some students’ sense of patriotism made them highly resistant to thinking about such issues (Hase 2002). A few dismissed virtually all the course materials as “ridiculous rubbish,” “hippy nonsense,” or laughably naïve. In their papers, I commented that, in college, students’ work must engage with the ideas presented. You can rebut them but you can’t simply dismiss them with “put-downs” like this. I asked the group, If you find yourself feeling defensive about a reading or something said in class, what is being attacked? What is at stake for you? Could you respond with curiosity instead of feeling offended? What else would it help you to know? As a group, the students knew much more about war than they did about peace, a concept that seemed hazy and weak. We watched Facing Fear (Cohen 2013), featuring Tim Zaal, a former neo-Nazi skinhead, and Matthew Boger, the gay victim of Zaal’s hate-crime attack. Remarkably, these men met again twenty-five years after that incident. They were challenged to grapple with their feelings and fears about each other, and against the odds, they became friends. I asked students about their own experiences of forgiveness and reconciliation and what it takes to change their hearts and their behavior. We watched Regret to Inform by Barbara Sonneborn (2000), who visited Vietnam to learn about other widows’ experiences twenty years after her husband was killed there. Vietnamese women were touched by this and thanked her for wanting to know how they’d coped with the devastation of that war in their own land—a small moment of personal reconciliation between women who had been defined as enemies. A guest speaker, formerly in the Navy and now a youth worker, explained why and how he became a conscientious objector. Students read about US Army veterans who knelt before indigenous elders at Standing Rock and apologized for US wars against their people. They read about community truth-telling efforts as part of healing from violence and conflict, and about dedicated behind-thescenes work to hammer out agreements between groups or nations. Following Enloe (2000), I emphasized demilitarization as a step-by-step process rather than peace as a static condition. Nations may become more or less militarized, depending on many factors. Creating Resources for Teaching and Learning Thanks to Franklin Graham, our first editor, Margo Okazawa-Rey and I were able to include a chapter on women and the military in Women’s Lives: Multicultural Perspectives. This focuses on militarism as a central institution in this country. It considers how militarism deploys gender and race, the impact of war and US bases on women overseas, and it discusses feminist opposition to militarism and war. Although not all teachers who use the book assign this chapter, the increase in militarization, especially since 9/11, makes it a salient topic for an introductory course. Another resource is Living along the Fenceline, a low-budget documentary featuring grassroots women leaders from Okinawa (Japan) to Texas and Puerto Rico (Hoshino, Kirk, and Lee 2012). Although not considered war zones, these strategic sites are part of a network of roughly 1,000 overseas bases that allow the United States to go to war anytime, anywhere. These women are not fourstar generals or White House strategists. Their expertise comes from living with the effects of militarism on a daily basis. Director Lina Hoshino focused on women’s stories. She filmed barbed wire fences around the bases, DANGERKEEP OUT signs, fighter jets zooming overhead, and the grassy spot in a park where a woman was raped by soldiers and tells us, this is where it happened. Despite different locations, the film shows recurring patterns: gender-based violence, environmental destruction, the impacts of colonization, and the importance of women’s organizing and leadership. Our goal was to affirm each woman’s work in responding to the US military presence in her backyard, and to show the possibility of a very different kind of security centered on respect for people and the land. I have helped to organize antimilitary fashion shows as a way to discuss militarism in accessible terms (Ahn and Kirk 2009). The Women of Color Resource Center staged the first one at a standing-room-only event in Oakland in 2005 featuring original designs as well as street “camo” and demo wear (Enloe 2007). As models walked the “runway,” a narrator read a script describing each outfit.5 Feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe talked about the military origins of khaki. Spoken word artists and musicians added to the event’s energy and political analysis. Since then, various groups have put on their own versions of this show. Local artists and designers, thrift-store bargain hunters, and people handy with a needle, glue gun, stapler, or duct tape have made remarkable outfits: Bomb Gown, Military Carbon Footprint, Bikini, Respirator Bra, Fence Dress, War Is Not Sexy, People’s Budget, Uncle Spam, and more. These shows can be theatrical events as in Oakland and at the University of Oregon, or pared down as part of a talk or workshop. Much of the excitement is in designing original outfits and scripts that encapsulate the stories people want to tell. Another community project was an event at the Comfort Women memorial in San Francisco. This memorial, located in a public park, commemorates some 400,000 young women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese Imperial Army from 1931 to 1945 (McGrane 2017).6 For International Women’s Day 2018, members of local groups created altars representing other examples of systemic violence against women—in addition to the plight of WWII comfort women—and celebrating resistance to it: • missing and murdered indigenous women, • women victims of war and drone strikes, • migrant women crossing the US-Mexico border, • women impacted by US military bases in Asia, • violence against Palestinian women living under Israeli occupation, and • violence against trans women in this country. In each case, soldiers, prison guards, police officers, or Border Patrol have assaulted, raped, and killed women or gender nonconforming people. This may be based on state policy as with WWII comfort women, or on militarized assumptions and cultures of law enforcement that condone, justify, or encourage gender-based violence. Those in authority may ignore these crimes. They may refuse to believe survivors’ testimony, close down public discussion, and cover up evidence. Culprits may be promoted, protected, or let off with a slap on the wrist. These factors make it imperative for feminists to speak out about such issues in public and demand that they be stopped. It was moving to see the care with which women had created their altars, placing photos and women’s names among flowers, candles, and colorful fabrics.7 Participants made brief presentations about these items as a way to explain each issue and to recognize the work of organizations that oppose these blatant violations of women’s human rights. Sharing these harrowing stories was an inspiring way to connect struggles across racial, ethnic, and national lines—an opportunity for learning, networking, and affirming shared beliefs about social justice and human integrity. Contexts and Frameworks In my experience, teaching for social justice requires focus and patience. It takes work to go against the grain. It may carry unacceptable personal and professional risks, especially for those responsible for children and other family members. As well as personal conviction, feminist scholars and teachers also need contexts that sustain us in this work. I am grateful for the support and encouragement I have received over the years from department chairs, colleagues, students, editors, and publishers. Also, I have benefitted enormously from working with Women for Genuine Security, a small but vibrant political community that is part of the International Women’s Network Against Militarism (Cachola et al. 2010).8 As teachers concerned with social justice, we are up against the teachings of the corporate media, right-wing talk shows, the stereotypes circulating in news reports and popular culture, and the echo chamber of social media. An iconic figure like Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. has been reduced to a “dreamer” by the news networks, while his hard-hitting speech linking “the giant triplets of racism, materialism, and militarism” is far less well known (King 1967). We are up against endless distractions, shorter attention spans, the price of tuition and textbooks, and other economic pressures students face. We are up against everyday psychological explanations that see inequality and injustice in terms of low-self esteem, poor identity development, learned helplessness, or a few “bad apples” that spoil the barrel. We juggle these considerations as we construct our courses, create assignments, and help students to absorb class materials, including structural analyses necessary to explain these systems of oppression.9 As well as identifying complexities and contradictions, intersectional feminist theorizing reminds us that academia was not set up to promote social justice, despite the development of fields like ethnic studies, women’s and gender studies, and queer studies that embrace this goal. As National Women’s Studies Association (NWSA) members know, these programs were created as a result of strong social movements and student demands. Determined faculty members generated the intellectual rationale for them. They negotiated with university administrators, got curriculum committees to approve courses, made connections across academic departments, and so on. In turn, they have needed Deans willing to validate such programs and direct resources to them. In the past twenty years, the political climate for WGS on campuses and in the wider society has become more challenging as misogynist, racist, and xenophobic viewpoints have gained ground through official rhetoric, legislation, policy, and the narrowing of public discourse. Increasingly, faculty members may face challenges to their teaching methods and course content; their work may be written off as “biased,” unscholarly, or politically motivated (Nisenson 2017). Indeed, such attacks on academic freedom have made many teachers’ lives more difficult, in some cases seriously affecting their physical and mental health, even leading to dismissal. Also, academic institutions have become increasingly beholden to corporate funding and values. Budget cuts, department mergers, and the fact that two-thirds of faculty are on part-time or temporary contracts these days all affect the organization and viability of interdisciplinary programs like women’s and gender studies. These turbulent times make the political nature of education explicit. It is crucial that we organize collectively on campuses and in communities to support teaching for social justice, and that we are part of strong, vocal, professional organizations that also do this. Tenured or tenure-track faculty must challenge the normalization of contingent labor and the professional and economic vulnerability of the many teachers hired on short-term contracts (Betensky 2017). As a community of feminist scholars and teachers, we must support those whose work is threatened by conservative voices and organizations on and off campus. We should help support feminist activist writers who have contributed to scholarship, teaching, and course materials over the years without regular remuneration for this. We should urge other professional associations to do the same. I believe our job as feminist scholars and teachers is to think big, to help provide spaces where students and community members can confront current challenges, and where they are affirmed as people who care about social justice, not based on guilt or pity, but as part of a “common context of struggle.”10 Ethnic studies, women’s and gender studies, and queer studies programs have all contributed to such understandings and communities of praxis. A silver lining in this wild time is that even as some political spaces are being closed down, new social movements are opening up others. The strong tradition of organizing for social justice in this country as well as the many efforts currently underway need to be much better known. They provide lessons, models, and inspiration. We cannot afford to despair or to nurture despair in others. We must continue to work for and hold out the possibility of progressive change even as past gains are being attacked and unraveled. In this regard, the 2018 NWSA conference theme, Just Imagine, Imagining Justice, is well chosen. A focus on values, beliefs, and visions is much needed in these challenging times. In October 2018, a Women’s March on the Pentagon seeks to refocus national attention on the immense costs of militarism at home and abroad.11 The organizers highlight the fact that both major political parties support war and militarism, and see the March as a call for a radical redefinition of security. Working for social justice means taking on the world as it is currently constructed. We need all our passion, creativity, skills, life experience, and the conviction that things can and must be organized differently, based on justice and love. How does your work contribute to such a vision? Who and what inspire you to do it? Who are your allies and accomplices? How do you cope with the challenges you face? What new processes, tools, and understandings do we need to create, as feminist scholars and teachers, to help us move forward?

## Alt – Rejection

#### The Alternative is to reject all instances of militarism

Maguire 18 Mairead Maguire (born 27 January 1944), also known as Mairead Corrigan Maguire and formerly as Mairéad Corrigan, is a peace activist from Northern Ireland. She co-founded, with Betty Williams and Ciaran McKeown, the Women for Peace, which later became the Community for Peace People, an organization dedicated to encouraging a peaceful resolution of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Maguire and Williams were awarded the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize. Abolish Militarism and War: Mairead Maguire to the International Conference against US/NATO Military Bases https://cpnn-world.org/new/?p=14245

Dear Friends, It is good to be here with you all. I would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to address the conference. Firstly I thank you all for your work for peace. It is good that we will have an opportunity in the next few days to get to know each other and together discuss what kind of a world we want to live in? There will be many different perspectives on this and the way forward, but let us agree to respect each other and to engage in deep listening and conversation no matter how hard and where the dialogue might take us! Let us be encouraged by the fact that we have made an important first step when we agree to enter into dialogue, and when we agree that peace is both the means and the great achievable gift. **It would be wonderful too no matter what area of social/political change we work in**, if we can unite on a shared vision of **a demilitarized world and find strength in agreeing we will not limit ourselves to civilizing and slowing down militarism, but demanding its total abolition. Some people might argue that peace is not possible in such a highly militarized world. However, I believe that peace is both possible and urgent. It is achievable when we each become impassioned about peace** and filled with an ethic that makes peace our objective and we each put into practice our moral sense of political/social responsibility to build peace and justice. **To build peace we are challenged to reject the bomb, the bullet, and all the techniques of violence.** Unfortunately, we are constantly bombarded with the glorification of militarism and war; therefore building a culture of peace and nonviolence will not be an easy task.  We are hearing about the building of a European army and we are asked to accept austerity and budget cuts to our health, education, etc. whilst increasing money to our own armies and also European military expansion. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization-NATO, which should have been disbanded when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, continue to carry out wars and proxy wars in many countries pushing towards the borders of Russia and resurrecting a cold war between the East and West. I believe that NATO should be disbanded and should be made accountable and make restitutions to the millions of people in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and many others it has illegally attacked, invaded, destroyed.  We will never be allowed by our governments, or our mainstream media, to hear many of the stories of the lives of so many civilians killed by US/NATO forces.  NATO forces have targeted and assassinated individuals and entire families.

# Root cause

## RC – War

**Militarism institutes warfare as a state of being - "deterrence" is a myth that implies war is temporary, denying our existence in a constant state of war**

**Gelot and Sandor, 19** (Linnea Gelot and Adam Sandor, 12-5-2019, accessed on 7-17-2022, Conflict, Security & Development, "African Security and Global Militarism", https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2019.1688959)

The concept’s intuitive nature, however, obscures two important features of threat governance in contemporary African politics. First, as pointed out by Frowd and Sandor, **while militarisation aims to capture processes of change in the legitimation and extension of military power, it nevertheless lacks the analytical flexibility necessary to bring into view varied practices and different forms of violence associated with contemporary interventions. For example,** it is increasingly the case that **interventions operationalised in Africa by leading states, international organisations and NGOs, including those that involve the military, engage in various forms of ‘armed social work’.**[20](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2019.1688959) The **pursuit of such practices, however, does not always signal a logic of war preparation and military power, but rather one of pastoral forms of power and selective (in)security. In other words, military actors are not always involved in martial pursuits, but the pursuit of such practices are nearly always defined or informed by logics of security, notably human security.** Secondly, if militarisation constitutes the entrenchment of society’s acceptance of military approaches to resolving problems, such that it affects all aspects of our everyday lives, then how do we know when that process is operative from when it is not? Certainly, we live with the complex legacies of past military practices and ideologies, even if today they are not presently operative or immediately coercive. Yet, when researchers use the Internet to research African politics, or communicate at a distance via WhatsApp with African interlocutors, does this constitute the militarisation of our everyday lives since these technologies were originally developed by military institutions? Indeed, if it is so inexorably pervasive, how can we analytically disentangle a civilian-centred society constituted by banal acts such as these from military-centred ones that regularise the constant possibility of the use of martial force? We pose these questions to highlight tensions in the concept of militarisation. Its theorisation in the literature has signified a set of processes that blurs political phenomena and boundaries like the public and private, police and military, and inside and outside. Nevertheless, as a concept it ultimately struggles to escape the rigidities of those distinctions and categories. The Special Issue equally shares the questions (posed as a critique) advanced by Anna Stavrianakis and Maria Stern: ‘if disciplines and practices central to civilian and military life grew up together, is it appropriate to talk of militarisation, as though ostensibly civilian practices were not already enmeshed with military power, itself central to the constitution of social order and the state?’[21](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2019.1688959) **Militari*sation* implies some pre-war, peaceful, normal state of affairs when war and its fighters kept to their corners instead of having shaped the arena of politics and the political itself.**[22](https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2019.1688959)**This is not to say that societal transformations regarding the use of force (e.g. militarisation, demilitarisation and the like) do not occur, or will not occur in the future. Our point is to stress that war, security and society have always been mutually imbricated, and that studying the use of force should always involve giving full recognition of those imbrications. Only by fully recognising this can we capture the diverse forms of political violence operating in and on transnationalised African spaces.** There is a danger that some usages of militarisation to explain the governance of threats in/on Africa result in an underestimation of war-like forms of politics because **it blithely assumes that war is somehow an historical and social aberration in African settings, or elsewhere. The same danger applies as a result of frequent unquestioning usages of security as a predominant guiding concept**. That said, an IPS approach to militarism that takes war and security into account can carve out analytical room for a fluidity in our use of concepts; that is, the possibility exists to pursue careful treatments of these concepts that successfully navigate a middle ground.

**Militarism is the root cause of ALL war in the current era**

**La Prairie**, Randy S. Western Michigan University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing,  20**21**. 28843783.

Whatever the broader social implications of the invasion of Iraq and American militarism may be, if one only takes the view that committing war crimes with vast and terrible human consequences should be avoided, then understanding the sociological causes of war in the United States may be necessary for preventing such paroxysms of violence in the future. This is especially true if the **causes of** the invasion of **Iraq were systemic** and structural, enduring features of our society, the same as at other times when the United States used military force. Indeed, many analysts (e.g. Mann 2003; Dorrien 2004) have insisted or implied that the Iraq War was unique in that the Bush administration’s unilateral assault on Iraq was rooted in a militaristic foreign policy ideology that advocated offensive military aggression and American global domination, whereas American defense policy has traditionally been more multilateral, defensive, and benign. I argue, on the contrary, that the **invasion of Iraq** sprang **from** the **same impulses** of powerful individuals and institutional configurations that have led the United States **to war throughout the entire post-World War II period**. Preventing illegal or otherwise unnecessary wars in the future, then, requires at the very least a correct understanding of the patterns of social behavior and institutions that cause them. That is, it requires having the right theoretical explanation at hand to inform public policy and activism. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Research Design: Because understanding patterns of behavior and institutional effects implies a study of multiple cases, one significant weakness of this inquiry is the singular focus on the case of the Iraq War. This study must be supplemented by studies of American involvement in other conflicts to prove the validity of the theory across all or most cases. The aim of this study is only to demonstrate the relative superiority of the elite model of war mobilization relative to the alternatives offered by sociologists. To the extent that this is achieved, this study will at least strongly suggest needed public policy changes and avenues for future research and teaching.

## ! – Eco

#### Militarization causes and enforces the structure for ecological destruction

**Burke and Smolyr, 22** (Matthew Burke and Nina Smolyr, 6-30-2022, accessed on 7-15-2022, Enforcing Ecocide, ""Demilitarize for a Just Transition", https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-99646-8.pdf)

**The U.S. military contributes significantly to ecological catastrophe and prevents the realization of a more ecological society**. First, we consider the direct environmental impacts. The **U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is the single largest consumer of energy and the largest institutional consumer of oil in the world, using billions of gallons of fuel annually** (Eisenscher, 2014; Steichen and Koshgarian, 2020). **Energy use for daily operations of the DoD, approaching 400,000 barrels of oil, exceeds that of any other private or public organization as well as more than 100 nations** (Crawford, 2019; Reisch and Kretzmann, 2008; Warner and Singer, 2009). Military vehicles, from tanks, fighter jets and bombers, to battleships and aircraft carriers consume petroleum-based fuels at extraordinarily high rates; for example, four to eight miles per gallon of diesel fuel for HUMVEEs, just over half a mile per gallon for tanks, 134 barrels per hour for non-nuclear aircraft carriers, four gallons of jet fuel per nautical mile for B-2 Bombers and 25 gallons per minutes for F-15 fighter jets (Crawford, 2019; Eisenscher, 2014). Indirect applications would further account for fuel consumed by private contractors and weapons manufacturing**. While U.S. average per capita energy use is already among the highest in the world** [https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/per-cap ita-energy-use], **the per capita rate for active-duty military and civilian personnel is 35% higher still than this average. The corresponding emissions amount to 59 million metric tons of greenhouse gases annually, the single largest volume of produced emissions in the world, even exceeding that of industrialized countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal. Since 2001, the U.S. military has emitted 1.2 billion metric tons of greenhouse gases and is one of the highest emitters historically** (Crawford, 2019**). Further, it would not be possible for fossil-fuel-dependent global production and consumption levels to keep growing and to remain so high without the U. S. military war machine deploying missions to protect oil supplies.** Up to **one half of all interstate wars since have been driven by this purpose**, though often not officially (Steichen and Koshgarian, 2020). **Intimidation and threat of military action and violence undergird the dynamics of uneven power relations between, on the one hand, Global North state interests to secure their levels of consumption, and on the other hand, communities often in the Global South, whose lands and livelihoods are devastated by the extractive industries and infrastructure protected by the military.** **Compounding and obfuscating the situation is the absence of military greenhouse gas emissions in global climate negotiations and agreements, resulting in a highly inaccurate depiction of the scale of the problem that these enormous international efforts seek to solve** (Steichen and Koshgarian, 2020). This absence is not an accidental oversight. In 1997, the U.S. team at the United Nations climate talks in **Kyoto, Japan, successfully lobbied for exemptions from requirements in emission reductions for the military. Even though the U.S. did not even ratify the Kyoto Protocol, military exemptions remained for all the nations that did sign, and continue to present day** (Buxton, 2015). Many U.S. military practices are also ecologically destructive and have wreaked havoc on the local environments where they operate. **The very notion of ecocide, as the mass destruction and extermination of ecosystems, arose in the context of the U.S. military’s devastating use of the chemical weapon Agent Orange in Vietnam (**Falk, 1973; Higgins, 2015). **More recently, the toxicity accumulated from using depleted uranium munitions and burning trash in open pits during military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has resulted in high incidences of crippling birth defects and cancer among civilians in both places** (Webb, 2017; Hussain, 2019). **Even if we were to accept the rather dubious notion that military operations have strengthened the cause of democracy in these parts of the world and solidified U.S. security, their devastated environments result in huge losses to local livelihoods. A cascading effect is that these governments and societies become further entrapped and dependent on international aid while instability is perpetuated. The financial instruments arising from these foreign aid regimes are structured by geopolitically powerful countries to extend their neocolonial power over those already enduring ongoing dispossession, extraction, and marginalization** (Hickel, 2018).

## ! – Climate

#### Militarization causes climate change woo hoo.

**Dunlap and Brock 19** (Alexander Dunlap and Andrea brock, Alexander Dunlap is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, Andrea Brock is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Centre for Global Political Economy and STEPS Centre at the University of Sussex, xx-xx-xxxx, "," Palgrave Macmillan Cham, [https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-030-99646-8\_11)//OA](https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-030-99646-8_11)/OA) The outsized influenve of military actors can serve to delegitimize and dis

The outsized influence of military actors can serve to delegitimize and disempower civilian actors, reinforce existing global power imbalances, and constrain the ability of communities to adapt to climate and environmental change (Jayaram and Brisbois, 2021). Further, so-called strategic interests are then translated into policy and persuasion overseas, such as pressuring members of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO) **to increase military spending** in their domestic budgets. Coupled with a commitment to military dominance relative to perceived adversaries, the effect is to drive military spending and its related impacts upward among allies and adversaries alike. Relatedly, **the U.S. military must also** then **ensure** continued **access and security** for sites of extraction and global **supply chains for fossil fuels and critical minerals** (Belcher et al., 2019; Schwartzman, 2020). These logistical and policing functions heighten tensions in regions with longstanding conflicts, including the Middle East and the South China Sea, and increasingly across less accessible locations, such as the Arctic, the deep sea, and outer space. More fundamentally, **there is a conflict between military logics** that frame the world in terms of “national security” **and** the logic of cooperation and shared-yet-differentiated **responsibilities required to respond equitably to ecological catastrophe** (Jayaram and Brisbois, 2021). As mentioned previously, **military use of fossil fuels has historically been excluded from climate targets and reporting** (Belcher et al., 2019), **exempting militaries from accountability and undermining the pursuit for greater transparency**. As dominant perspectives on the global scene**, militarized logics can exert substantial influence on climate action** as more people experience the direct impacts of climate change. **Military modes of operation escalate the problems** rather than strategize their prevention and effective remediation, which require cooperation, diplomacy, and sustained coalition building. The focus on national interests preempts possibilities for building real trust and alliances with other nations and incentivizes each nation to adopt an isolationist policy in their own foreign relations, even if public statements attempt to assert differently. True collective security arises from social and political peace and well-resourced infrastructure and institutions to meet the real human security needs for healthy food and environment, meaningful, sufficiently compensated livelihood, quality housing, education, healthcare, and sel fdetermination. These social needs are currently deprived of the resources they need, because the funds are diverted into increasing militarization, which generates more conflict while drastically reducing capacity to meet human needs. **Decarbonization must mean demilitarization, and demilitarization in turn requires a just transition.**

## RC – Violence

#### Militarism paints human existence as nothing more than war and individuals are essentially agents of violence

**Marzec 9** (Robert P., Associate Professor of English literature and postcolonial studies at Purdue University, and associate editor of Modern Fiction Studies. The Global South, Volume 3, Number 1, “Militariality” Spring 2009. Project Muse AD 7/9/09) JM

These stratocratic controls of planetary human activity reveal more than the ideology of a single administration; they are an extension of what we can now see as the complete devotion to an apparatus that captures all cultural and political energies in terms of what Clausewitz defined as “policy.” The original state of “emergency” as defined by the Bush Administration in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks has been naturalized and sedimented as to become a fundamental starting point of human existence. Consequently, understanding the full intensity of the age of militariality requires more than the common critical awareness of Clausewitz’s central doctrine: “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means” (28). It requires first an understanding that for Clausewitz, war is the very ontological basis of human existence, a basis that transcends culture, history and temporality. War defines the very structure of human subjectivity, a juridico-natural “code of law” that is “deeply rooted” in a people, an army, a government: “war is a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy” (30). Clausewitz assigns a constituency to each of the registers of this trinity: “The first of these…mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government” (30). In a totalizing problematic organized according to the idea of war serving as the basis of human existence, the people of a nation are equated with that of a blind primordial force of violence: “the first,” which refers to “primordial vio- lence, hatred, and enmity” identifies the people living in the nation. “Government” therefore names that entity constituted for the exclusive purpose of controlling its unstable citizenry by reorienting the energies of the people to- wards warfare. This reorientation lays the groundwork and delineates the horizon of human creativity, and determines the single legitimized space of freedom: the army, where the “creative spirit is free to roam.” The space of in- stability, of chance, which is the condition for the possibility of creativity, en- ters into the war-footing picture of reality only on this register of militarized human activity. This connection here is not a matter of association; military activity defines the very essence of freedom and human creativity. The army and its state are not defined in this picture in traditional terms of democracy, protection, and service to a people. Nor are they the a sign of the discourse of biopower, for biopower has its eyes on the productivity of a population and functions according to a general administration of life that, although affecting “distributions around a norm,” still invites and produces a certain amount of heterogeneity (Foucault 266).

#### The drive to militarize destroys the value to life – We live life in our seatbelts instead of embracing the things that make life worth living. Their method only locks us in a cycle of violence and counter-violence

Der Derian 98 (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html, AD: 7/10/09) jl

The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" [37](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note37) The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols : The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. [38](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note38) A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." [39](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note39) The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." [40](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note40) For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." [41](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note41) Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt  that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength. [42](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note42)

## ! – Democracy

#### Militarism Weakens Democracy

Giroux 06 Henry Armand Giroux (born 1943) is an American-Canadian scholar and [cultural critic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_critic). Giroux earned a [Doctor of Arts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctor_of_Arts) degree in history at [Carnegie Mellon University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carnegie_Mellon_University) in 1977. One of the founding theorists of [critical pedagogy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_pedagogy) in the United States, he is best known for his pioneering work in public [pedagogy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedagogy), [cultural studies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_studies), [youth studies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Youth_studies), [higher education](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higher_education), [media studies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_studies), and [critical theory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_theory). In 2002 [Routledge](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Routledge) named Giroux as one of the top fifty educational thinkers of the modern period. “The Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: Political Culture under the Bush/Cheney Administration” https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40550717.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ac6a3b26f52206ea8b79ff616be0edb22&ab\_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1

**In the contemporary context of globalization, militarism has become what David Theo Goldberg calls a "new regime of truth," a new epistemology defining what is fact and fiction**, right and wrong, just and unjust (qtd. in S. Giroux). **Not only are Americans obsessed with military power, but "it has become central to our national identity"** (Bacevich 1). How else to explain the fact that the United States now has "725 official military bases outside the country and 969 at home" or that it "spends more on 'defense' than all the rest of the world put together" (Judt 16)?As President Bush explained at a news conference on April 13, 2004, and has repeated again and again in different public venues as 2006 has unfolded, "This country must go on the offense and stay on the offense" (qtd. in Judt 16). By regarding military power as the highest expression of social truth and national greatness, the Bush *administration* has opened a dangerous new chapter in American military history that now gives unfettered support to what C. Wright Mills has called a "'military metaphysics' - the cast of mind that defines international reality as basically military" (222). As Andrew Bacevich indicates, this mentality leads to a "tendency to see international problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a solution except through military means" (2). Similarly, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri point out in Multitude that in the current era war has become the organizing principle of society and the foundation for politics and other social relations (12-3). Broadly speaking, militarization refers to the related instances of the increasing centrality of the military in American society, the militarization of U.S. culture, and the **growing propensity to suppress dissent.** The process of militarization has a long history in the United States and is varied rather than static, changing under different historical conditions.12 The **militarizing of public space at home contributes to the narrowing of community and an escalating concentration of unaccountable political power that threatens the very foundation of democracy in the United States. Militarization is no longer simply the driving force of foreign policy, it has become a defining principle for social changes at home.** Catherine Lutz captures the multiple registers and complex processes of militarization that have extensively shaped social life during the twentieth centur

#### **Militarism exacerbates racism and inequality and decks Liberal Democracy**

Crawford 21 Crawford Neta C. Crawford is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Boston University and co-director of the [Costs of War Project](https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/). “**The militarization of American democracy** https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/534424-the-militarization-of-american-democracy/

In October, Thomas Weiss and I urged all of us to [keep calm](https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/520335-keep-calm-and-carry-on-with-the-2020-election) in the face of what might be a violent election and transition season. We foresaw the need to say, among other things, that the military should affirm the rule of law and their oath to the Constitution. Sadly, the [Joint Chiefs](https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/01/joint-chiefs-affirm-election-results-condemn-assault-our-constitutional-process/171362/) felt the need to do just that last week. When [President Trump](https://thehill.com/people/donald-trump/) extolled “[strength](https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-transcript-january-6)” to a nascent mob in Washington on Jan. 6, he wasn’t talking about moral force. **In militarized societies, the model of political change is often military**. War is the assertion of “might makes right,” the negation of the rule of law. Political scientists worry these days about democratic erosion, when the norms and institutions of previously stable representative democracies decline. We usually ponder the causes of erosion in other countries. Democracy is, on one hand, democratic elections where the people decide who will govern them, and processes for horizontal and vertical oversight and accountability. There is also a deeper conception of democracy — the norms of citizen deliberation, and human and civil rights that guarantee expression, inclusion and collective action. Democratic legitimacy depends on the ability of citizens to engage in public reason. The more democratic a society is, the greater the limits it has on the use of force both at home and abroad. We don’t take out weapons to resolve our disputes. Democratic erosion or backsliding occurs when democratic institutions, norms and values are gradually — and sometimes almost imperceptibly — reduced. Democratic erosion includes the decline of competitive elections, the reduction in forums where citizens can deliberate and form policy preferences, and the diminished ability for accountability. The indicators of erosion also include constraints on freedom of the press, which reduces transparency and accountability, the unchecked accretion of power in the executive branch, and the loss of civil rights, including the right of assembly. Democratic erosion has various causes. Some blame power-hungry executives who don’t want to give up power. The question, here, is why democratic institutions aren’t able to stop power-hungry elites who would concentrate power and economic resources. Suzanne Mettler and Robert Lieberman, in their book “[Four Threats](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250244420),” also highlight excessive executive power but then add political polarization, racism and nativism, and economic inequality that prompts the wealthy to mobilize to protect their position. **War and militarism exacerbate all those things**. But more than that, **war and militarism are antipodal and undermining of democratic norms, institutions and practices**. At the beginning of the post-9/11 wars, we worried about the effects on our civil liberties and democracy. But after nearly 20 years, we’ve almost forgotten about these wars and have underappreciated their effect on our democratic institutions and values**. The urgency of war is often used to justify the concentration of executive power and deference to the executive in times of national emergency**. In the United States, the trend toward the concentration of power in the executive was accelerated in the George W. Bush administration. John Yoo, working for President Bush, argued the legal basis for what he called the unitary executive theory where, in war, the president’s powers are essentially [unchecked](https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president). **Other officials excused secrecy and torture because the United States was at war.** President Trump has continued in that tradition, acting as if the laws and the rule of law do not apply to him. President Dwight Eisenhower is usually given credit for pointing out the dangers of a military industrial complex. Eisenhower rejected massive conventional forces quite explicitly because he sought to prevent the United States from becoming a garrison state: If the U.S. were to do so, [Eisenhower said](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d120), “we might as well stop any further talk about preserving a sound U.S. economy and proceed to transform ourselves forthwith into a garrison state.” Militarization is a perennial concern. James Madison warned in the [Federalist Papers](https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/full-text) in 1795 that “Of all the enemies of true liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. … No nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.” Madison worried that “war is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement” that could increase public debt and lead to a “degeneracy in manners and morals.” George Washington, in his 1796 [farewell address](https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=15&page=transcript), urged Americans to protect their union and “avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty.” In war, fear is often part of the equation — and fear may be deliberately heightened, threats inflated. We have been living in fear for nearly two decades. When humans are fearful, they tend to pay more attention to fearful information and think less critically. This can bolster groupthink dynamics among decision-makers who otherwise might provide horizontal checks and accountability for leaders. Trump’s [Muslim travel ban](https://www.axios.com/trump-muslim-travel-ban-immigration-6ce8554f-05bd-467b-b3c2-ea4876f7773a.html) was, if anything, rooted in fear of another terrorist attackand racial animus. Elements of our political culture also have been militarized. And, as Kathleen Belew’s [research](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674237698) shows, **veterans also flock to the white power movement and paramilitary organizations**. Veterans are often at the forefront of these movements — including the Air Force veteran who was [killed](https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/01/07/ashli-babbitt-dead-capitol-riot/) trying to get into the chambers of the House of Representatives on Jan. 6 and another [Air Force veteran](https://www.foxnews.com/us/air-force-veteran-identified-capitol-zip-ties-senate-floor) who was recently arrested. Active duty [military personnel](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/emily-rainey-fort-bragg-captain-resigngs-washington-rally-army-investigating/) also were present. **Militarized right-wing extremism emulates the military, even if the actors aren’t veterans themselves.** It is no accident that many who marched in Charlottesville, Va., in 2017 at the [Unite the Right rally](https://www.vox.com/2017/8/12/16138246/charlottesville-nazi-rally-right-uva), who occupied the [Michigan State Capitol](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/politics/michigan-state-capitol.html) in 2020, and who stormed the U.S. Capitol wore military-style uniforms, khaki camouflage and bulletproof vests. In sum, we don’t just have a right-wing violence problem. **We have a democracy problem fueled by a war problem.**

# Impact

#### The War in Afghanistan cost the US trillions and corruption.

WILPF 21 – Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 2021 (“Militarism And Afghanistan: Costs And Profits,” *WILPF,* December 2, available online at <https://www.wilpf.org/militarism-and-afghanistan-costs-and-profits/>, accessed 07/13/2022)

The Death, Destruction and Other Deliverables blog explored the various forms of violence that have resulted from the past twenty years of war in Afghanistan, including the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, drone strikes, torture, special operations, and the broader harms caused by the “Global War on Terror”. These brutal costs of war run in parallel to the economic costs.

None of the violence described in the Death, Destruction and Other Deliverables blog has been cheap. The Cost of War Project at Brown University estimates that the war in Afghanistan cost the United States $2.3 trillion to date. The governments of other countries participating in the invasion and occupation have also spent billions: the United Kingdom spent about $28.2 billion, Canada about $13 billion, Germany about $11 billion, Italy about $9 billion, France about $4 billion, Australia about 10 billion AUD, Norway about 11.5 billion NOK.

More broadly, as noted by the National Priorities Project in its report State of Insecurity: The Cost of Militarization Since 9/11, since 2001 the US government has spent more than $21 trillion at home and overseas on militaristic policies that led to the creation of a vast surveillance apparatus, worsened mass incarceration, intensified the war on immigrant communities, and caused incalculable human suffering in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and elsewhere.

But for all that it has cost taxpayers in the United States and other occupying countries, the profits from the war in Afghanistan have been seemingly limitless.

War Profiteering

The Security Policy Reform Institute found that US Congress gave $2.02 trillion to the top five weapons companies — Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Boeing and Northrop Grumman — between 2001 and 2021. During the war in Afghanistan, the top five weapons firms spent $1 billion lobbying Congress and received $2 trillion in Pentagon contracts. That’s $1,813 in Pentagon contracts for every dollar spent on lobbying — a 181,214 per cent return on investment.

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) have also profited from the wars. A recent study by Brown University shows that much of the growth in US military budgets since 2001 is due to payments to military contractors. Contractors received about $104 billion for services in Afghanistan since 2002, including nearly $9 billion just in the last five years. Some engage in military and security operations, including “interrogation” (such as the CIA’s torture program); others handle laundry, food services, transportation, and construction, employing foreign nationals and paying them less than US employees. In Afghanistan, contractors outnumbered US soldiers. At its peak in 2011, there were about 90,000 contractors in Afghanistan; by the withdrawal in 2021, about 17,000 contractors were still in the country.

#### The 1AC’s language perpetuates and normalizes militarism as a cultural system and stuff yay

Gusterson and Besteman 19 (Hugh, Professor in the Department of Anthropology and Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University, Catherine, Professor in the Department of Anthropology of Colby College, “Cultures of Militarism: An Introduction to Supplement 19”, February 2019, “Current Anthropology Volume 60, Supplement 19”) // Ilake LT🐣

In contrast, anthropologists’ interest in militarism has taken shape in the context of post–cold war transformations in the management of violence. These years have seen the violent reorganization of some cold war client states; the proliferation of militia-led insurgencies; the interpenetration of organized crime and drug trafficking with insurgency and counter in-surgency in parts of the global south; the articulation of coun-ter insurgency abroad with domestic policing at home in many Western countries; the reformulation of the United Nations into an institution of militarized peacekeeping and occupation; the increasing use of military labor to perform civil, humanitarian, policing, and development activities; and a growing awareness of the ways in which militarism as a set of cultural practices and ideologies pervades all domains of social life. The anthropologists in this volume see militarism as a cultural system; it is shaped through ideology and rhetoric, effected through bodies and technologies, made visible and invisible through campaigns of imagery and knowledge production, and it colonizes aspects of social life including reproduction, self-image, and notions of community. We interrogate militarism in its established and emergent forms, probing its genealogies, its facility at colonizing daily life, and its ability to present itself as a response to insecurities it has itself provoked.4This collection of papers draws on the rich discussions at the symposium from which this volume emerged to capture some of the distinctive features of cultures of militarism. The papers emphasize militarization as a contingent process over militarism as a measurable object;5decenter the state as the core locus of such processes; probe the relationship between militarism, experience, and identity, with a special focus on the body; examine connections between militarism and social injustice; and evince a commitment to critique and under-mine militarism while, at the same time, respecting the force of its appeal. The New Anthropology of Militarism: Four Features Threat Constructions These papers understand militarism as a process rather than as a bounded, measurable thing enmeshed in deterministic relationships with other reified variables. Militarism as an in-flective force or bundle of processes acts upon society in pow-erful and expansive but uneven and contingent ways. Although militarism carves its way deep into social structures, it is also shaped and reshaped in the dialectical interaction between in-grained structures on the one hand and human agency and contingency on the other. It is capillary, shape-shifting, always in motion as it constructs threats, enrolls constituencies, colonizes cultural life, and generates new loci of resistance. As Michel Foucault (2007:44) writes, security apparatuses “have the con-stant tendency to expand; they are centrifugal. New elements are constantly being integrated....Security therefore involves or-ganizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits.” And there is no domain of social life it does not touch. Just as contemporary wars seem to have no clearly demarcated end, so militarism has no discernible edge; it increasingly seeps into every corner of the world, every aspect of social life, in someway. Military/intelligence logics and personnel are now being directed to manage arenas of life formerly understood as outside the purview of the military, like development projects in Africa, humanitarian aid, and responses to environmental catastrophes, black markets, and the hacking of political parties’ computers. In the words of Catherine Lutz, one of the foremost anthropological theorists and observers of militarism, the process of militariza-tion“ has reshaped almost every element of global social life over the 20th century.” It involves an intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including the shaping of other institu-tions in synchrony with military goals. Militarization is simul-taneously a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them. Militarization is intimately connected not only to the obvious increase in the size of armies and resurgence of mil-itant nationalisms and militant fundamentalisms but also to the less visible deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legiti-mate military action. (Lutz 2002:723)As Lutz’s comment indicates, the material base of militarism is connected with ideologies and discourses through which proliferating militarized infrastructures and rationalities are normalized, naturalized, and legitimized. Such ideologies and discourses valorize the ethos of the warrior (Gibson 1994; Orr2004; Webb 2018) and construct threats in such a way as to validate military spending, military interventions, and the mil-itarization of formerly nonmilitary arenas of life. To say that threats are “constructed” does not mean that they are imaginary or unreal. But threats can be figured through different narratives and addressed in different ways, and the choice of narrative figuration may have enormous material consequences. The So-viet missiles deployed to Cuba in 1962 were quite real and, if used, would have inflicted crushing damage on the United States. But the United States could have chosen to regard them as a reasonable counterweight to its own Jupiter nuclear-tipped mis-siles in Turkey, on the Soviet Union’s doorstep, rather than pro-voking a global crisis by narrating them as an existential threat (Weldes 1999). Likewise, based on the evidence of the last 2 de-cades of US-Vietnamese relations, the United States could plausibly have decided in the 1960s that its vital interests would have suffered little if a small country on the other side of the planet were allowed to “go Communist. “Instead, it fruitlessly expended the lives of over 50,000 Americans and 2–3 million Vietnamese in what American national security elites wrongly perceived, thanks to the consensually accepted domino theory, as a struggle it could not afford to lose. Or, as discussed in this volume, Turkey in the early twentieth century could have constructed Armenians as constituency to be accommodated, not exterminated, and Guatemalan and Colombian elites could have constructed rural challenges against inequality and injustice as a social problem to address through development and land reform, not a military threat that demanded counterinsurgency. In these cases, the preferred threat constructions militarized the problems at hand, mobilizing more resources for military projects and saturating the social field with militarized violence.

#### INCOMPLETE ---- Further US-NATO support promotes disastrous militarism, greenlighting a laundry list of impacts that feed the military industrial complex.

<https://natowatch.org/default/2022/militarism-cannot-prevent-war-urgent-call-de-escalation-demilitarisation-and>

Behind this current crisis lies a history of militarised and economic violence. Both Russia and the United States are settler colonial states, forging their countries by expanding their “frontiers” and killing and repressing Indigenous populations. Both engage in imperialist actions outside of their now-established borders, interfering, through military and economic action, in countries they deem to be within their “spheres of influence”. Both use militarism, aggression, and forced economic ties to guide their conduct in international relations, and both deal with domestic inequality, poverty, and resistance through policing and punishment.

The governments of both countries critique each other for the same type of behaviour. Russia criticises US imperialism, yet invades and occupies its neighbours, bombs civilians, and engages in cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure that harm ordinary people. The United States criticises Russia as an autocracy yet overthrows democratically elected governments if they threaten US interests, builds military bases and engages in wars and military operations in hundreds of countries around the world, and spends billions of dollars a year on militarism while so many of its citizens live without health care, housing, or food security.

Both countries have built up their militaries, military alliances, and nuclear arsenals to challenge the other. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s expansion eastward is about constraining Russia, just like Russia’s invasion of countries to the west are about constraining NATO. Ukraine, in this context, is a pawn being used by both “sides”.

This gamesmanship runs the serious risk of mass destruction. Between them, Russia and the United States possess more than 11,850 nuclear weapons. NATO members France and the United Kingdom have a few hundred each. The US also stations about 100 nuclear weapons in NATO members Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey. These weapons are not remnants of a past Cold War — they are actively deployed right now, ready to be used. The stockpile numbers, alarming as they are, don’t convey the sheer horror each weapon packs within it. Every single bomb is designed to melt flesh, burn cities, decimate plants and animals, and unleash radioactive poison that lasts for generations. Even the use of one of these weapons would be disastrous. A nuclear exchange would be catastrophic.

Russia and the United States, along with France, United Kingdom, and China, together recently agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, echoing a statement from Gorbachev and Reagan in 1985. Yet each of these countries has been investing billions in the “modernisation” and expansion of their nuclear arsenals, preparing not for nuclear disarmament but for nuclear Armageddon. Each maintains doctrines and policies for the use of nuclear weapons. And some within the US nuclear complex, at least, apparently believe that nuclear war can be fought — and won. This is an incredibly dangerous message to be sending to those responsible for the potential destruction of the world, but one that benefits the military-industrial complex.

There are other corporate interests behind the festering conflict, including in relation to weapons production and sale, pipelines and “energy security,” and access to “natural resources,” with profits to be made at the expense of human lives as well as the protection of the planet. In the midst of a climate emergency, in which capitalist extraction and exploitation has decimated biodiversity, ecosystems, and land, water, and air, the governments of NATO members and Russia continue to use fossil fuels and refuse to embrace a degrowth economy that would drawdown the use of energy, especially in the global north, and prioritise the creation of systems of care and equality for people and planet.

Militarised world order and the abstraction of harm

There is plenty of blame to go around when it comes to the current crisis and the historical moments that have led us here. All parties involved have contributed actively to this situation; arguing that one side or the other has been “provoked” only serves to obscure the reality that each of the countries involved have together, deliberately, built a militarised, capitalist world order that exclusively serves the interests of the war profiteers and the political and economic elite.

What is happening right now over Ukraine is bigger than Ukraine. Tectonic shifts in global geopolitics are taking place and Ukraine is but one field of “play” for the heavily militarised states. Gamesmanship between the United States and China is on the rise; proxy wars, occupations and aggression, and military and economic pressure is occuring throughout the world; extraction primarily by the global north and exploitation of the so-called global south is rampant, exacerbating and accelerating poverty and inequalities and environmental devestation; militarism and military spending is on the rise globally. Approaching the situation in Ukraine without recognising this larger context is like applying a bandaid to a global hemorrage. It is a piece of a much bigger puzzle: of a world order dictated and dominated by the militarised elite.

This is a world order that sees war as a legitimate means to an end. It celebrates militarised masculinities, empowering the culture of militarism and violence as brave and noble pursuits, while rendering invisible the gendered and racialised harms of militarism. It is a world order that uses a technostrategic language to sanitise the image of war. Think tanks and politicians, media, and war gamers act as if countries are chess pieces and people are numbers on a page. US government officials, for example, have estimated that a war in Ukraine could kill 25,000 to 50,000 civilians, 5,000 to 25,000 Ukrainian military personnel, and 3,000 to 10,000 Russian soldiers. The fighting since 2014, in eastern Ukraine it should be noted, has already killed more than 14,000 people and displaced millions.

Instead of seeing these people as individuals, whose lives have value and meaning, who are part of families and communities, the number crunchers calculate “acceptable loss” and risks of “collateral damage,” and look the other way as the bodies pile up. Also accounted for is the disruption to daily life — the interruption of education, of food production, of supply chains; the destruction of hospitals, homes, markets, water and sanitation facilitations, and all of the other critical infrastructure that people rely on to survive. These numbers don’t take into account the psychological terror of living in conflict, of hearing bombs dropped or drones hovering overhead, of being afraid to leave your house, of watching loved ones die. These figures also don’t take into account the environmental impacts of war, the toxic or explosive remnants of weapons, the damage to land and water and animals.

These humanitarian and environmental impacts should be at the forefront of all policy making decisions. Yet they are completely ignored by those talking in board rooms in capital cities far from where the harm will be felt, deciding what choices to make for the sake of “geopolitical strategy” or “balance of power”.

#### Militarization is the biggest cause of climate change now; increasing it will kill the environment.

Simon **Dolittle 2003** works for the Program on Development, Peacebuilding, and the Environment at the Political Economy Research Institute. Originally produced by the Population and Development Program at Hampshire College. doolittle, simon. “Ten Reasons Why Militarism Is Bad for the Environment - Peri.” Ten Reasons Why Militarism Is Bad for the Environment, Mar. 2003, https://peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/s\_doolittle\_paper.pdf.

As the world faces war with Iraq, many are understandably concerned with the immediate horror that war would bring. Beyond these very real dangers, we should take this opportunity to re-examine whether militarism is a healthy thing for our society and our planet. Reducing dependence on the rule of force and de-militarizing society would not only make the world more peaceful and free up resources to address the underlying causes of terrorism, it would also have a dramatically positive impact on global health and the environment. Here are ten reasons why. 1. Militaries are notorious polluters. According to geographer Joni Seager, “anywhere in the world, a military presence is virtually the single most reliable predictor of environmental damage.” Since the end of the Cold War, many plans to convert military bases to civilian use have been cancelled because the sites are contaminated beyond any hope of restoration. And military pollution isn’t limited to bases, it does significant damage to the environment at large. In the US – the world's most oil-thirsty country – the largest single consumer of oil is the Pentagon. Together, the world’s militaries consume as much petroleum as Japan – the world's second largest economy – and produce an estimated 6-10% of global air pollution. As Seager concludes: “Militaries…that have little else in common share a distinctive environmental sensibility – namely, one of disregard.”1 2. Militarism robs other social needs. As President Dwight Eisenhower said, “Every gun that is made, every warship fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed” – and, one should add, pressing environmental needs. In 2004, President Bush hopes to increase the US military budget to $399.1 billion. Worldwide military spending – about $798 billion in 2000 – has recently increased for the first time since the end of the Cold War. That’s a lot of money not spent on finding ways to reduce poverty, hunger, and environmental degradation. Allowing social ills such as poverty, illiteracy, and hunger to fester only deepens the disparities that often lie at the heart of many environmental problems. Since militaries are such notorious polluters, heavy military spending is also a dramatic pollution subsidy. It fosters a military culture that casts aside environmental concerns as not “serious” enough to warrant attention. As one American military commander put it, “We’re in the business of protecting your country, not protecting the environment.”2 3. Nuclear weapons are an environmental catastrophe. Nuclear weapons pose an environmental threat to humanity unprecedented in human history. Although the world escaped nuclear holocaust during the Cold War, the nuclear arms race has not stopped. India and Pakistan now have nuclear weapons and North Korea may have them as well. According to some estimates, the radiation from weapons testing alone will eventually cause about 2.4 million cancer deaths worldwide. Hiroshima and Nagasaki offer a frightening reminder of the terror of nuclear weapons used in combat. A year after the US bombed the two cities, 140,000 were dead in Hiroshima and 70,000 in Nagasaki. Because of the much greater destructive capacity of modern nuclear weapons, a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could kill up to 30 million people. A massive nuclear war involving half the world’s weapons could trigger a worldwide “nuclear winter,” blocking virtually all of the sun’s light with debris, potentially for weeks, threatening everyone not killed directly in the blasts.3 4. Nuclear waste is an environmental catastrophe. Even if they are never used, nuclear weapons leave in their wake wastes unlike any other in human history, remaining deadly for hundreds of thousands – sometimes millions – of years. There is no completely safe place for these wastes over geological time. A volcano erupted just 20 kilometers from Yucca Mountain in Nevada, where the US plans to store much of its nuclear waste, only 20,000 years ago, a mere blip on the geological timeline. Leaving such long-lived waste for future generations is profoundly irresponsible. The Soviet military is guilty of probably the single most egregious failure to contain nuclear waste (although the American record is far from spotless): dumping waste directly into Lake Karachay, creating what a Natural Resources Defense Council official has called “the most polluted spot on the planet.” Standing at the shore of Lake Karachay for an hour would kill you within weeks.4 5. Military toxins poison the poor and people of color. Those who pay the price for military pollution tend to be society’s weakest and most vulnerable. For decades the US Army contaminated a poor and largely black neighborhood in Memphis, dumping chemical weapons and other hazardous toxics without informing the residents. Pollution by Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio has elevated the cancer rates and birth defects in the surrounding Latino neighborhoods. For more than fifty years, the US Navy has contaminated Vieques, Puerto Rico, leaving residents with cancer rates 26% higher than the Puerto Rican average. Sadly, the same pattern holds internationally. As Joni Seager observes, “most nuclear weapons in the United States and Europe have been tested on indigenous peoples’ land with dramatic health consequences,” most severely for women and children. Even within the US military, soldiers whose health is threatened by poisonous weapons such as Agent Orange and Depleted Uranium (DU) – not to mention combat – are disproportionately poor and people of color. For both civilians and the rank and file, the pattern is clear: the poor and marginalized are poisoned by the pollution of the rich and powerful.5 6. Militaries are exempt from environmental regulation. Militaries are routinely exempted from environmental regulations in the name of “national security”. In the US, many major environmental laws give the military dramatic regulatory loopholes, including the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act, all laws governing nuclear activity and waste, and many more. As the Military Toxics Project and the Environmental Health Coaltion observe, “These exemptions have serious consequences when … the Department of Defense and Energy are the nation’s leading polluters.” Internationally, a treaty banning plastic dumping at sea explicitly exempts militaries – despite the fact that the US Navy alone dumps over 5 tons of plastic overboard daily – and agreements governing foreign military bases almost never include provisions for environmental protection. Although the Pentagon tries to put a green spin on its activities with initiatives such as “green bullets,” which pollute soil less than conventional lead bullets, it fiercely resists regulation and aggressively covers up information about its pollution. One person fired from a military facility for voicing concerns over environmental health likened the intimidation directed at him to the work of the KGB and the Gestapo, calling it a “police state”. An EPA official once described the Department of Energy’s attitude about regulation of their nuclear activities as: “Look, Buster, don’t bug me with your crap about permits. I’m building atomic weapons.”6 7. War destroys ecosystems and livelihoods. From “carpet bombing” to “scorched earth” campaigns, war routinely leave ecosystems ravaged and agricultural livelihoods destroyed. In the Vietnam War, US Air Force planes that dropped Agent Orange were emblazoned with the slogan, “Only we can prevent forests.” Beyond the 19 million gallons of Agent Orange, the US dropped some 25 million bombs on South Vietnam, wiping out half of the mangrove forests and eliminating almost 5 million acres of forest. In Central America, sociologist Daniel Faber reports that “Vietnam-style ‘scorched earth’ operations and military maneuvers have obliterated vast agricultural lands and crucial ecosystems, pushing millions of refugees into overcrowded cities and overtaxed hillsides.” A US military official happily reported that in Honduras “you don’t need to worry…about the EPA or…the environmentalists. Those are not concerns down there.”7 8. War destroys health and sanitation infrastructure. War undermines public health. This grim reality was on full display in the Gulf War. A UN observation team at the end of the war found that the “recent conflict has wrought apocalyptical results on the infrastructure” leaving “means of modern life support…destroyed or rendered tenuous.” By dropping 5,000 tons of bombs, allied forces destroyed water and sewage facilities, electrical generators, and communication centers. Raw sewage flowed into drinking water supplies, and public health systems collapsed. Security scholar Michael Klare writes that the wrecked “water, electricity, and transportation systems have resulted in extensive death, disease, and hunger.”8 9. War poisons many generations of civilians. War is the curse that keeps on killing. Vietnamese parents and children today are still being poisoned by the 19 million gallons of Agent Orange the US dumped on them during the war. Congenital birth defects more than tripled between 1966 and 1996, while Vietnamese women suffer spontaneous abortion and cervical cancer at rates among the world’s worst. What’s more, the country remains littered with unexploded weaponry. As one doctor put it, “No one can be certain when the war’s remnants will disappear.” In Iraq, allied forces fired between 320 and 350 tons of DU, and as a result radioactivity has been found in Iraq’s ground water and both plant and animal tissues. The level of damage done by this “recycled” radioactive waste won’t be fully understood for years, but we know that DU can cause kidney failure, cancers, reproductive problems, genetic damage, and weakened immune systems. The bombing of Iraq’s oil infrastructure released thousands of tons of very toxic hydrocarbons and chemicals. Baghdad has seen dramatic increases of lead and particulate matter in the air. Infant mortality and death of children under five each doubled between 1989 and 1999, while birth defects have also dramatically increased. Since the war, cancer rates have gone up by five times, and cancer victims are getting younger. Dr. Huda Ammash describes the combined effects of war and sanctions as “a health crisis of immense proportions.”9 10. War kills people. Any environment with bullets whizzing and bombs dropping is polluted in the most lethal way. As the technology of warfare has advanced, the deadliness of humanity’s militarism has grown by leaps and bounds. War killed up to 175 million people, most of them civilians, in the 20th century alone – history’s most bloody century. We must work now to ensure that our present century is known for peace – not war.10

#### Militarization causes climate change and there can be no real ecological protection in the world of the aff.

Jorgenson 2012. Andrew Jorgenson is Professor and Chair in the Department of Sociology, Professor of Environmental Studies, and coordinates the [Global Environmental Sociology Lab](https://globalenvirosoclab.weebly.com/) at Boston College. Jorgenson, Andrew K., et al. "The environmental impacts of militarization in comparative perspective: an overlooked relationship." Nature and Culture, vol. 7, no. 3, winter 2012, pp. 314+. Gale Academic OneFile, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A313972354/AONE?u=umuser&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=c3de5be4.

War has long contributed to ecological degradation, including the diversion of rivers, scorched earth practices, the destruction of plants and animals, oil spills, the burning of oil wells, and the use of chemical and biological weapons. The atmospheric testing of atomic and nuclear bombs produced radioactive fallout that spread throughout the world via wind, water, and living creatures (Commoner 1967, 1971). In fact, the detonation of Trinity--the first atomic explosion--in the New Mexico desert on 16 July 1945 ushered in the nuclear era, which coincides with the age of ecology (Hagen 1992; Worster 1998). The environmental impacts of militarization are not limited to war and the testing of nuclear weapons. Military institutions, often in the name of national security and geopolitical circumstances, have created large-scale built and social infrastructures to sustain and support the coercive power of nations. Advances in military technologies, the resource demands to maintain the social and built infrastructures of militaries, the testing of machinery and weapons, and the [transportation](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) of soldiers and weapons to distant places have increased the overall ecological and environmental impacts of the world's militaries (Clark and Jorgenson 2012). As a result of these activities, "the world's armed forces are the single largest polluter on earth" (Renner 1991: 132). In what follows we direct attention to the relationships between the environment and the world's national militaries. We present a general discussion of the treadmill of destruction theory, a sociological perspective that highlights the expansionary tendencies and environmental impacts of militarism. We then offer a brief account of recent military developments and expenditures, with a focus on the ascent of the military in the [United States](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r). Following this discussion, we examine how the growth and structure of militarization contributes to an array of environmental impacts. We conclude by calling for future sociological research to seriously consider the environmental impacts of the world's militaries. In this call we suggest fruitful avenues for future research, while recognizing some of the unique challenges faced by those who do research on the effects of the world's militaries on the environment. "Militarization" is recognized as "the single most ecologically destructive human endeavor" (Gould 2007: 331). Yet, with few exceptions, the environmental impacts of militarism and militarization are mostly overlooked in environmental sociology and other environmental social sciences. The general inattention to such relationships, given the scale and range of influence, is problematic. Military preparedness impinges--in a highly deleterious fashion--on the nation's physical environment and, all too often, that of their neighbors as well. From depleting resources, eroding the physical environment, destroying natural flora and fauna, or leaving behind a vast array of toxins and radioactive elements, all aspects of military activity defile our environment in some way. (Singer and Keating 1999: 326). Military operations, land holdings, forces, and production facilities are often exempt from environmental laws, at home and abroad, "in the name of national security" (Gould 2007: 331; Singer and Keating 1999: 327). Within sociology, the treadmill of destruction perspective examines how the expansionary dynamics and structure of militarism produce profound environmental impacts (Hooks and Smith 2004, 2005). This theoretical approach is influenced by and related to the treadmill of production tradition within environmental sociology, which is one of the area's foundational orientations. Thus, prior to discussing the treadmill of destruction perspective, we first provide a brief description of the treadmill of production theory. The treadmill of production theory posits that environmental degradation and [pollution](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) are an inherent part of [economic development](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) (Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). Given that a capitalist economy is predicated on the constant pursuit of profit and expansion, its operations have "direct implications for natural resource extraction," the generation of pollution, and the overall state of environmental conditions (Gould et al. 2004: 297). The economy generates ecological problems, as it must continually withdraw resources from the environment to produce goods and power machinery, and such activities inevitably generate waste. The state, while often caught in contradictory positions, is an important social institution that supports economic expansion through negotiating trade agreements, bailing out industry and banking, promoting military spending, and protecting private property. According to treadmill of production scholars, the growth imperative of [capitalism](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) creates an "enduring conflict" between human societies and the environment (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). Nature--in the form of matter and energy--is used to fuel industry and to produce commodities for the market. "As societies increase their production," Schnaiberg (1980: 20) pointed out, "they 'discover' resources and 'create' new products." Each expansion in the production process creates a higher level of demand for [natural resources](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) from [ecosystems](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r), often at rates that exceed the regenerative capacity of these systems, in order to sustain economic operations on a larger and more intensive scale (Gould et al. 2008; see also Foster 2005). Ecosystems are actively transformed to meet the needs of the economic system, which contributes to ecological disorganization (Schnaiberg 1980). Producers attempt to externalize environmental costs as much as possible, as this has the potential to enhance profits. From this perspective, there is a strong relationship between economic development and [environmental degradation](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r), and this applies to both developed nations and developing nations (Jorgenson and Clark 2012). Hooks and Smith (2004, 2005) argue that while the military is linked to the economy, it is not simply a derivative of the latter. Militarism has its own distinct expansionary dynamics and produces specific forms of environmental degradation, part and parcel of the treadmill of destruction. Primarily for geopolitical reasons, states declare and wage wars (Mann 1998; Tilly 1990). Militaries are institutions that actively seek to shape and control information to secure funding and to expand their infrastructure (Bond 2011). As nations attempt to maintain and increase power, it spurs military development, which increases the lethality and ferocity of conflict (Tilly 1990). At the same time, these military developments increase the scale, intensity, and danger of environmental degradation (Hooks and Smith 2004). Militarism produces a treadmill of destruction that effectively restricts [environmental protection](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r). The focus of the military in relation to the environment is made clear by a US military base commander, who, when responding to citizen's concerns about pollution, stated: "We are in the business of protecting the nation, not the environment" (Renner 1991: 152; see also Clark and Jorgenson 2012). Geopolitical competition often drives arms races as well as attendant technological advances, infrastructural development, and growth in troop size. The environmentally damaging capabilities of militaries, especially for developed nations, are partly a function of technological developments with weaponry and other machinery (Jorgenson 2005; Jorgenson and Clark 2009; Jorgenson et al. 2010). Capital-intensive militaries employ advanced weaponry and utilize state-of-the-art transportation systems to facilitate the rapid movement of troops and to enhance the strike capabilities of nations, including an extensive system of vehicles and infrastructure to aid in the deployment of equipment and personnel (Clark et al. 2010). Further, capital-intensive militaries are likely to increase their material infrastructure or become more spatially dispersed, bringing more land under their operations (Kentor et al. 2012). The structure and organization of the military requires access to and consumption of vast amounts of resources, such as oil, to maintain its basic operations. The growth dynamics of militarism further expand the treadmill of destruction, increasing the overall environmental demands of and degradation caused by this institution (Clark and Jorgenson 2012; Jorgenson and Clark 2009). International superpowers have historically used part of the social surplus generated through economic dominance to invest in military development (Hooks and McLauchlan 1992; Kentor 2000). Domestic politics, the position of nations within the global interstate system, and actual and perceived threats shape the course of military development. During the twentieth century, technological, political, economic, and ideological changes contributed to the ascendancy of the military into the power elite (Mills 2000). These changes expanded the influence and scale of militaries, deeply rooting the treadmill of destruction within national and international politics. The discussion that follows is largely focused on the military within the United States, in part due to the predominance of this nation's military within the world and the magnitude of annual military spending of this country. However, it is important to note that recent scholarship has extended the treadmill of destruction perspective to the comparative-international level. Multiple cross-national and longitudinal studies within sociology indicate that the relative size (i.e., military participation rate) and technological capacity (i.e., military expenditures per solider) of nations' militaries both contribute to growth in energy consumption (Clark et al. 2010), carbon dioxide [emissions](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) (Jorgenson et al. 2010; York 2008), and overall resource consumption in the form of the ecological footprints of nations (Jorgenson 2005; Jorgenson and Clark 2009, 2011). These cross-national studies and their results indicate that the environmental impacts of national militaries are far beyond trivial, net of other human drivers of pollution and degradation, including levels of economic development, [population](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) size, [urbanization](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r), manufacturing levels, and various forms of globalization. Furthermore, and in the context of generalizability, many of these studies indicate that the environmental impacts of national militaries are observable for samples of all countries as well as for samples restricted to only developed countries and only [developing countries](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) (e.g., Jorgenson and Clark 2009; Jorgenson et al. 2010). Figure 1 is a scatter plot that illustrates the relationship between carbon dioxide emissions per capita and military expenditures per soldier (i.e., technological capacity of national militaries), both presented in logarithmic form. These data include observations of 72 nations from 1970 to 2000 in five-year increments (i.e., 1970, 1975 ... 1995, 2000). Military expenditures per soldier is calculated by dividing total military expenditures by total military personnel. Figure 2 is a scatter plot that illustrates the association between carbon dioxide emissions per capita and military participation rate (i.e., relative size of national militaries), both in logarithmic form, and for the same nations and time points as in Figure 1. Military participation is the ratio of military personnel per 1,000 people in the general population. These data in both figures are the same data analyzed by Jorgenson et al. (2010). (1) Consistent with treadmill of destruction theory, Figure 1 indicates that the association between per capita carbon dioxide emissions and military expenditures per solider is positive and strong in magnitude (correlation = 0.802), while Figure 2 suggests that the relationship between per capita emissions and military participation rate is also positive and moderately strong (correlation = 0.486). Both world wars in the twentieth century resulted in an unprecedented scale of destruction, in part due to the use of new, more deadly weapons. C. Wright Mills (2000) explains that following the Second World War the military joined the economic and political elite in the United States. He indicates that other historical developments and transformations in the social order facilitated the ascent of the military into the power elite. The scale of military operations--including troops, equipment, and the theater of war--had greatly expanded. The military catalyzed scientific research and development, especially in the production of high-tech equipment and the development of new weapons. In fact, technological innovation became closely linked to the weapons industry (Galbraith 1998: 257). The expansion of the military provided economic benefits for powerful segments within industry due to armament and other military contracts. The destructive potential of nuclear weapons elevated military matters, increasing the influence of the military in both the state and the economy within the United States. The power elite increasingly adopted a "military definition of reality" (Mills 2000: 198). Due to geopolitics and the ascendancy of the military, the overall expenditures on military and expenditures per soldier continued to increase, helping create a permanent war economy. Figure 3 provides the total annual military expenditures (defined as the "total military budget") for the United States for the 1900 to 2007 period, while Figure 4 provides the annual expenditures per soldier (2) for the same range of years. These data, which are reported in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars (3) and thus adjusted for inflation, were obtained from the Correlates of War online data set (www.correlatesofwar.org/). As indicated by Figure 3, total military expenditures increased from $439,960 in 1900 to $649,800,000,000 in 2007. Turning briefly to Figure 4, military expenditures per soldier increased from approximately $3 in 1900 to $431,460 in 2007. In 1961, President Dwight Eisenhower noted that following the Second World War the United States, and by extension the world, had entered a new era of militarism. Prior to this period, domestic industrial operations were redirected to support the war effort during times of conflict. Geopolitical competition and the ascent of the military helped create "a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions" and an expansive military structure that included millions of enlisted soldiers. While Eisenhower is known for warning against the "unwarranted influence" of the military-industrial complex--a concept that had been introduced in the late 1940s (Riefler 1947)--he also upheld the imperative need for its development (Eisenhower 1961). The ascent of the military increased the interaction and traffic between the corporate and military realms. Mills (2000: 213) indicates that following the Second World War, "[m]ilitary demands continued to shape and to pace the corporate economy," especially given major military contracts. What is more, "military production helped prop up the entire economic edifice in the United States, and was a factor holding off economic stagnation" (Foster 2006: 110). In reflecting on the interconnections between the power elite, the expanding military budget, and the growth imperative of the larger system, Charles H. Anderson (1976: 76-77) explained, "Military spending is ideally suited to the growth system since it pumps money into private production, redistributes income upward, and always finds an outlet, that is, there is never enough military power or sophisticated enough military hardware." The expansion in military spending wedded "big science" to the military in the United States (and elsewhere), as research and development were geared to addressing the specialized technological needs for advanced military performance (Hooks and McLauchlan 1992). The military directed social resources to designing, developing, testing, and deploying superior vehicles, planes, boats, and weapons for national security and potential use in future conflicts. The new equipment was made of special materials, corresponding to advances in weapons. These technological developments have made the military more capital- and material-intensive (Shaw 1988). Technological advances allow the military to move massive amounts of equipment and soldiers throughout the world more easily, covering more land in less time (Collins 1981). These advances have increased the expense of military operations, especially the costs associated with operating special equipment such as aircraft carriers, planes, helicopters, and tanks. Such trends encourage the international arms race between the global powers, as novel technologies and weapons set a new standard for warfare (Clark and Jorgenson 2012). While the military (i.e., the treadmill of destruction) is connected to the economy (i.e., the treadmill of production) in complex ways, given the military-industrial complex, it also generates its own growth dynamics that require immense amounts of capital, supplies of energy, and other raw materials to sustain its operations (Clark et al. 2010; Jorgenson and Clark 2009). Figure 5 provides primary energy consumption (coal, petroleum, electricity, and natural gas) for the United States, measured in thousands of coal-ton equivalents, for every twenty years (i.e., 1900, 1920 ... 1980, 2000) from 1900 to 2000, as well as for the year 2007. These data were also obtained from the Correlates of War online data set. The consumption of such energy sources leads to increases in greenhouse gas emissions and thus contributes to climate change (IPCC 2007). As indicated by Figure 5, primary energy consumption in the United States increased from 256,081 thousands of coal-ton equivalents in 1900 to 5,548,023 thousands of coal-ton equivalents in 2007, and the general pattern of the increase is quite similar to the upward trajectories for both military expenditures measures in Figures 3 and 4. Militarism contributes to environmental degradation during times of war and peace. The environmental and public health harms associated with war are more obvious, so we provide only a few examples to illustrate the range of impacts. Biological and chemical weapons contaminate ecosystems and devastate landscapes. Agent Orange was used to defoliate the [landscape](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) during the Vietnam War, polluting the land and water and causing significant health problems for citizens of Vietnam and US soldiers. More recently, depleted uranium has been used in the manufacturing of bullets, shells, and bombs. This material contributes to the contamination of the land during and following war and presents serious health risks for human and animal populations (Birchard 1998; Sanders 2009; White 2008). Waging war also produces a broad range of debris that accumulates as pollution within the nations where war is being waged, as well as at the military bases used in the military campaign. Debris, in this particular case, includes fuel deposits, ammunition dumps, drums filled with oil and solvents, asphalt, grease, paint, tires, cables, unexploded munitions, gunpowder, and fiberboard. These materials introduce an array of chemicals and other toxins into ecosystems that will continue to harm both flora and fauna unless a "clean operation" is conducted (Lanier-Graham 1993). Military campaigns consume enormous amounts of fossil (and nuclear) fuels in planes, ships, and tanks (Grimes 1999; Klare 2002; Lanier-Graham 1993; Marshall 2005; Pellow 2007; Thomas 1995). Michael Klare (2007) indicates that the US military consumes at least 1.3 billion gallons of oil annually in the Middle East alone--more than the annual consumption of Bangladesh. Such levels of fossil fuel use contribute to the global accumulation of carbon dioxide emissions and thus cause climate change (IPCC 2007). War also contributes to [deforestation](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) and the loss of wildlife habitat, as people attempt to rebuild what was lost during the conflict (Lanier-Graham 1993). Too often the environmental impacts of militarism are overlooked. This situation is especially true in terms of the expansionary dynamics and environmental impacts of militarism during periods of peace (Clark and Jorgenson 2012). The constant preparation for future conflicts by vested military interests and persistent geopolitical concerns escalate the scale and operations of militaries. As a result, the treadmill of destruction expands even in the absence of armed conflict. Military institutions and their activities consume vast amounts of nonrenewable energy and other resources for research and development, maintenance, and operation of the overall infrastructure (Dycus 1996; Jorgenson 2005; Jorgenson et al. 2010; Sidel and Shahi 1997; York 2008). At the same time, military operations generate large amounts of toxic substances and waste, which contribute to the contamination of land and water. The testing of nuclear weapons released strontium-90, iodine-131, and other radioactive isotopes directly into the environment, leading to the bioaccumulation of these materials throughout the food web (Commoner 1967; Hastings 2000; LaDuke 1999; Shulman 1992; Ward 1999). Other hazardous toxins are introduced into the environment through the production, storage, transportation, and disposal of biological and chemical weapons (Lanier-Graham 1993). In the 1940s, the Hanford Project was built in the state of Washington in the United States to manufacture nuclear weapons. Nuclear reactors were used to produce plutonium. When this plant was decommissioned, there remained millions of gallons and cubic feet of radioactive waste. The groundwater in the area is contaminated. This site, located along the Columbia River, is generally deemed to be one of the most polluted sites in the world (McNeill 2000). Likewise, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, also within the United States, which manufactured chemical weapons, remains a Superfund site, as the "by-products from the production of mustard gas, napalm, incendiary weapons, and other types of munitions were dumped on the land for decades" (Lanier-Graham 1993: 80). Pesticides, solvents, mercury, lead, and arsenic also contaminate this land. These toxins are known to pollute groundwater. Military bases throughout the world have been identified as sites of toxic contamination, and in the 1960s and 1970s, millions of gallons of radioactive waste were dumped by the US Navy into Pearl Harbor (LaDuke 1999: 173). Singer and Keating (1999: 330-331) detail how military preparedness includes use of "rare and poisonous metals such as titanium, beryllium, germanium, cobalt, thallium, and depleted uranium," which "are extremely toxic to extract and refine." These materials, as well as other potentially dangerous chemicals, are often exclusively employed in the production of military goods. Part of the everyday operation and maintenance of military equipment includes the use of a broad range of thinners, solvents, lubricants, degreasers, fuels, pesticides, and propellants. As a result, "the Department of Defense . generates 500,000 tons of toxic waste annually, more than the top five US chemical companies combined, and it is estimated that the armed forces of the major world powers produce the greatest amount of hazardous waste in the world" (Singer and Keating 1999: 338). Thus, "the most ecologically devastated locations on Earth" are found wherever "military production facilities" operate (Gould 2007: 331). Armed forces have used a steadily increasing amount of land for bases, other installations, and training exercises over the last century ([United Nations](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) Center for Disarmament 1982). The end of the Cold War did not reduce the use of public lands for military operations, training, testing, and exercises (Singer and Keating 1999). In 2003, the United States alone had over 900 military bases located domestically and operated over 700 military bases in 130 countries (Johnson 2004). By 2007, there were over 800 US military bases overseas (Sanders 2009). A network of military bases encompasses the globe, requiring a vast amount of [fossil fuels](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) and other resources to staff, operate, and transport equipment and personnel between destinations. Even with advanced technologies, military operations require bases close to theaters of action to supply energy and personnel needs (Collins 1981). To a significant extent military power remains dependent upon access to land (Foster 2006; Jorgenson and Clark 2009). Militaries must have ready supplies of raw materials and energy as well as the infrastructure to support their operations and to meet the needs of their personnel. Consequently, military-oriented resource use involves strategic stockpiling of munitions, spare parts, fossil fuels, and other ancillary equipment to sustain its operations. The resource consumption of the military is further increased by [industries](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) that produce marginal equipment for the armed forces and their support economies (Jorgenson 2005). The production of such marginal equipment and stockpiling of fuels places greater demands upon the environment. The populations of armed forces also use large quantities of materials for uniforms and specialized forms of clothing that would not otherwise be consumed. Furthermore, the labor intensity of militaries increases the resources required for training, armaments, transportation, and the [housing](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA313972354&v=2.1&it=r) of troops and support personnel (Jorgenson and Clark 2009; Jorgenson et al. 2010). During regular operations, including peacetime activities, the armed forces consume large amounts of fossil fuels, adding to the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Jorgenson et al. 2010; Roberts et al. 2003). Vaclav Smil (2000) points out that the three branches of the US military consumed approximately 25 million tons of fuel per year in the 1990s, excluding energy consumed in both the Gulf War and the bombing of Kosovo. He indicates that this amount was "more than the total commercial energy consumption of nearly two thirds of the world's countries" (Smil 2000: 38). The high consumption of fossil fuels is, in part, a reflection of the high-tech equipment employed by the armed forces. Additionally, soldiers must be constantly trained to use this equipment, and the high-tech machinery and vehicles must be tested. Planes, helicopters, ships, tanks, and armed vehicles all require enormous amounts of oil to make them move--not to mention the various ancillary infrastructures that are required for their operation, such as air strips, roads, and supply vehicles. For example, one hour of operation of a nonnuclear aircraft carrier consumes 21,300 liters (over 5,621 gallons) of fuel; large, high-tech military helicopters burn 5 gallons of fuel for every mile that they travel; and fighter planes, such as the F-15 and F-16, consume between 1,500 and 1,700 gallons of fuel per hour. If their afterburners are used, up to 14,400 gallons are exhausted per hour (Cutler 1989; Renner 1997: 120; Sanders 2009; Smith 2003). Renner (1997: 120) states that "a modern battle tank's fuel consumption is so voracious that it is better measured in gallons per mile than in miles per gallon." Of the top ten fuel guzzlers, eight of them are support vehicles that carry fuel and supplies. Only two are combat vehicles--the Apache helicopter and the M-1 Abrams tank (Karbuz 2007). As the military pursues "bigger, faster, and more sophisticated weapons, fuel efficiency continues to plummet" (Smith 2003). Superior combat performance of equipment is a greater priority than energy efficiency for military institutions. In the 1980s, "nearly a quarter of all jet fuel" was consumed by militaries throughout the world; and approximately three-quarters of the petroleum used by the armed forces fuels vehicles, aircrafts, sea vessels, and other forms of warfare machinery (Renner 1991, 1997: 120). The Pentagon has the largest fleet of high-tech military equipment, which is fueled almost entirely by oil. According to Klare (2007), it is perhaps the "leading consumer of petroleum" in the world. Figure 6 provides the results of Jorgenson et al.'s (2010) cross-national longitudinal study of per capita carbon dioxide emissions (emissions resulting primarily from fossil fuel consumption) for 72 nations from 1970 to 2000. The reported coefficients, which are all statistically significant, are estimated from fixed effects regression analysis and standardized, allowing for comparisons of the relative magnitude of the effects of the explanatory variables. Of particular relevance, the effects of both military variables are positive and larger in magnitude than the effect of manufacturing as percent of total gross domestic product (GDP). These results also hold in analyses restricted to just developing nations as well as for analyses of total carbon emissions. Besides directly contributing to carbon emissions through the consumption of fossil fuels, militarization appears to influence the willingness and timing of nations to ratify environmental treaties. In a recent cross-national study, Givens (2012) employs event history analysis techniques and finds that higher levels of militarization, in the context of both military expenditures and military participation rates, are associated with longer periods of time until ratification and/or failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Along these lines, Christoff (2008) explores how the United States' position as a global "superpower," with unrivaled military and economic power, did not exempt it from censure when it refused to agree to the proposed text at the Bali climate conference. He also explores how the economic and military positions of the United States and China in the global system influence their actions on climate negotiations and notes the importance of the United States' internal budgetary issues and external attempts to retain military supremacy in shaping climate discussions (Christoff 2010). In conclusion, we forcefully assert that the environmental impacts of the nation's militaries must be seriously considered in future research on the anthropogenic drivers of environmental harms. Doing so will not be easy, but this broader perspective is imperative given that global climate change and unsustainable resource consumption are among the most serious challenges currently facing the world.

#### US military is one of the biggest causes of climate change now; the aff’s militarization of the military locks into a cycle of hydrocarbon use.

**Lancaster University** 6/20/**19**. REF 2021 rated 99% of Lancaster's overall research environment as 4\* 'world leading' or 3\* 'internationally excellent'. Lancaster University. Lancaster University is a collegiate public research university in Lancaster, Lancashire, England. "U.S. military consumes more hydrocarbons than most countries -- massive hidden impact on climate." ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, 20 June 2019. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/06/190620100005.htm.

The US military's carbon footprint is enormous and must be confronted in order to have a substantial effect on battling global warming, experts argue. Research by social scientists from Durham University and Lancaster University shows the US military is one of the largest climate polluters in history, consuming more liquid fuels and emitting more CO2e (carbon-dioxide equivalent) than most countries. The majority of greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting routinely focuses on civilian energy use and fuel consumption, not on the US military. This new study, published in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, calculates part of the US military's impact on climate change through critical analysis of its global logistical supply chains. The research provides an independent public assessment of the US military's greenhouse gas emissions. It reports that if the US military were a nation state, it would be the 47th largest emitter of GHG in the world, if only taking into account the emission from fuel usage. Report co-author Dr Patrick Bigger, of Lancaster University Environment Centre, said: "The US Military has long understood it is not immune from the potential consequences of climate change -- recognising it as a threat multiplier that can exacerbate other threats -- nor has it ignored its own contribution to the problem. "Yet its climate policy is fundamentally contradictory -- confronting the effects of climate change while remaining the largest single institutional consumer of hydrocarbons in the world, a situation it is locked into for years to come because of its dependence on existing aircraft and warships for open-ended operations around the globe." Despite the recent increase in attention, the US military's dependence on fossil fuels is unlikely to change. The US is continuing to pursue open-ended operations around the globe, with the life-cycles of existing military aircraft and warships locking them into hydrocarbons for years to come. The research comes at a time when the US military is preparing for climate change through both its global supply networks and its security infrastructure. This study brings transparency to one of the world's largest institutional consumers of hydrocarbons at a time when the issue is a hot-button topic on the US Presidential campaign trail. Leading Democratic candidates, such as Senator Elizabeth Warren, are asking critical questions of the role of the US military in climate change and examining its plans for the future. Co-author Dr Benjamin Neimark, Associate Director of the Pentland Centre for Sustainability in Business at Lancaster, said: "This research provides ample evidence to support recent calls by activist networks to include the US military in Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's Green New Deal and other international climate treaties." Co-author Dr Oliver Belcher, of Durham University's Department of Geography, said: "Our research demonstrates that to account for the US military as a major climate actor, you must understand the logistical supply chain that makes its acquisition and consumption of hydrocarbon-based fuels possible. "How do we account for the most far-reaching, sophisticated supply chains, and the largest climate polluter in history? While incremental changes can amount to radical effects in the long-run, there is no shortage of evidence that the climate is at a tipping point and more is needed." The researchers' examination of the US military 'carbon boot-print' started with the US Defense Logistics Agency -- Energy (DLA-E), a powerful yet virtually unresearched sub-agency within the larger Defense Logistics Agency. It is the primary purchase-point for hydrocarbon-based fuels for the US Military, and a powerful actor in the global oil market, with the fuels it delivers powering everything from routine base operations in the USA to forward operating bases in Afghanistan. "An important way to cool off the furnace of the climate emergency is to turn off vast sections of the military machine," added Dr Neimark. "This will have not only the immediate effect of reducing emissions in the here-and-now, but create a disincentive in developing new hydrocarbon infrastructure integral to US military operations." Other key findings of the report include: In 2017 alone, the US military purchased about 269,230 barrels of oil a day and emitted more than 25,000 kt- CO2e by burning those fuels. In 2017 alone, the Air Force purchased $4.9 billion worth of fuel and the Navy $2.8 billion, followed by the Army at $947 million and Marines at $36 million. If the US military were a country, it would nestle between Peru and Portugal in the global league table of fuel purchasing, when comparing 2014 World Bank country liquid fuel consumption with 2015 US military liquid fuel consumption. For 2014, the scale of emissions is roughly equivalent to total -- not just fuel -- emissions from Romania. According to the DLA-E data obtained by the researchers, which includes GHG emissions from direct or stationary sources, indirect or mobile sources and electricity use, and other indirect, including upstream and downstream emissions. The Air Force is by far the largest emitter of GHG at more than 13,000 kt CO2e, almost

# AFF Answers

## 2AC – Militarization Good

#### Militarization is key to Russia deterrence

**Sherr 17** (Sherr, James. “Policy Implications.” *The Militarization of Russian Policy*, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2017, pp. 15–17. *JSTOR*, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19014.9. Accessed 20 Jul. 2022](http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19014.9.%20Accessed%2020%20Jul.%202022)) // OA

Since February 2014, NATO Allies have become increasingly aware of Russia’s determination to disrupt the cohesion of the West as we have come to define it. However, doubts persist about the degree of strategic thinking that motivates its policy. The picture we have presented not only outlines a strategic framework. It delineates, even by Russian standards, an unusual degree of integration between the political objectives of the state and the expansion of its military power. That expansion is not a Brownian motion. It is a coherent and purpose-driven activity designed to challenge Western dominance of an international order that Russia’s state leadership perceives as harmful to its interests and intrinsically vulnerable. For understandable reasons, many in the West are also addressing the critical question of how our own policy tools might be used to change Russian mindsets and perceptions. But the underlying challenge, much as Putin has aggravated it, is not Russian perceptions, but its interests. And, where European security is concerned, Moscow’s interests can be expected to diverge from ours in significant respects even if Putin is replaced by a successor with different priorities. The more immediate challenge is to change Western mindsets rather than Russian ones. Our homo economicus, business school metrics do not explain very much about Putin’s Russia. State mobilization might impose serious diseconomies on an already overburdened resource base. But as long as it continues, it continues and produces consequences that NATO needs to confront and counter. Those who believe that compromise, vigorous dialogue, or neorealist grand bargains will resolve our differences have been neither watching nor listening. Dialogue will never be more effective than the policy underpinning it. Angela Merkel’s exhaustive discussions with Vladimir Putin have provided useful reinforcement to a moderately tough policy. John Kerry’s indefatigable dialogue with Sergey Lavrov over Syria only amplified weakness. The Kremlin is willing to match us in talking as well as fighting. Its curt and pre-emptive rejection of a grand bargain with the United States at the start of the Trump administration is telling in itself. Russia expects material changes to the structure of international relations and is determined to press its perceived advantages until concessions are forced upon us. The only way to diminish the threats Russia poses is to diminish these advantages. Once that imperative is accepted, we will find that the news is not all that bad. Time does not favor Russia. True enough, Russia has defied repeated Western forecasts about the unsustainability of its economic model. Low oil prices and Western sanctions have brought its proverbial coping mechanisms and organizational ingenuity to the fore. Nevertheless, Russia’s economy is in decline, its technological base is stagnant, and the mobilization reflex merely postpones the day when its structural problems are either addressed or wreak vengeance. Thus, the West has good grounds for strategic patience. However, time is not a strategic actor. It has to be used. For strategic patience to bear fruit, there must be a strategy as well as patience. Deterrence is only a strategy if it addresses the threat to be deterred. As serious students of Russian strategy have noted, war with Russia means war with all of Russia. Yet the war Russia is preparing to fight has limited objectives: to shatter the cohesion of NATO, destroy its forces in the operational theater, and force it to concede defeat at the earliest possible moment. Without confidence in these outcomes, Russia will not go to war. The aim of NATO’s deterrence must be to convince Russia that any war against NATO means war with all of NATO, wherever its forces are based. **To this end, the priority for Western military establishments is not to outmatch the Russians where they are naturally strong, but to invest in the antidotes to these strengths**. The Alliance confronted a similar challenge at the height of the Brezhnev era. Its “dual track” decision of 1979 forced the Soviets to contend with mobile, high-readiness, theaterbased nuclear systems that could have been used to devastating effect at the outset of conflict. Coupled with the exploitation of then revolutionary “smart” non-nuclear U.S. Army weapons and war-fighting concepts (AirLand Battle), the West effectively threatened to annul ten years of Soviet investment in a “strategic offensive operation” against NATO. NATO undertook this task in the teeth of unprecedented internal opposition to its policy (focused on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) and an intense Soviet active measures campaign in Europe. The result of the new NATO policy was not an apocalyptic confrontation, but a change of course for the USSR and a process of mutual de-escalation of military threats and political tensions in Europe. Today’s conditions are in one respect more promising than those that confronted NATO 35 to 40 years ago. Gerasimov’s anxiety, “the destruction of military forces and key state assets in several hours,” derives from “prompt global strike” and shorter range non-nuclear systems against which Russia might only be able to threaten nuclear retaliation. Strategically, they have the potential to threaten assets critical to war-waging and state management without producing nuclear devastation. Operationally, they might cut several of Russia’s pathways to escalation dominance that presently exist. From a Russian perspective, this new generation of weapons is destabilizing**; from a Western perspective, the opposite**. Investment in these systems will not absolve NATO of the need to maintain a coherent nuclear posture. But when combined with other means of enhancing the West’s robustness and resilience, it will constrain Russia’s ability to fight war on its terms. If it cannot do so, it is most unlikely to fight at all. The observation of Finland’s leading expert on Russian military policy is worth citing: In the Georgian and Ukrainian crises and Syrian air operations, Russia has demonstrated its high readiness for limited military operations to secure and promote its national interests in situations when, according to its estimation, success is easily gained and risk of unfavourable escalation is low.36 In these respects, Vladimir Putin is a good steward of Russian tradition. Only two conditions have provoked Russia during his tenure: weaknesses (Ukraine in conditions of state collapse and Syria after a geopolitical vacuum had been created by the United States) and bluff (NATO’s ill-judged 2008 promise that Georgia and Ukraine “will become members of NATO”). No example can be found of Russia attacking a stronger opponent that understood its own strength. **A strong opponent afraid of its own strength is only asking for trouble**. The simple and most basic object of deterrence is to persuade would-be opponents that force is not the solution to their problems. **But it is not simple to achieve**. In 1987 the Soviet Union concluded that  “the application of military means to resolve any dispute is inadmissible under current conditions.”37 It is not beyond our means to bring Russia to the same conclusion

## 2ac – Small States

#### NATO and the US have a vested interest in protecting and incorporating smaller states

James Jay, 8-10-2018, "Why Small States Matter to Big Powers," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-small-states-matter-big-powers-28362//CDMoney

Nobody is bigger than the United States of America. No big power more appreciates small powers. No small state will find a better friend than the United States. In an era of great power competition, “small” matters a good deal. Little nations are not sand to be ground between the great wheels of major powers. They are made up of people, not pawns. Citizens in small states have the same hopes, aspirations and natural rights as those in world powers. These people have every reason to expect and demand a life of freedom, peace and prosperity. Further, it is in the interests of bigger states to help small states flourish. Great powers, if wise, will support the best hopes of smaller states. There are three reasons why the United States, in particular, ought to take small states seriously. Sonovia 1. Geography Matters. In geopolitics—as in real estate—a critical consideration is “location, location, location.” To a major power, a country’s greatest asset might be its map coordinates rather than the size of its arsenal or bank account. Geography matters when it comes to economic integration, transportation, energy distribution and physical security. Even in a digitized world, the freedom to move people, goods, and services across physical space is a valuable commodity. Recognizing the importance of connecting dots on the ground is not an argument for hardened spheres of control (such as during the Cold War) or carving up the world (like seventeenth-century mercantilists). On the other hand, there is a case to be made for building bridges between like-minded nations that want to live together with surety in commerce and share peaceful borders. Thus, a small state in the right place can be very important to a big power. Iceland is a case in point. Even though it has no armed forces, the island’s location makes the nation a lynchpin in transatlantic security. That’s the reason Iceland was included as one of twelve founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Without question, Iceland’s strategic location is of far greater importance to U.S. security than the state’s size and resources would suggest. Washington should be working hard to make that bilateral relationship even stronger. Part of the reason NATO continues to keep the membership door open is because there are nations still not included whose accession would enhance collective security due to their location. These include Macedonia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kosovo. And there are states in other regions where stronger bilateral relations would greatly serve U.S. interests. Closer ties with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, for example, would further U.S. efforts to sustain a free and open Indo-Pacific. In the Middle East, few states are smaller than Jordan. Yet, a peaceful, prosperous Jordan is a keystone for regional stability, and regional stability is a vital interest of the United States—as important to this administration as it should have been to the last one. Similarly, Tunisia is an important state for extending an umbrella of regional stability in the greater Middle East to North Africa. 2. Freedom Matters. Like-minded nations make better partners. One of the reasons NATO works is because the alliance is a partnership of free nation-states. The foundational rationale of the transatlantic alliance is that free states have the right to associate for the purpose of collective security. To close NATO’s open door would undermine what NATO stands for: the right of free peoples to choose their future.

#### **If not already, aff increases coordination and quality of life for smaller states**

James Jay, 8-10-2018, "Why Small States Matter to Big Powers," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-small-states-matter-big-powers-28362//CDMoney

Building Bridges to Small Nations The United States has an inherent advantage over adversarial powers in partnering with small nations. China and Russia don’t have allies. They have underlings. No country wants to be a suburb of Beijing or Moscow. America, however, has to up its game. Here is a ten-step process to get the job done. Step 1. Set the Right Objectives for Friends. In reducing vulnerabilities of friends, allies and strategic partners to adversarial influences, American objectives should be framed less in driving particular political outcomes or agendas (e.g., promoting marriage equality) than in achieving good stable governance, strong institutions and a reduction in corruption. This will make our partners more resilient and self-confident. Step 2. Avoid Us-or-Them-ism. The goal of a small-state strategy is not to exclude adversarial competitors. For example, America can’t ask countries not to do business with China. After all, the United States does business with China. The goal is not to get countries to takes sides but to engage and help them act consistent with their own interests—eschewing, for instance, economic engagement detrimental to national security or that undermines the rule of law and good governance. Step 2. Promote Economic Freedom. China and Russia can buy influence because, in poor nations with weak governance, a little money goes a long far. The best way to make these states more resistant to malicious influence is to help them become wealthier and better governed. This is best accomplished by promoting economic freedom. Step 3. Enter Free Trade Agreements (FTA). Trade agreements fundamentally have to be about liberalizing trade and making markets freer. That said, prioritizing agreements with states where the United States is seeking friendship, and common cause makes sense. America, for example, ought to have an FTA with Tunisia. Step 4. Be There. In many small, like-minded nations, all the United States has to do to win friends is, simply, to be there. Too much American engagement rests on foreign assistance and not enough on building human-to-human relationships and a more robust presence by the U.S. private sector.

## Author Indicts

#### Balko is biased!

McMichael 16 (Christopher, PhD in Politics from Rhodes University, research include organized crime, Libertarian Marxism, and Fascism, “Pacification and Police: A critique of the Police Militarization Thesis,” November 29 2016, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)

 Strikingly, and little commented on by liberal or leftist outlets, some of the most vocal proponents of the ‘militarization’ thesis (at least within the context of the United States) have been from the Libertarian Right. An article published by the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) portrays the disturbing arrival of a ‘new breed of cop’ with a ‘military mentality’ ([Greenhunt 2008](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)), while an essay in the journal of the Independent Institute claims that a long standing separation between the domestic police and military functions of the US government has been irrevocably breached ([Hall and Coyne 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 501). By far the most influential advocate of the militarization doctrine is Radley Balko, a former writer and analyst for libertarian institutions Reason Magazine and the Cato Institute, the latter of which has intimate ties with the powerful Koch Brothers, who have also increasingly become concerned with police reform. Balko, currently of the Huffington Post, is a prolific and outspoken journalist, who has written countless media articles and policy reports and two books on the subject: Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America ([Balko 2006](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)) and the more recent Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces ([Balko 2013a](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)). [Balko (2006)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569) maintains that domestic law enforcement has become dangerously invasive: ‘Americans have long maintained that a man’s home is his castle and that he has the right to defend it from unlawful intruders. Unfortunately, that right may be disappearing’ (p. iv). His main contention is that such tactics have encouraged a dangerous blurring between the police and military, in which the police work of protecting public safety is confused with the military work of seeking and destroying enemies ([Balko 2006](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 15). Despite Balko’s work focusing primarily on the United States, it has transcended its North American trappings, with his work referenced in a report prepared by the South African government, which called for the ‘demilitarization’ of the national police force ([National Development Plan 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569): 392). Although his work is often cited in progressive or radical publications, Balko’s politics are squarely on the right: getting his start with Fox News, and then working long stints for Republican Party aligned think tanks, calling for the privatization of social welfare and prisons and, of course, defending the public influence of the Koch Brothers ([Ames & Levine 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0309816816678569)).

## AT 1033 is militarized

#### 1033 is largely not militarized

Mendenhall 21 ( Michael, “Consideratons For Acquiring Excess Military Equipment by Police Leaders”, PhD from Western Michigan Administration on Publican Administration and Philosophy, Published by Western Michigan University, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2599062490?parentSessionId=CYdTyFk9fAuCK3M32D8nUg2Hel7MeXMgGlOk3ZD92vY%3D&pq-origsite=primo&accountid=14667>)

It is important to note that according to the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO, 2020), 5% of the excess property that law enforcement agencies receive are small arms (handguns), and less than 1% are tactical vehicles. Some of the weapons and tactical vehicles that can be acquired include: MRAPs (Mine Resistant Vehicles), other armored vehicles, night vision (sights, binoculars, goggles and lights), aircraft (planes and helicopters), machine guns (5.56mm and 7.62mm rifles) and or magazines with no ammunition. The vast majority of property acquired through the program includes clothing, office supplies, tools, and rescue equipment and is thus not militarized (LESO, 2020).

## AT Democracy Impact

#### Case solves the impact to the K – NATO can promote democratic reform

\*NOTE: This card could be cross-applied to the perm – warrants of card do say how gov is key to democracy (2nd paragraph )

Poast and Chincilla 20 (Paul and Alexandra; associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago; Rosenwald Fellow in US Foreign Policy and International Security and Niehaus Postdoctoral Fellow at Dartmouth College & Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Chicago, Assistance professor at Texas A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public service, “Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO Expansion”, April 30 2020, <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6.pdf>)

In what way should one expect NATO to enhance democratic development? After all, as highlighted above, democracy is a core principle of the institution. Much of the existing work on NATO and democratic development points to several avenues of possible influence: socialization, guidance from NATO about how to create and implement reforms, NATO pressure to implement reforms, and legitimizing new democracies by helping them provide the public good of security through NATO membership. It is important to note that each of these mechanisms for how NATO could prompt reform should begin operating before full NATO membership is achieved. Once prospective members are given a promise of membership in the form of the MAP, they will be brought into close contact with NATO members and therefore exposed to the socialization mechanism. If domestic reform is a necessary condition for NATO membership, prospective members participating in the MAP should begin reforming so that they can reap the benefits of membership. Finally, if democratic reforms made to gain NATO membership persist, NATO membership should also be associated with higher levels of democracy in new member states. Below we discuss each of these means for NATO influence proposed in the literature.

First, NATO may have a subtle impact on future member states by socializing military and civilian leaders from states seeking membership to respect democratic norms. Democracy is dependent not only on the formal institutions of a country, but also on whether elites are willing to abide by democratic constraints on their power rather than undermine or dismantle them. The example of Poland’s recent democratic backsliding despite the former presence of formal democratic institutions illustrates this point. Even when democratic reforms preceded NATO involvement, NATO could still have a democratizing influence by socializing military and civilian elites to respect democratic reforms—particularly civilian control of the military. NATO created the conditions for regular, institutionalized interaction between elites from partner states and longtime member states within the institutional framework of the alliance and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), making socialization possible. NATO taught military officers and civilian defense policymakers who had served most of their professional lives under a communist system about the norms of a democracy and their role in it (Gheciu [2005b](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR24)). This socialization logic outlined by Alexandra Gheciu and others is not in conflict with our argument, as we measure changes in democratic institutions rather than changes in elite attitudes. However, recent democratic backsliding in some NATO countries indicates that either the right elites were not socialized by NATO or the main effect of NATO socialization was teaching elites to value civilian control of the military and continued engagement with NATO.

Elite socialization began well before NATO membership, with collective briefings, individualized MAPs for each prospective member state, NATO-led workshops, military advisers from NATO member states, and professional education programs (Gheciu [2005b](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR24)). NATO used these cooperative activities to teach the goals and norms of the alliance and assess the commitment of PfP countries to them (Gheciu [2005a](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR23)). Joint military exercises, in addition to augmenting the capability aggregation of the alliance, allowed military elites from NATO states and prospective member states to interact. Military education programs—such as the NATO Defence College and programs through partner states such as the year-long International Fellows program at the US National Defense University—played a similar role in building military capability while creating space for socialization through military-to-military interactions.

Second, even when countries intended to make democratic reforms on their own initiative, they often lacked institutional knowledge about how to reform. NATO stepped in to provide assistance and advice to prospective members regarding how to enact democratic reforms. Democracy advising was provided through the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the associated Rose-Roth seminars. According to Trine Flockhart ([2004](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR18)), the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and Rose-Roth seminars brought together parliamentarians from NATO and partner states to ‘familiarize legislators with key security issues and debates, to promote the development of appropriate civil–military relations, and to facilitate the sharing of expertise and experience in parliamentary practice and procedures.’ These seminars also played a ‘very important social function’ as policymakers from NATO and partner countries built professional networks with one another (Flockhart [2004](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR18)). Civilian defense policymakers and military officers from NATO partner countries were also able to participate in the NATO-adjacent George C. Marshall Center, which has over 13,300 alumni. Courses at the Marshall Center include discussion of international law, democracy, rule of law, and human rights alongside more traditional security topics (Marshall Center [2019](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR22)).

Third, NATO provided pressure for specific reforms through direct communication with a country’s NATO liaisons and naming and shaming countries slacking on reforms. For example, a US Congressional Research Service report released in 1995 raised concerns that Poland was not ready for NATO membership. The report stated: ‘Initiation into NATO nevertheless may hinge even more on publication of a democratic Constitution and the legal basis for civilian control. Meanwhile, the Minister of Defense and many senior officers who set policy and shape opinions have become mired in political wrangling over control of the armed forces’ (quoted in Epstein [2005](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR15), 254–285). As Rachel Epstein notes, this report was widely publicized in the Polish media with the effect of shaming Polish officials into complying, given that NATO membership was by this time an established national foreign policy goal. When the chief of the Polish General Staff, General Tadeusz Wilecki, opposed increased civilian control of the military, an unflattering New York Times article put sufficient pressure on Polish president Aleksander Kwasniewski that he removed Wilecki (Epstein [2006](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR16), 280–281).

By utilizing naming and shaming tactics and building alliances with pro-reform domestic politicians, NATO successfully shepherded a select group of partner states through enacting civilian control of the military and more internationalized defense policies (Epstein [2005](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR15)). Although Poland joined NATO in the 1999 wave of enlargement, one could argue that the logic of pressure for reforms was still relevant for the countries that joined NATO in 2004. The smaller reforms of hiring personnel supportive of democratic norms and building political coalitions in support of democracy that Epstein highlights are consistent with what we find in our quantitative analysis. Some states that rapidly enacted democratic reforms after transition to democracy in the early 1990s made small improvements under NATO tutelage, even though their average democracy scores after reaching NATO applicant status and membership remained similar to what they had been before. Other NATO-induced changes, such as the firing of Wilecki in Poland, may have been crucial for continued progress even though our quantitative data do not measure them. NATO’s value, then, may be in encouraging states already democratizing to persist in maintaining democracy despite challenges from domestic elites. However, any democratizing effect of NATO would be concentrated on the premembership period, as democracy is in practice not a condition for remaining a NATO member.

Finally, NATO can assist in providing the public good of security, which can be critical for the legitimacy of some new democracies. Poast and Urpelainen ([2018](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR49)) argue that leaders in transitional democracies use, and often must create, international organizations to consolidate democratic rule and improve their ability to distribute public goods to the populations under their rule. Public goods are broadly defined as policies that benefit large constituencies in society. Examples of public goods include internal and external security (Loader and Walker [2007](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR40); Bueno de Mesquita et al. [1999](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR6)), public infrastructure that increases investment (Henisz [2002](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR29)), free and fair elections (Donno [2010](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR14)), reduction of corruption (Banerjee [1997](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR2)), and environmental protection (VanDeveer and Dabelko [2001](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR55)). Providing such goods is critical to the survival of leaders in democratizing states. But because autocratic developing countries have little need or capacity to improve the provision of public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. [2003](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR7); Wintrobe [1998](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR59)), democratization leaves leaders in newly democratic regimes with a unique challenge; they face high expectations for public good provision, yet their administrative apparatus has little experience providing public goods (Haggard and Kaufman [1997](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR28)). Therefore, newly democratic governments can benefit from outside expertise on public goods provision, namely that offered by international organizations (IOs). IOs can assist democratizing states in the provision of public goods. IOs provide a venue through which members can pool limited resources or coordinate on policy reforms even with limited institutional capacity. IOs assist in highly technical tasks, including advising on governance capacity, monitoring elections, and facilitating learning about democratic institutions. IOs can help governments of transitional democracies govern effectively and acquire the resources to supply public goods to the newly expanded electorate.

The credibility of the Baltic states’ democratic institutions and democratic process were tied to providing the public good of security through establishing and maintaining effective sovereignty. This meant that preventing interference from Russia was critical to the survival of Baltic democracy. Historically, the Baltics were classic buffer states that had been repeatedly occupied and/or annexed by the major European powers over the centuries (Fazal [2007](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR17); Snyder [2010](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR53)). But the governments of the Baltic states could not provide security from their own resources. Indeed, the security forces of these states were nonexistent. Kasekamp and Veebel ([2007](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR34), 13) point out that ‘unlike the Warsaw Pact countries, the Baltic states had no military establishment or diplomatic service of their own during the Cold War. These had to be built from scratch in the 1990s.’ Zalkans ([1999](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR60), 2), the former Latvian national security adviser, remarked in 1999 that, upon gaining independence, the Latvian military had no military threat analysis, defense concept, defense plan, or knowledge of budgetary processes or force planning. Former Lithuanian defense minister Linas Linkevičius labeled the status of the Lithuanian military ‘a mess,’ while Danish defense minister Hans Haekkerup observed that the Baltic states’ officers would need substantial retraining, as their only professional soldiers had been Soviet trained (Ito [2013](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR31), 241–242). Furthermore, a 1993 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted that progress in establishing forces would be slow because of a lack of financial resources and necessary expertise, a general reluctance to volunteer for service, and the various exemptions from conscript service (Rudzīte-Stejskala [2013](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR51), 171). NATO Commander of Allied forces in Northern Europe Sir Garry Johnson remarked that the Baltic states ‘started from zero’ (quoted in Ito [2013](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR31), 242).

Security, in the view of the Baltic states, could only be acquired by foreign help, and this left just one option: the Western democracies. In fact, the Baltic states never considered alternatives to seeking membership in Western institutions, namely NATO. For example, Raivo Vare, the Estonian state minister, asserted: ‘The only real possibility is NATO’ (quoted in Lepik [2004](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR38), 164). NATO’s PfP initiative was a useful first step in fulfilling the needs of the Baltic states. PfP, approved by the existing NATO members at the autumn 1993 NATO summit, allowed NATO to engage in peacekeeping operations with Central and Eastern European countries. By the mid-1990s the USA, sensing the need to craft a policy regarding the Baltic states, devised the Baltic Action Plan (BAP), a three-track process for integrating the Baltic states into the West: expand US-Baltic cooperation, expand US-Nordic cooperation to assist the Baltics, and expand US involvement in mediating Baltic-Russian differences. This was followed by the creation of the MAP. When the first Eastern European states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) officially entered NATO in 1999, the other NATO hopefuls embarked on the MAP. The MAP was a series of workshops in which NATO staff offered advice, assistance, and support for countries wishing to join NATO, and only a subgroup of PfP members were invited to take part in the MAP. Indeed, whereas PfP included countries as unlikely to join NATO as Russia (because of historical animosity toward NATO) and Uzbekistan (because of geographic location), embarking on the MAP meant that a country was now on a path to membership. As one senior NATO adviser remarked, participating in the MAP meant that ‘there was an open door and it just seemed to make sense to provide sensible advice’ (quoted in Rudzīte-Stejskala [2013](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6#ref-CR51), 178–180). Critically for democratic development, this advising included technical assistance in reforming civil–military relations and supreme command of the military. In the specific case of the Baltic states, setting out on a formal path to NATO membership also accorded their democratic regimes legitimacy by enabling them to provide for the external security of their states. In other words, NATO offered a security umbrella necessary for democratic development to endure

## Deterrence Theory Good

### General

#### Deterrence theory already considers possibilities of failure but still gives the logical conclusion that the aff is most likely to succeed – critique of the theory only provides examples of instances where the theory failed, but fails to take down the logics of the theory – it’s a hasty generalization

Achen and Snidal 89 (Christopher H. and Duncan, professor of politics at Princeton University, professor of international relations at Oxford University, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” 1989, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/rational-deterrence-theory-and-comparative-case-studies/05B3C8641D5EF6F9A36067EEA0210CCE#:~:text=Several%20recent%20books%20have%20argued%20that%20comparative%20case,This%20paper%20shows%20that%20such%20contentions%20are%20unwarranted.)

Conversely, if a deterrable initiator believes that it would very likely not be in the defender's interest to retaliate, or that the defender lacks the means or the will to do so, the initiator will attack. Thus, under conventional rational-choice assumptions, when the attacker is deterrable, successful deterrence turns on the defender's credibility. If the latter can convince the attacker that he has the political and military ability to fight, and that the prize (or his reputation for fighting when challenged) is worth more to him than the cost of the war, then, and only then, will a deterrable initiator be deterred.24 This simple model is less brittle than sometimes thought. Its propositions are contingent: if the expected punishment exceeds the gain, then opponents will be deterred. Thus, for example, the model implies that some conceivable punishment would deter, but not that any particular one will, nor even any feasible one. Put more strongly, the model implies that deterrence will fail for sufficiently determined attackers. Not all conceivable opponents are deterrable.25 Critics of rational deterrence sometimes write as if failures of deterrence were equivalent to failures of deterrence theory. Levy, for example, notes, "this is an ad hoc hypothesis which cannot technically be derived from any formal theory of deterrence."26 The truth is that the theory actually predicts some breakdowns. When deterrence fails because the retaliatory threat is absent, incredible, or less valuable than the prize, the theory has forecast perfectly. Rational deterrence theory implies that deterrence will not always be successful. Rational deterrence is very much an ideal-type explanation. No sensible person pretends that it summarizes typical deterrence decision making well, or that it exhausts what is to be said about any one historical case. Yet it has dominated discussion in all traditions of deterrence research, including historical investigations. For example, George and Smoke criticize rational deterrence for its assumption that a government is a rational actor and can be treated as if it were a single person.2 ? Yet the same authors summarize their case-study evidence as follows: In almost every historical case examined, we found evidence that the initi- ator tried to satisfy himself before acting that the risks of the particular op- tion he chose could be calculated and, perhaps more importantly, con- trolled by him so as to give his choice of action the character of a rationally calculated, acceptable risk.28 The rational unitary-actor model is not easily evaded. The power of rational deterrence theory is conceptual, not mathematical. It derives from the underlying logical cohesion and consistency with a set of simple first principles, not from the particular language in which it is expressed. In consequence, the model has been astonishingly fecund; both for theory and for policy. Its surprising implications, now familiar from the literature, include "the rationality of irrationality," the dangers of total disarmament, and the value of aiming for strategic equivalence between the superpowers.29 Perhaps most importantly, it was rational deterrence theory that sensitized policy makers to the negative aspect of defensive systems such as civil defense, the ABM, and SDI, which make first strikes less dangerous. The point is strongly counterintuitive; indeed, Aleksey Kosygin told Lyndon Johnson at Glassboro that he didn't understand it.30 But this surprising conclusion is a clear implication of rational deterrence theory. Contrary to George and Smoke's view, rational deterrence theory has proved itself in practical policy applications. No other theoretical perspective has had nearly the impact on American foreign policy, certainly not the conclusions of the case-study literature. Far from being an abstract, deductivistic theory developed in a policy vacuum, rational deterrence theory has repeatedly taken inspiration from the most pressing policy questions of the day, from decisions of bomber-basing in the 1950s to SDI in the 1980s. It has set the terms of the debate, and has often influenced the outcome. One may choose to applaud or decry its impact, but one cannot deny that the theory of rational deterrence, like any good theory, has been of immense practical importance.

### AT Empirical Ev

#### Their empirical examples are only generalizations NOT reasons why deterrence theory in this instance fail – that a misuse of their case studies

Achen and Snidal 89 (Christopher H. and Duncan, professor of politics at Princeton University, professor of international relations at Oxford University, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” 1989, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/rational-deterrence-theory-and-comparative-case-studies/05B3C8641D5EF6F9A36067EEA0210CCE#:~:text=Several%20recent%20books%20have%20argued%20that%20comparative%20case,This%20paper%20shows%20that%20such%20contentions%20are%20unwarranted.)

Analysts who employ case studies of deterrence have done well at producing lists of variables that influence deterrence success, along with certain empirical generalizations about how different types of crises unfold. But they have produced no impressive general propositions to compare with those of rational deterrence. Case-study generalizations are not a substitute for theorizing; empirical laws should not be mistaken for theoretical propositions. More than anything else, the hallmark of good theory is a fecundity that logically entails novel,sometimes surprising, insights and predictions. Inductive "theory" lacks this fecundity because it contains too few logical constraints. Categories can be multiplied to fit all cases. "Surprises" emerge not from the generalization, but from the case. Hence, we often cannot tell a consequential finding from an artifact; and when we succeed, the next case makes us begin all over again. By contrast, deductive theoretical propositions are of interest precisely because they interconnect with one another and prevent arbitrary multiplication of explanatory categories. The investigator is forced to be coherent. Multiple case studies are also no substitute for statistical testing of theoretical propositions; contingent empirical generalizations should not be confused with confirmed statistical regularities. Here again, the informal procedures of case-study analysis provide too few constraints on the imagination of the analyst. In consequence, empirical evidence from case studies is rarely strong enough to falsify a theory. In the case-study literature on deterrence, these weaknesses have appeared, first, in selection bias—the tendency to oversample deterrence failures—and, second, in the uncritical use of decision makers' own reconstructions of their thinking. Each of these virtually guarantees a negative evaluation of rational deterrence theory, no matter how well it actually performs. Only statistical analysis, with its formal criteria for inference, is likely in practice to provide honest tests of theories. Case studies are an important complement to both theory-building and statistical investigations, for precisely the reason Russett and George indicate: they allow a close examination of historical sequences in the search for causal processes.79 The analyst is able to identify plausible causal varw Russett (fn. 53); George (fn. 6). RATIONAL DETERRENCE: ACHEN & SNIDAL 169 iables, a task essential to theory construction and testing. Comparison of historical cases to theoretical predictions provides a sense of whether the theoretical story is compelling, and yields indispensable prior knowledge for more formal tests of explanatory adequacy. The method also generates novel empirical generalizations, which pose puzzles and challenges for theory to explain. In all these ways, case studies provide guidance in the revision and reformulation of analytic theory to account for a broader range of phenomena. Indeed, analytic theory cannot do without case studies. Because they are simultaneously sensitive to data and theory, case studies are more useful for these purposes than any other methodological tool. Too often, however, their findings have been interpreted as bodies of theory and tests of explanatory power. It is to these misuses that our criticisms have been directed.

## AT Verification Procedure Fail in Deterrence Theory

#### That’s descriptivist fallacy – deterrence theory doesn’t have to prove that the decision maker’s mental choices perfectly align, just that the consequences are aligned with the theory

Achen and Snidal 89 (Christopher H. and Duncan, professor of politics at Princeton University, professor of international relations at Oxford University, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” 1989, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/rational-deterrence-theory-and-comparative-case-studies/05B3C8641D5EF6F9A36067EEA0210CCE#:~:text=Several%20recent%20books%20have%20argued%20that%20comparative%20case,This%20paper%20shows%20that%20such%20contentions%20are%20unwarranted.)

There is a second objection to the empirical testing of rational deterrence in comparative case studies—namely, that the verification procedure fails to engage the rational deterrence theory of how states behave. In particular, rational deterrence is implicitly misconstrued as a theory of how decision makers think. Case study analysts have often expressed the opinion that, if decision makers do not really carry out the appropriate mental calculations, rational deterrence theory does not apply. This argument is the "descriptivist fallacy." As a glance at any appropriate text will show, the axioms and conclusions of utility theory refer only to choices. Mental calculations are never mentioned: the theory makes no reference to them. Indeed, a major reason for the various axiomatizations of expected-utility theory is to show that decision makers need not calculate. If they simply respond to incentives in certain natural ways, their behavior will be describable by utility functions.65 Rapoport puts it this way: Now, in being asked to choose between the two [lottery] tickets, the man is not asked to calculate anything. He is asked simply to choose between the two. It is from his choices that the theoretician will construct the man's util- ity scale on which all the outcomes will be assigned numbers (utilities).66 To our knowledge, no one who does rational-choice theorizing disputes this point, but it seems not to be widely understood. Rational deterrence theory does contain some minimal psychological content: for example, the initiator must realize that the defender exists and threatens to defend. But rational deterrence is agnostic about the actual calculations decision makers undertake. It holds that they will act as if they solved certain mathematical problems, whether or not they actually solve them. Just as Steffi Graf plays tennis as if she did rapid computations in Newtonian physics (and in game theory, too—at least against Navratilova), so rational deterrence theory predicts that decision makers will decide whether to go to war as if they did expected-utility calculations. But they need not actually perform them.67 To avoid misunderstandings, we want to point out that our point here has nothing to do with Friedman's famous argument that the truth of assumptions need not matter.68 Friedman maintained that a theory might sometimes work well for certain purposes, even though its assumptions were known to be false. We have our doubts; but whatever its merits, this line of reasoning has no bearing on our argument. Our point is that even if decision makers do not actually calculate, or if they rationalize their actions after the fact with foolish calculations, the assumptions of rational choice theory may yet remain true. Understanding what rational deterrence demands of decision makers is important because it sharply limits what counts against the theory. A proper understanding of the theory eliminates most of the arguments in the historical deterrence literature that are supposed to overturn it. Consider, for example, the fact that many decision makers do not seem to think in terms of probabilities at all. This point is made by Steinbruner with respect to Kennedy's remark that he faced certain impeachment if he did nothing about the Cuban missiles;69 Stein has made it in connection with Anwar Sadat's forecasts of various foreign policy consequences, for Egypt in the early 1970s.70 Both authors maintain that, because each decision maker failed to discuss probabilities in situations where rational deterrence theory implies he should, rational deterrence is inaccurate in describing what happened. Related arguments have been advanced by Jervis and by Betts.7 ' These conclusions do not follow. Let us repeat that rational deterrence theory deals with choices, not mental calculations. It makes no predictions about what decision makers say influenced them, only about what actually did so. The distinction is particularly important in the case of postdecision reconstructions. As diplomatic historians have long been aware, the historical record often differs sharply from decision makers' memories, even memories about their own thoughts at the time.72 Since the critics of deterrence wish to adduce evidence that is not only dubious but apparently irrelevant to the theory under discussion, they bear the burden of proof. They must show that no plausible psychological mechanisms could have introduced a gap between the reality and the reconstruction, and they must demonstrate that what decision makers say influenced them is identical with what actually happened. Neither Stein nor Steinbruner have made such a case. Indeed, several plausible psychological mechanisms would render their evidence irrelevant—mechanisms of the sort that they and others have often put forward as key factors in international decision making. Suppose, then, that decision makers actually behave according to rational-choice theory. Indeed, no matter what he said, it is hard to believe that Kennedy's Cubanmissile decisions were unaffected by the difference between a.possibility of impeachment, a livelihood of impeachment, and a certainty of impeachment. But suppose that, like the rest of us, Kennedy subsequently bolstered his decision by thinking and saying that any other choice would have brought on unpleasant political consequences with certainty. If so, he would speak in the apparently nonrational language that he actually used, but his behavior would be predicted perfectly by rationality assumptions. Obvious competing interpretations like this one have not been excluded by the critics of rational deterrence. It is not easy to do so. Indeed, no matter how detailed the historical records, disagreements break out routinely over interpretations of decision makers' thoughts and intentions.73 The degree of uncertainty in historical interpretations of motive and intention is often substantial, and conclusions deriving from such interpretations must be discounted appropriately. Yet case-study analysts usually provide no assessment of the reliability of their historical judgments. In particular, without a detailed showing that the questionable memories of decision makers represent the historical process accurately, no amount of evidence about their apparent calculation errors is relevant to the issue of whether rational deterrence theory predicts decision making.^ In the absence of such a showing, rational deterrence theory stands unrebutted.75 It is not our central point here to set out one particular list of inferential slips by case-study analysts. After all, one can imagine case studies that select cases in a nonprejudicial fashion, and that take proper account of the fallibility in assessments of decision makers' intentions. Well-designed case-study tests may not be decisive, but they can be highly enlightening and strongly persuasive.?6 They are certainly an indispensable first step before proceeding to statistical methods—a point quantitative researchers have too often ignored at their peril. In principle, case studies are capable of doing everything statistical analysis can do; they may simply replace symbols with words and replicate the random samples, precise definitions, and rigorous inferences of statistical methods. But in practice, inferential rigor is not the best tool for what case studies should accomplish, and the comparative method works best when it enforces no such discipline. As Jack Snyder notes, "The best analysts in the [case study] field have always used a rough-and-ready version of the scientific method," which they have identified, not with the powerful counterintuitive logic of the real McCoy, but rather with the substantially tamer "self-conscious, systematic application of commonsense rules of inference."77 When the purposes of comparative case studies are properly understood, informality is the right choice. Creativity is enhanced when historical cases can be chosen at liberty and analyzed in accord with the investigator's intuitions. The great many degrees of freedom in these studies are inordinately helpful in finding useful variables and producing empirical generalizations. Like all good things, however, this free play for unaided common sense has a price. Used in isolation from scientific methods, it creates inevitable inferential errors and makes decisive theory verification well-nigh impossible. In case studies of rational deterrence, the consequences have been both predictable and devastating for the credibility of their conclusions

## AT: Root Case – War

#### War is caused by leadership succession, democracy necessary to curtail

Chares **Lipson**, 20**13**. Leadership Succession as a Cause of War: The Structural Advantage of Democracies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 112–38, doi:10.1515/9781400850723.112.

The last chapter dealt  with all four  sources of the  democratic contracting advantage: transparency, audience costs, constitutionalism, and continuity of regimes. This chapter continues the examination of regime continuity, focusing on leadership succession. **Succession crises are a frequent source of wars**. **Democracies are systematically better at averting** them and, hence, at averting the **wars** that stem from them. Because democracies have solved the succession problem internally, they avoid its most dangerous consequences externally. My main point, however, is not simply that succession crises produce wars. They obviously do. My aim is to show how they block the path to peace, mainly by creating vast uncertainties and obstructing long-term bargains that could prevent war.

## Perm

#### The aff uses *perfect deterrence theory,* that can enable demilitarization AND strengthening security.

Chong Woo 20 – KIM CHONG WOO, Author and Attorney at Kim & Chang, 2020 (“Implications of Perfect Deterrence Theory for South Korea” *Asan Institute for Policy Studies,* September 1st, Available online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26115.3?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents>, accessed 07/22/22

Perfect Deterrence Theory has been developed as an alternative to classical deterrence theory. We have become interested in the theory as it seems to be aesthetically more appealing than classical deterrence theory. It provides another way of looking at deterrence but, this time, without its internal structure plagued by logical inconsistency. As Frank Zagare & Kilgour, the creators of Perfect Deterrence Theory, explain in their co-authored book ‘Perfect Deterrence,’3 classical deterrence theory suffers from what is known as the paradox of mutual deterrence. Classical deterrence e theory hinges on the fact that the status quo is reinforced as the cost of conflict becomes higher. However, logic dictates that the status quo is not a rational choice when both States (A & B) prefer capitulation to conflict when challenged. The status quo is not a Nash equilibrium7 in the standard 2 x 2 game of Chicken in which there are four outcomes (i.e., A wins, B wins, status quo and conflict). The game of Chicken was a tool favored by classical deterrence theorists as it captured essential aspects of deterrence during the age of nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, as it was then. In this game, conflict is understandably assumed to be the worst choice and, hence, the contradiction ensues. The proponents of classical deterrence theory are yet to provide a satisfactory resolution to this logical inconsistency although various attempts have been made.8 Perfect Deterrence Theory was also developed to overcome the empirical deficiencies of classical deterrence theory. Zagare & Kilgour point out that the ‘power imbalance’ is a poor indicator for measuring the likelihood of war as there have been many instances of war fought between two states with roughly equal power, World War II between Britain and Germany for one. There is little empirical support for associating the power imbalance with the likelihood of war. It is a prerequisite that a good theory must stand up reasonably well to empirical evidence. Overall, Perfect Deterrence Theory’s predictions are more in agreement with empirical findings. Here are some distinguishing features of Perfect Deterrence Theory. As explained, in classical deterrence theory, the cost of conflict plays a ‘central’ role in deterring an adversary. Hence, it makes a perfect sense for a state to stock up on more powerful weapons to deter the adversary. These weapons will unleash more destructive power, thereby significantly raising the cost of conflict which, in turn, reduces the possibility of conflict.9 Any adversary would think twice before challenging to upset the status quo. However, as Zagare & Kilgour point out, this model of deterrence is deficient in the sense that there is no maximum limit on the cost of conflict (i.e., that is, a state should just keep on accumulating stockpiles of ever more destructive weapons as long as it can monetarily afford them). There is no built-in mechanism within the model that provides the maximum limit. Such a limit can be shown to exist inherently in some models of Perfect Deterrence Theory, beyond which further strengthening of deterrence becomes totally redundant (i.e., making a case for minimum deterrence). This is a desirable feature to have in the model of deterrence. The theory also gives due consideration to the importance of maintaining the ‘status quo’ which is somehow neglected in the past. The status quo did not receive much attention, as the focus was heavily on the cost of conflict. The emphasis was on the punishment side. Moreover, States A and B no longer have to be undifferentiated in the theory. If needed, one state can be specifically designated as challenger determined to upset the status quo while the other state, as defender, is determined to keep the status quo. This will better approximate a realworld situation. ‘Capability’ and ‘credibility’ are two critical variables in the analysis of a deterrence situation. In Perfect Deterrence Theory, capability is defined as one’s ability to hurt the other (i.e., adversary) while credibility is defined in terms of one’s willingness to fight rather than capitulate. These variables together with other utility variables (e.g., a utility for A wins, B wins, Status Quo and Conflict) are used to determine rational choices and the conditions under which those choices exist. These conditions usually take the form of mathematical inequalities and many insights are gained through analyzing these inequalities. At some decision points in the game (or tree),10 it may be necessary that States A and B update their belief about the other’s determination to fight rather than capitulate based on conditional probability.11 Zagare & Kilgour provide all mathematical details in the appendix section of their book.3, 12 Their work is firmly founded on logic and, hence, model predictions are the direct consequences of a rational decision-making process. In practice, rational choices are nothing but Nash equilibria. Determining these choices simply amounts to finding Nash equilibria. There can be more than one Nash equilibrium under a given condition, which is perhaps a less desirable feature of the theory as it loses predictability. It is simply not possible to know which course of action will be taken in a situation with multiple Nash equilibria.13 Hence, multiple equilibria may be able to explain the success or failure of a deterrence situation that has occurred in the past. One can only hypothesize which one might have been in play. In the theory, only a Nash equilibrium that fulfills Selten’s ‘Perfectness’ condition (i.e., being subgame-perfect) is thought to be a ‘rational’ choice. This condition is used to eliminate all choices which have at least one incredible (a technical term as explained later) decision made along the decision path. Only subgame-perfect Nash equilibria are of true interest as they are free of irrationalities. Accordingly, Zagare & Kilgour have named their deterrence theory with this game theory term ‘Perfect’ in front. It does not mean ‘Perfect Deterrence’ in the ordinary sense of ‘perfect,’ as such deterrence has never existed and never will. Perfect Deterrence Theory has been specifically chosen to be the basis of our study for these reasons. We sought to draw out valuable implications for South Korea based on Zagare & Kilgour’s findings.3 Basically, what can this deterrence theory tell us about strengthening the security of South Korea and continuing to preserve peace and stability in the face of North Korea’s growing nuclear threat? In the next chapter, basic concepts in Perfect Deterrence Theory are reviewed.

#### Perfect deterrence theory is accurate and robust.

**Quackenbush 10**. Stephen L. Quackenbush is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Missouri. He received his PhD in 2003 from the University at Buffalo, SUNY.Stephen L. Quackenbush (2010) General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory, International Interactions, 36:1, 60-85, DOI: [10.1080/03050620903554069](https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620903554069)

The specific purpose is to fill this evidentiary gap by subjecting perfect deterrence theory—a recently developed theory of general deterrence—to a systematic test. I do so for several reasons. First, perfect deterrence theory (Zagare and Kilgour 2000) is supported by a **formal logic** with explicit theoretical expectations that facilitates empirical testing. Second, several preliminary tests of perfect deterrence theory have rendered promising, albeit provisional results (Senese and Quackenbush 2003; Quackenbush and Zagare 2006).1 And finally, as Huth (1999) points out, standard formulations of deterrence—to the extent that they have been explored empirically—are without compelling support. Perfect deterrence theory is an axiomatically distinct theoretical alternative to classical deterrence theory, which focuses on ideas such as brinkmanship and mutual assured destruction. Perfect deterrence theory highlights the importance of two variables: capability and credibility. A state’s threat is capable if the threatened party believes that it would be worse off if the threat were carried out than if it were not. For example, if Defender has a capable threat, then Challenger prefers Status Quo to Conflict. One additional equilibrium—Steadfast Deterrence Equilibrium—exists. As with the Certain Deterrence Equilibrium, Status Quo is the only possible outcome. However, this equilibrium exists at intermediate and **high values of Defender credibility**, and thus coexists with equilibria of other types. Therefore, through the Steadfast Deterrence Equilibrium, perfect deterrence theory predicts that the Status Quo is always possible as long as Defender’s threat is capable. Thus, Zagare and Kilgour’s (2000:149) claim that successful “deterrence could conceivably emerge under (almost) any conditions in a one-sided deterrence relationship.” hese independent variables constitute the equilibrium outcome predictions of perfect deterrence theory. However, a number of alternative explanations of international behavior exist. Therefore, several control variables, representing the major foci of recent conflict studies, are used to test the robustness of the results obtained. Some of these variables (particularly relative power and S score) are components of the utility functions that form the basis of the equilibrium predictions to be tested. However, it is possible that these variables exert an independent influence on deterrence outcomes in addition to their influence on equilibrium predictions. Furthermore, since these individual components are combined in a different, nonlinear fashion within the unilateral deterrence game to generate equilibrium predictions, multicollinearity between the equilibrium predictions and the control variables is not present.16 To examine the robustness of these results against alternative explanations, the full multinomial logit model was run including the control variables. The full model, shown in Table 3, produces a highly significant fit to the data. The results of the full model indicate that the predictions of perfect deterrence theory are quite robust. Therefore, perfect deterrence theory’s predictions of Status Quo, Defender Concedes, Challenger Defeated, and Conflict are all strongly supported by the empirical record, and these predictions are robust against alternative explanations. Thus, perfect deterrence theory provides a proportional reduction in the error of non-status quo predictions of 20 percent. Although improvement is always possible, these results nonetheless support perfect deterrence theory.

#### The military is necessary for the stability and to deter aggression

White house archives 02. The archived White House website is a useful resource for photographs, speeches, press releases, and other public domain records of presidency. White House Archives. “Maintaining Military Advantage Through Science and Technology Investment.” National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives and Records Administration, 2002, <https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/nssts/html/chapt2.html#:~:text=U.S.%20military%20capabilities%20not%20only,defense%20commitments%20around%20the%20world>.

Our defense science and technology investment enables us to counter military threats and to overcome any advantages that adversaries may seek. It also expands the military options available to policymakers, including options other than warfare in pursuing the objectives of promoting stability and preventing conflict. Science and technology help to counter special threats such as terrorism that cannot be met by conventional warfighting forces, and they underpin the intelligence capabilities necessary to assess the dangers our nation faces. The U.S. military also relies on science and technology to make our advanced military systems more affordable through their entire life cycle. And by maintaining a close dialogue with the warfighters, the defense S&T community not only remains sensitive to user needs but also sensitizes the user to the possibilities that technology offers for responding to evolving threats. U.S. military capabilities not only protect the United States and its citizens from direct threats, they also help maintain peace and stability in regions critical to U.S. interests and underwrite U.S. defense commitments around the world. Maintaining a strong defense capability means that the U.S. Armed Forces, and the Department of Defense more broadly, must be prepared to conduct the following kinds of missions, as described in the President's national security strategy: Deterring and defeating aggression in major regional conflicts. U.S. forces must be capable of offsetting the military power of regional states with interests opposed to those of the United States and its allies. To do this, the United States must be able to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression, in concert with regional allies, by projecting and sustaining U.S. power in two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously. Providing credible overseas presence. Some U.S. forces must be forward deployed or stationed in key overseas regions in peacetime. These deployments contribute to a more stable and secure international environment by demonstrating U.S. commitment, deterring aggression, and underwriting important bilateral and multilateral security relationships. Forward stationing and periodic deployments also permit U.S. forces to gain familiarity with overseas operating environments, promote joint and combined training among friendly forces, improve interoperability with friendly forces throughout the world, and respond in a timely manner to crises. Conducting contingency operations. The United States must be prepared to undertake a wide range of contingency operations in support of U.S. interests. These operations include smaller-scale combat operations, multilateral peace operations, noncombatant evacuations, counterterrorism activities, and humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Countering weapons of mass destruction. While the United States is redoubling its efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated missile delivery systems, we must at the same time improve our military capabilities to deter and prevent the effective use of these weapons. We are pursuing this objective by sustaining adequate retaliatory capabilities and by increasing our capabilities to defend against weapons of mass destruction, to locate and neutralize or destroy them before they are used during a conflict, and to fight in an environment in which such weapons have been used. Finally, to meet all these requirements successfully, U.S. forces must be capable of responding quickly and operating effectively across a wide range of environments. That is, they must be ready to fight. Such high combat readiness demands well qualified and motivated people; adequate amounts of modern, well-maintained equipment; realistic training; strategic mobility; and sufficient support and sustainment capabilities.

## Alt fails

### Empirics

#### Alt fails – US Military isn’t perfect but Obama admin proves demilitarization is impossible

John R. Deni, 10-30-2015, "Obama’s Failure to Demilitarize U.S. Foreign Policy," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2015/10/obamas-failure-to-demilitarize-u-s-foreign-policy/Dr. John R. Deni is a Research Professor of Security Studies at the Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute.//CDMoney

The Obama administration has received much attention for its policy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. The rebalance has been described as President Obama’s signature foreign policy initiative. Launched in 2009, it has received much attention from academics, practitioners, think tanks, and the media. In reality, the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has been more evolutionary than revolutionary; a U.S. shift in focus and grand strategy began well before President Obama’s inauguration in January 2009. If the Obama presidency in fact initiated a revolutionary rebalancing, it was his effort to rebalance American foreign policy generally from over-reliance on the military and toward greater reliance on diplomacy and development. Despite a concerted effort, when viewed through several lenses it seems clear that demilitarization has failed and U.S. foreign policy remains very, perhaps overly, militarized. As a result, the Pentagon can expect to be handed messy military operations short of inter-state war that it may not be prepared, equipped, or organized to handle efficiently or effectively. In the 2008 presidential campaign, candidate Barack Obama pledged to correct what he perceived as a fundamental imbalance between the three-legged stool that comprises U.S. foreign policy ­— defense, diplomacy, and development — through such measures as expanding the State Department’s Foreign Service. Once in office, the Obama administration expressed its intent to rebalance away from defense and toward diplomacy and development though a variety of strategies as well as policy statements. Most recently, the 2015 National Security Strategy explicitly notes that military force is not the sole means of achieving U.S. national security objectives, arguing, “our first line of action is principled and clear-eyed diplomacy, combined with the central role of development in the forward defense and promotion of America’s interests.” In addition to published strategies and policy pronouncements, the Obama administration repeatedly emphasized diplomacy and development in policy implementation over, or instead of, large-scale military measures. Across a number of issues, the administration has sought to rely less on overwhelming American military power to accomplish foreign policy objectives. A short list of examples could include maintaining drawdown timelines in Iraq and (with some modification) in Afghanistan, “leading from behind” in Libya, nuclear negotiations with Iran, and relying on sanctions to pressure Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine. Relying on diplomatic, political, and development-based solutions typically takes time to bear fruit. In contrast, wielding military force often yields results more quickly, even if the apparent success is illusory in the long run. Critics of the Obama approach conflate the emphasis on diplomacy with indecision, and hence weakness. However, the tragedy of President Obama’s rebalance toward diplomacy and development is not that it represents an America in retreat, but rather that the rebalance has not succeeded in demilitarizing U.S. foreign policy, as seen in three separate contexts. First, available fiscal data show the continuing dominance of defense spending relative to international affairs spending. Even under sequestration scenarios, that budget will continue to dwarf the amount of money spent on diplomacy and development. Second, despite congressional concerns about the risks of granting the Department of Defense increased authority in security cooperation, Congress continues to do just that. The Department of Defense continues to expand its activities into areas over which the State Department previously had purview. Finally, based on several examples over the last two decades or more, many experts, practitioners, and observers have concluded that the civilian instruments of American foreign policy simply lack the capacity and capability to handle the complex, large-scale challenges facing U.S. national security. In particular, the challenge of failed or failing states has laid bare Washington’s inability to implement so-called “whole of government” solutions. As a result, the Department of Defense continues to be the problem-solving agency of choice for legislators as well as those in the executive branch. The implications of a continued militarization of American foreign policy are significant, most consequentially for the U.S. military. Despite political intent and rhetoric, the Department of Defense is very likely to be relied upon again and again to achieve national security objectives, both within and outside its particular areas of competence. As such, it should take some preparatory steps. First, the military services should make a more holistic, institutional commitment to embrace security cooperation as a core mission. There is some evidence that this is underway, but there is much room for improvement, especially in terms of doctrine, acquisition, and personnel policies. Second, the military needs to improve its ability to assess whether and where security cooperation tools are likely to be successful. All too often, the U.S. military becomes a captive of its “can-do” attitude, despite what seem like obvious and insurmountable challenges in hindsight. Finally, if the best military advice is ignored by senior policymakers on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, the Department of Defense needs to recognize and prepare for “muddling through” missions it may only have a small chance of achieving. Hence, the U.S. military must prepare for a future not terribly unlike the very recent past, characterized by messy stability operations, hybrid warfare, and disorder short of major interstate war.

### Russia

#### Alt is a romanticized pipe dream of demilitarization – Ukraine proves Russia will take advantage

**Broad, 22** (William J. Broad, 2-5-2022, accessed on 7-20-2022, The New York Times, "Ukraine Gave Up Nuclear Weapons 30 Years Ago. Today There Are Regrets.", https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/05/science/ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html)

At the end of the Cold War, the **third largest nuclear power on earth was** not Britain, France or China. It was **Ukraine**. The Soviet collapse, a slow-motion downfall that culminated in December 1991, resulted in the newly independent Ukraine inheriting roughly 5,000 nuclear arms that Moscow had stationed on its soil. Underground silos on its military bases held long-range missiles that carried up to 10 thermonuclear warheads, each far stronger than the bomb that leveled Hiroshima. Only Russia and the United States had more weapons. **The removal of this arsenal often gets hailed as a triumph of arms control.** Diplomats and peace activists cast Ukraine as a model citizen in a world of would-be nuclear powers. But **history shows** the **denuclearization to have been a chaotic upheaval that shook with infighting, reversals and discord among the country’s government and military.** At the time, both Ukrainian and American experts questioned the wisdom of atomic disarmament. The **deadly weapons**, some argued, **were the only reliable means of deterring Russian aggression**. Today Ukraine has no easy path to producing or acquiring the materials to build a bomb. Even so, the nuclear genie is once again stirring as Russian troops encircle the nation and wage a shadow war in its easternmost provinces. “**We gave away the capability for nothing**,” said Andriy Zahorodniuk, a former defense minister of Ukraine. Referring to the security assurances Ukraine won in exchange for its nuclear arms, he added: “Now, every time somebody offers us to sign a strip of paper, the response is, ‘Thank you very much. We already had one of those some time ago.’” Western analysts say the current Ukrainian mood tends to romanticize the atomic past. “The gist is, ‘We had the weapons, gave them up and now look what’s happening,’” said Mariana Budjeryn, a Ukraine specialist at Harvard University. “On a policy level, I see no movement toward any kind of reconsideration. But on a popular level, that’s the narrative.” “Regret is part of it,” Dr. Budjeryn, a Ukrainian native, added in an interview. “The other part is whatever one feels as a result of being subjected to injustice.” At first, Ukraine rushed to get the Soviet arms off its soil. Bombs, artillery shells, land mines and the relatively small warheads atop short-range missiles were the easiest to relocate and most likely to fall into unfriendly hands. More difficult to move were the long-range missiles, which could weigh 100 tons and rise to a height of nearly 90 feet. In January 1992, a month after the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Ukraine’s president and defense minister ordered military commanders and their men to pledge loyalty to the new country — a move that would exert administrative control over the remaining arms. Many refused, and the soldiers who managed Ukraine’s nuclear forces fell into a period of tense bewilderment over the fate of the arsenal and its operational status. **Volodymyr Tolubko**, a former nuclear-base commander who had been elected to the Ukrainian Parliament, **argued that** Kyiv should never give up its atomic edge. In April 1992, he told the assembly that **it was “romantic and premature” for Ukraine to declare itself a nonnuclear state** and insisted that it should retain at least some of its long-range warheads. **A residual missile force, he declared, would be enough to “deter any aggressor.”** While his stance never gained wide support, “it compounded existing tensions,” according to a detailed history of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament. In the summer of 1993, John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent international relations theorist at the University of Chicago who was no stranger to controversy, lent his voice to the issue of atomic retention. He argued in Foreign Affairs that a nuclear arsenal was “imperative” if Ukraine was “to maintain peace.” The deterrent, he added, would ensure that the Russians, “who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it.” In Kyiv, the government in 1993 went so far as to consider seizing operational control of its nuclear missiles and bombers. But that never came to pass. Instead, Ukraine punted. It demanded that, in exchange for nuclear disarmament, it would need ironclad security guarantees. That was the heart of the agreement signed in Moscow early in 1994 by Russia, Ukraine and the United States. In late 1994, the pledges got fleshed out. The accord, known as **the Budapest Memorandum, signed by Russia, Ukraine, Britain and the United States, promised that none of the nations would use force or threats against Ukraine and all would respect its sovereignty and existing borders. The agreement also vowed that, if aggression took place, the signatories would seek immediate action from the United Nations Security Council to aid Ukraine**. While Kyiv had failed to get what it wanted — the kind of legally binding guarantees that would come with a formal treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate — it received assurances that Washington would take its political commitments as seriously as its legal obligations, according to Dr. Budjeryn, a research analyst at the Managing the Atom project at Harvard’s Kennedy School. In May 1996, Ukraine saw the last of its nuclear arms transported back to Russia. The repatriations had taken a half decade. What undid the diplomatic feat was the “collective failure” of Washington and Kyiv to take into account the rise of someone like Vladimir V. Putin, Steven Pifer, a negotiator of the Budapest Memorandum and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine now at Stanford University, said in an interview. After Russian troops invaded Crimea in early 2014 and stepped up a proxy war in eastern Ukraine, Mr. Putin dismissed the Budapest accord as null and void. “They’ve been fighting a low-grade war for eight years,” Mr. Pifer, who just returned from Kyiv, said of the Ukrainians. “You can’t find bullets in the stores. A lot of civilians are arming up.” In Ukraine, the Crimean invasion and the lengthy war led to a series of calls for atomic rearmament, according to Dr. Budjeryn, author of “Inheriting the Bomb,” a forthcoming book from Johns Hopkins University Press. In March 2014, **Volodymyr Ohryzko**, a former foreign minister, **argued that Ukraine now had the moral and legal right to reestablish its nuclear status**. In July, an ultranationalist parliamentary bloc introduced a bill for arsenal reacquisition. Later that year, a poll showed that **public approval stood at** nearly **50 percent for nuclear rearmament**. Last year, Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, Andriy Melnyk, said **Kyiv might look to nuclear arms if it cannot become a member of NATO. “How else can we guarantee our defense?”** Mr. Melnyk asked.

### T/ – Demil esc

#### Demilitarization decks deterrence theory, which guarantees escalation

**Mazarr 20** (Michael Mazarr, Senior Political Scientist and Researcher at RAND Corporation, 12-3-2020, accessed on 7-20-2022, NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice, "Three Fundamental Conditions for Successful Deterrence", )

Much of **classic deterrence theory can be boiled down to a simple proposition: The potential aggressor must believe that the defender has the capability and will to do what it threatens**.36 This criterion is, again, perceptual: The question is not whether the defender actually has such capabilities or will, it is whether the aggressor believes that it does. **Deterrence depends on the perception of the “threatener’s determination to fulfil the threat if need be”—and, more importantly, on the potential aggressor’s “conviction that the threat will be carried out”**. 37 **Deterrence fails, Bruce Russett concludes, “when the attacker decides that the defender’s threat is not likely to be fulfilled.**” 38 This axiom highlights two distinct factors—capability and will. Perceived weakness in either can undermine deterrence. Capability is straightforward enough. As suggested earlier, the immediate, local balance of forces is not always a key determinant of deterrence success—but **a defender’s broadly perceived suite of capabilities, military and otherwise, must be strong enough to convince a potential attacker that it is likely to pay a heavy price for aggression.** Will is a much more abstract variable and easily subject to misperception. Aggressors have repeatedly convinced themselves that a defender did not have the will to respond, especially in cases of extended deterrence. Will is partly a function of the national interests involved: If a defender is seen to have vital interests at stake, a potential attacker will believe threats of response. **Aggressors can try to undermine a defender’s willingness to respond by using “salami slicing” approaches—using a long series of low-level aggressions to change the facts on the ground** without ever taking action that would justify a major response. Such strategies are designed to put the defender in a dilemma: It cannot respond to every small violation, but if it does not begin to punish minor transgressions, its strategic position will erode over time. The United States confronts this challenge with Chinese and Russian grey-zone campaigns today.

#### NATO is key to global peace – demilitarization would cause China & Russia escalation

**Binnendijk, 19** (Hans Binnendijk, 3-19-2019, accessed on 7-20-2022, Defense News, "5 consequences of a life without NATO", https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/19/5-consequences-of-a-life-without-nato/)

**The most catastrophic impact of NATO’s retirement would be** the risk of **Russian aggression and miscalculation.** **Without a clear commitment to defend allied territory backed up by an American nuclear deterrent, President Vladimir Putin will** certainly **see opportunities to seize land** he believes is Russian. He has already done this in Georgia and Ukraine. Had they not joined NATO, the Baltic states would probably already be occupied by Russian troops. Certainly Putin would also see an opportunity to seize more of Ukraine without the “shadow” of NATO to protect it. History teaches us that **major wars start** **when aggressive leaders miscalculate**. German leader Adolf **Hitler attacked Poland in 1939, believing** that after then-British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s Munich Agreement**, England would be unlikely to respond. North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950 after the United States appeared to remove Seoul from its defensive perimeter**. Iraqi leader **Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, believing the United States** had signaled that it **would not respond**. In each case, miscalculation led to larger conflict. Secondly, NATO’s retirement would also decrease American military reach, its political influence and its economic advantage. American bases throughout Europe not only provide for the defense of Europe — they bring the U.S. a continent closer to trouble spots that threaten vital American interests. Fighting the Islamic State group, clearly an American interest, would have been markedly more difficult without permanent U.S. bases in Europe and without the American-built coalition that included every NATO nation. Without NATO, the mutual security interests that underpin both U.S. bases and coalition operations would be undermined. This extends to the economic realm. U.S. annual trade in goods and services with Europe exceeds $1 trillion, and U.S. total direct investment in Europe nears $3 trillion. These economic ties enhance U.S. prosperity and provide American jobs, but they require the degree of security now provided by NATO to endure. NATO’s retirement would thirdly exacerbate divisions within Europe. NATO’s glue not only holds European militaries together — it provides the principal forum to discuss and coordinate security issues. The European Union is unlikely to substitute for NATO in this respect because it has no military structure, few capabilities and no superpower leadership to bring divergent views together. Germany and France already seek a plan B should NATO collapse, but without the United Kingdom in the European Union, an all-European approach is likely to fail. The **added insecurity of NATO’s collapse would** also **amplify** current **populist movements in Europe.** The **consequence could be renationalization of European militaries**, a system **that brought conflict to the 19th and early 20th centuries**. The fourth consequences of life without NATO would be global. American bilateral alliances in Asia would each be shaken to their core should NATO fail. America’s defense commitments there would become worthless. With China determined to claim a dominant position in Asia, the collapse of NATO would cause America’s Asian partners to seek accommodation with China, much as the Philippines is in the process of doing. Trump’s decision to abandon the economic Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement has already given China new advantages in the region. **Without credible American security commitments, there would be little to stop China from controlling the South China Sea and** probably **occupying Taiwan as well**. Add to this equation the new footholds that China is building in central Asia, Africa and Europe: Abandoning NATO would help assure China’s competitive success. The **final impact of NATO’s retirement would be the** near **collapse of** what has been called the “**liberal international order.”** This order consists of **treaties, alliances, agreements, institutions and modes of behavior** mostly created by the United States in an effort **to safeguard democracies. This order has kept relative peace in the trans-Atlantic space for seven decades**. The Trump administration has begun to unravel elements of this order in the naive notion that they undercut American sovereignty. The entire European project is built on the edifice of this order. NATO is its principal keystone. Collapsing this edifice would undercut the multiple structures that have brought seven decades of peace and prosperity. S

## **Nuclear Deterrence Good**

#### **Effective Nuclear deterrence reduces the risk for both Nuclear and Conventional conflict between Nuclear Powers.**

Bertolin 13 Giorgio Bertolin has a post-graduate diploma in economics from the university of Bristol and is the head of ClimatePartnerItalia To What Extent is Nuclear Deterrence Important in the Post-Cold War World? https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/04/to-what-extent-is-nuclear-deterrence-important-in-the-post-cold-war-world/

The eventuality of a nuclear attack has always represented one of the most dangerous threats to the safety **of a country, inasmuch the precision and lethality of nuclear devices permit an adversary to cripple in an extremely short period of time** **the command, control and communication (C3) structure of the attacked state, in what is called a “decapitation strike”** (Walton, 2010: 215). **The only effective deterrent for such an attack remains the threat of another nuclear strike, in what is called a “second-strike capability”.** Anyway, today’s nuclear threats are extremely different from the ones that lead to the establishment of the classic balance of terror during the Cold War. In a 2008 report, the US Secretary of Defense indicates as the current most urgent causes for concern terrorism and nuclear proliferation (US Secretary of Defense, 2008: 9). The two phenomena are closely linked, since the two most likely scenarios of terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons – acquisition of HEU (highly enriched uranium) with or without the assistance of a government and theft or transfer of a completed weapon – require the existence of a nuclear arsenal in a sympathising or unreliable country (Gallucci, 2006: 53). As previously said, the main strategy developed to deal with the threat of a nuclear attack conducted by a non-state actor is expanded deterrence; anyhow, this measure must be implemented by steps to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation, that is, the growth in the number of actors armed with nuclear weapons. In fact, the enlargement of the nuclear club has increased the likelihood of a nuclear strike taking place: since a single weapon is sufficient to conduct such an attack, it can be deduced that, while vertical proliferation (the growth in the number of warheads within a country) does not make the eventuality of such an attack more likely, horizontal proliferation does. Nuclear deterrence has traditionally been associated with the neorealist view that a world with more nuclear actors, and ideally a world composed only by nuclear actors, is the prerequisite to a lasting peace founded on the fear of nuclear war (Berkowitz, 1985: 115). However, this model does not consider the current relevance of non-state actors and so-called rogue states and their asymmetrical relationship with the traditional players. One of the most serious challenges to nuclear deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age is, in fact, represented by the issue of its applicability to actors with a different behaviour than the Cold War-era US and USSR (Walton, 2010: 214). These new actors may not conform to a model of rational behaviour, the latter being a fundamental prerequisite for deterrence to work. Hence, the major contemporary challenge for nuclear deterrence is to find ways to adapt itself to actors that may be non-rational: this means forcing them to assume a rational behaviour. The reduction of the “nuclear threshold” referred to in the US Nuclear Posture Review can be read in the light of these facts not as an introduction of flexible response strategies in nuclear policy, but as an action consistent with the need for improved deterrence schemes. Being credibility far more influential than capability as a variable that decides the effectiveness of a nuclear deterrent (Lowther, 2009: 32), the aggressive policy of nuclear pre-emption which is discussed in the above said document and in the US National Military Strategy to combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006: 18) can be seen as a way to make the prospect of nuclear attack more real in the minds of the potential enemies of the US. Since the nuclear taboo does not apply to terrorist organisations or rogue states ruled by irrational leaders, the only way to counter them is acting as if its validity was lost also for the traditional actors (in this case, the US). The matter is different with regard to the relationships within the circle of the established nuclear powers. In this case, nuclear deterrence is based on the schemes of the Cold War, as the policies of Russia and the US show. In fact, the current expenditure for nuclear weapons, despite significant cuts, is still extremely high, as previously mentioned. China has a considerably inferior arsenal compared to that of the two former superpowers, sufficient only to assure a policy of “minimal deterrence” (Lieber and Press, 2006: 8). The concept of minimal nuclear deterrence could be the most suitable to today’s security issues regarding the relations among declared nuclear armed states, and there are sectors of the public opinion lobbying for an even greater reduction in the nuclear stockpiles of the US: among the others, this position is supported by the Federation of the American Scientists (Kristensen et al., 2009: 21). Anyway, at the moment the official strategy of the US is oriented differently, and the same can be said for Russia. While at the beginning of the First Nuclear Age the US relied on nuclear weapons to counterbalance Soviet conventional forces, today the situation has reversed, and Russia keeps an apparently anachronistic large storage of nuclear weapons to cope with the drastic reductions which took place after the Cold War in its non-nuclear offensive capabilities. NATO has stated in its Deterrence and Defence Posture Review that the current amount of its strategic nuclear weapons is dependent on the reciprocal level of these weapons on the Russian soil, so it is very unlikely that there will be drastic reductions, similar to those that occurred at the end of the Cold War, by the US and its allies in the foreseeable future. **Nuclear Deterrence of Non-nuclear Attack** The role of nuclear deterrence in averting the threat of a conventional attack is currently proving to be alive especially with regard to non-traditional nuclear actors, that is, non-declared nuclear powers, states outside the NPT and states that have violated the terms of the NPT. Countries in this category have not been attacked militarily in recent times, and there is some evidence that their nuclear capabilities could have played a major role in defending them. It is the case of North Korea, a part of Bush’s “axis of evil”: her policy towards the development of WMD programs was far more aggressive than that of Iraq (on her current and past programs: NTI, 2012), but she has not suffered any attack by the US nor by any of their local allies. It can be argued that it was her very progress in the development of WMDs, and especially of nuclear weapons, that permitted her to avoid an external aggression. Given the sensitivity of the American public opinion toward the number of casualties during recent conflicts, it is easy to understand that a retaliatory strike conducted by an actor facing foreign invasion is considered as an unacceptable condition by the US. On the other side, the threat of a nuclear attack should be questioned the survival of the state apparatus must be considered seriously: in fact, the price to pay to break the nuclear taboo is high, but certainly lower than that of regime capitulation: so, these actors gain in credibility what they lack in capability. **Nuclear deterrence has a role also in averting conventional attacks in a regional context. The conflict between India and Pakistan exemplifies this point: in fact, despite the existence of sources of tension between the two countries, t**hese actors have not engaged in major open hostilities since their development of a nuclear arsenal. **The fear of nuclear escalation may be the explanation for the restraint of these governments in an area like Kashmir**, where since the acquisition of nuclear weapons both sides have only supported a low-intensity conflict (Joeck, 1997: 36). In any case, nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear attack seems inconsistent with regard to the traditional nuclear actors. In fact, these have continued to experience major conventional conflicts (it is, for example, the case of Russia with Georgia). It is possible that the threat of a nuclear retaliation lacks credibility when only the aggressor is armed with nuclear weapons – as the behaviour of many nuclear powers in time of war may lead to think – but this would be hardly true in the case of a WMD attack. In this respect, the biggest innovations are those developed by the US within its strategy to combat global terrorism. The same policy of expanded deterrence which has been discussed above is applied also to non-nuclear threats, in particular with regard to the scenario of a terrorist use of WMDs (Huntley, 2006: 49-50). In the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington has confirmed its willingness to pursue a policy aimed at “dissuading, deterring and defeating those who seek to harm the US directly […] especially extremist enemies with weapons of mass destruction” (US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006: 9). Nuclear deterrence is the most likely way to counter terrorism to be used in the future, since pre-emptive war lacks popular support and has been recognised to be an excessively expensive strategy. As Trager and Zagorcheva argue, nuclear deterrence may prove to be an effective method to counter the threat posed by non-state actors, as long as terrorists’ political aims will be influenceable by states (2005/2006: 88). **Conclusion** **Nuclear deterrence is still relevant in dealing with contemporary security issues.** Although different strategies concerning the use of nuclear weapons have been proposed in recent times, their application would be extremely controversial, and for this reason is very unlikely. Nuclear deterrence is still an important part of the official strategy of the US to fight traditional threats, and has been adapted to meet also today’s new security concerns. The other nuclear armed states, the traditional as well as the non-traditional ones, have shown their willingness to maintain the nuclear taboo, pursuing in most cases a minimal deterrence policy. **The threat of a nuclear strike can deter both nuclear and non-nuclear attacks**, the contemporary security scenario requires an evolution of deterrence rather than a discharge of the concept as a whole. In fact, nuclear weapons are still among the most powerful and intimidating weapons with which states can arm themselves, and the stability of a system based on deterrence still remains attractive, although since the end of the Cold War maintaining this system has become far more complicated. However, nuclear deterrence alone cannot be the answer to every security issue in the contemporary world, and its application needs to be strengthened by other strategies. The main role it held during the First Nuclear Age is lost, but its relevance, although resized, is not.